Monthly Archives: February 2012

More on UN NonPro Sanctions

Thinking about “this post,”: I realized that I should have mentioned “UNSCR 1874”: and its predecessor. Although the NK nuclear situation is obviously unresolved, it’s still too soon to make the sort of judgements about UNSCR 1874 that we can reasonably make about UNSCRs 1172 and 1441.

Super-Inspector Videos

“These”: fail as satire because the basic premise is nonsensical. The IAEA does not claim to possess anything like “super-inspectors;” in fact, Agency officials are generally careful to point out the IAEA’s limitations. So, although the vids raise some legitimate points, they’re lampooning something that doesn’t really exist.

I do like the medium as a communications tool, though.

Reuters on Iran Shipping and Sanctions

Reuters has a “report”: about sanctions on Iran’s shipping company IRISL.

Says Reuters:

bq.. …many in the West hold up IRISL as exhibit A for Iran’s ability to evade sanctions because the shipping line regularly reflags its ships and changes their official owners.

An analysis of shipping data sheds new light on that deception.

p. The report claims that

bq. The data shows that in the 48 months before U.S. sanctions began in September 2008, IRISL made 345 changes to its fleet including names, the flags ships sailed under, operators, managers and registered owners. In the 40 months since sanctions began there have been at least 878 changes, including 157 name changes, 94 changes of flag, 122 changes of operator, and 127 changes of registered ownership.

p. In other news, I had no idea that Singapore had a High Court Sheriff. You can discover that and more if you read the rest of the report.


Late to the party on this, I’m sure, but “NUKEMAP”: by Alex Wellerstein is really awesome. It allows one to detonate nuclear weapons of various yields over the locations of your choice. It is truly great.

I chose to detonate a 20 kt bomb over Boston, MA (I figure I can drop a U.S. nuke on my hometown w/o causing a stir). The link is “here”:

There will be little to no blogging while I’m out of town for the next week or so, but you now have this toy with which to play.

P Jenkins Interview

IR Diplomacy has “an interview”: with Peter Jenkins, who was UK Permanent Representative in Vienna from 2001 to 2006.

Without getting into his policy recommendations, he makes an interesting argument:

bq.. IRD: In June 2005, Bruno Pellaud, former IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards, said that if Iran had a military program, it would not have accepted the Additional Protocol. Is this a sound analysis?

PJ: Essentially, yes. *Iran would have been taking a big risk in December 2003, when it provisionally applied the Additional Protocol, if it had possessed nuclear material or facilities that it had no intention of declaring to the IAEA,* since the Additional Protocols grants the IAEA intrusive inspection rights.

p. Given that Iran apparently shelved its nuclear weapons program in late 2003 and Tehran agreed in October 2003 to accept the Additional Protocol, it might be more accurate to say that Iran decided to halt the program _because_ Tehran was going to be implementing the AP. But Jenkins makes an interesting point, nevertheless.

Timeline for Fordow Breakout

Well, sort of. I was looking for information on another subject in the “September 2009”: talking points/Q&A about the Fordow enrichment facility, when I noticed a (forgotten, at least to me) estimate of the amount of time Iran would need to produce an SQ of weapons-grade HEU at that facility.

In response to “How many weapons can [the facility] make?,” the portion called “IC-DRAFTED Q/As” states that

bq. The answer depend on the type and performance of the centrifuges installed at the facility, but we asses it would be capable of producing *approximately one weapons worth of highly enriched uranium per year,* if they chose to do so.

Based on the rest of the document, I think this estimate assumes 3,000 centrifuges, probably IR-1s. It also appears to assume unenriched or ~5% UF6 feedstock (since Iran hadn’t yet begun producing ~19.75% UF6), though I don’t know that for a fact.

So there you go.

NonPro Sanctions: Just Saying

The recent history of UNSC-imposed sanctions to end nuclear weapons programs is, well, um….just read.

“UNSCR 1441:”: Iraq mostly complied and was increasing its compliance when the US-led invasion happened in early-2003. And Iraq had no WMD.

“UNSCR 1172:”: It’s pretty hard to say that either India or Pakistan has complied. Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally and the United States has obviously been improving its relations with India (as have a lot of other governments).

Yes, that’s condensing some complex history, but I think you get the point about compliance/response.

This Blog on Twitter, II

Since very few people wanna follow the twitter feed I set up for this blog, I will discontinue it soon. However, I have now opened “my regular Twitter feed”:!/Pkerr2006 so anyone can follow it. I’ll cross-post blog posts there.

Czech Intel Reports

The Czech Republic’s “Security Information Service”: (their counter-intel agency) publishes “English-language reports,”: some of which contain some non-pro info.

They also contain some other items of interest. For example, the “2006 edition”: has a tale about some individuals who aspired to be Iranian soldiers. According to the report, the Service

bq. registered attempts of some individuals to revitalize the
neo-Nazi environment. The most visible manifestation of such efforts was an application for permission to serve in the Iranian army sent in mid-August 2006 by 41 Czech right-wing extremists to the Office of Czech President.

I do wonder how the Iranians would have responded.

Life, Art, Imitation, Etc.

bq. Iranian officials said Wednesday they were increasingly concerned about the United States of America’s uranium-enrichment program, fearing the Western nation may soon be capable of producing its 8,500th nuclear weapon. “Our intelligence estimates indicate that, if it is allowed to progress with its aggressive nuclear program, the United States may soon possess its 8,500th atomic weapon capable of reaching Iran,” said Iranian foreign minister Ali Akbar Salehi, adding that Americans have the fuel, the facilities, and “everything they need” to manufacture even more weapons-grade fissile material. “Obviously, the prospect of this happening is very distressing to Iran and all countries like Iran. After all, the United States is a volatile nation that’s proven it needs little provocation to attack anyone anywhere in the world whom it perceives to be a threat.”

“Where else”:,27325/? And, yeah, I’m back.