That ongoing effort is being “broadcast on CSPAN2.”:http://c-span.org/watch/index.asp?Cat=TV&Code=CS3&ShowVidDays=30&ShowVidDesc=&ArchiveDays=30
Will someone please point out that India’s population size, type of government, and economic growth don’t mean that it gets to have nuclear weapons?
Anyway, ACA sponsored a related event on Tuesday. “Check out the transcript”:http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20061114_India_Transcript.asp for more details.
I would point out that Zia Mian discussed “this report”:http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmresearchreport01.pdf which, I think, pretty much demolishes “this one”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18443&prog=zgp&proj=zsa by Ashley Tellis.
Bottom line: India doesn’t have enough uranium for both its nuclear weapons and nuclear power programs. That is why the agreement aids Indiaâ€™s nuclear program.
If you don’t believe me, check out this line from a “previous Tellis report”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_India_strategy_2006.FINAL.pdf:
The energy dialogue represents the best means of reaching a U.S. – Indian modus vivendi on civilian nuclear power. Given its huge energy requirements, the growing pressures to avoid burning dirty coal in order to protect the environment, and the need to reduce carbon emissions that exacerbate global warming, New Delhi has little alternative but to rely increasingly on nuclear power. Unfortunately for India, two major challenges threaten this objective.
One of which is “India has the misfortune to have been poorly endowed with natural uranium.”
While the difficulties of mastering the thorium- based fuel cycle will preoccupy India for many years to come, New Delhi is confronted by more pressing threats. The critical problem facing India right now is the severe shortage of natural uranium, which, if unresolved, could bring the operation of many stage 1 PHWRs to a gradual halt. Not only would this worsen Indiaâ€™s electricity production problemsâ€”with all the consequent implications for economic growthâ€”but it would also decisively undermine the three-stage program on which the Department of Atomic Energy has staked the nationâ€™s energy independence for the secular future.
Interestingly, check out his description of a series of considerably less-ambitious steps (relative to the nuclear deal) that would aid India’s nuclear program:
If the administration were to settle for even such conservative reforms as these, it would not only send an important signal to India about larger American intentions but would materially contribute to preserving the future balance of power in Asiaâ€”a prospect that motivated former U.S. ambassador to India Robert D. Blackwill to ask recently, â€œWhy should the U.S. want to check Indiaâ€™s missile capability in ways that could lead to Chinaâ€™s permanent nuclear dominance over democratic India?â€23 Even if the United States cannot actively aid India in developing its strategic capabilities, it ought to *pursue policies having exactly that effect.* Currently, the easiest way for the administration to do this is simply to leave New Delhiâ€”and its international partnersâ€”alone.
“Here’s an article”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061117/ap_on_go_co/us_india_nuclear_6 about the final vote.