I haven’t written much about the six-party talks as of late, but will something related up later. Meantime, this is the relevant part of the Press Communiqué from the most recent 6pt meeting, which ended today.

Essentially the parties agreed to fulfill their commitments under the February “agreement”:http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2007/20070212_NKJointStatement.asp and September 2005 “Joint Statement.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/country/northkorea/20050921_JointStatement.asp They also agreed to take steps to implement them:

1. *Before the end of August, the Working Groups* for Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Normalization of DPRK-US relations, Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations, Economy and Energy Cooperation and Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism *will convene their respective meetings to discuss plans for the implementation of the general consensus.*

2. *In early September, the Parties will hold the Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing* to hear reports of all Working Groups and work out the roadmap for the implementation of the general consensus.

3. *Following the Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks, the Parties will hold a ministerial meeting in Beijing as soon as possible* to confirm and promote the implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement, the February 13 agreement and the general consensus, and explore ways and means to enhance security cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Full text is “here.”:http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t342668.htm

From KCNA:

The U.S. cites the life of the existing nuclear forces and their low technical efficiency as a main reason for developing the RRW. This is, however, nothing but a deceptive artifice to cover up its black-hearted intention. *The U.S. pretext to modernize nuclear weapons is too clumsy to convince people, taking into consideration the fact that the existing U.S. nuclear forces are confirmed to last more than a hundred years.*

*The U.S. loud-mouthed development of the RRW and the like are aimed at ensuring decisive upper hand in terms of strategic nuclear forces and thus prevailing over its major rivals and establishing an unchallenged domination over the world with nukes.* The world disturbance caused by the nuclear issue is attributable to the U.S. unreasonable policy of double standards.

Sorry for the light posting as of late…I have been on holiday with limited internet access.

Anyway, I thought I’d follow up on “this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1468/ceip-conference-hibbs-conversation in which I discussed, among other topics, Mark Hibbs’ 2002 take on the Norks’ HEU program.

While doing research for “this _ACT_ article”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/NewsAnalysis.asp about the program, I came across this material in my files and thought I’d share it here. It’s all from fall 2002 and discusses the ROK’s take on Pyongyang’s HEU efforts. [I also referenced the _ACT_ piece in “this post.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1408/north-korean-heu-bad-decisions ]

p=. *N Korea/Khan Network Coop*

All three reports provide various details about what the US and ROK knew and when they knew it. For example, Yonhap reported 25 October 2002 that, at a “parliamentary briefing,” NIS Director Shin Kuhn said that *“the IS began to track” North Korea’s HEU program in “the early part of” 1999 when the ROK learned that “three North Koreans had been dispatched” to KRL.*

Shin also said that South Korean and US intelligence agencies “succeeded in *preventing North Korea from securing certain metallic alloys* needed for building centrifugal separators.”

In the same vein, ROK MoD spokesperson Hwang Eui-Don told reporters that Seoul informed Washington of *“crucial military intelligence in 1999”* regarding the HEU program, AFP reported 21 October 2002. According to Hwang, the ROK “obtained information in 1999 that North Korea was *trying to import production facilities”* for HEU.

Similarly, Yonhap reported three days earlier that, according to an unnamed “diplomatic source,” the *US started investigating the program in 1998.* The report added that Washington “know[s] *the North is receiving assistance from Russia, China, and Pakistan for the uranium-based nuclear program and that a Pakistani Nobel Prize laureate with expertise on nuclear development entered the North.”*

p=. *So What Did Seoul Think About All This?*

Well, according to the same Yonhap report, an unnamed South Korean lawmaker said that Yim Tong-won, special adviser to then-president Kim Dae-Jung, said that, “according to our government’s assessments,” the program *“is at an elementary stage.”* Moreover, he said that *the belief that North Korea admitted “to having such a program” in order to “stimulate negotiations with the United States is gaining more weight.”*

Incidentally, Washington notified Seoul about its intelligence on the HEU program in August 2002, Yim said.