Monthly Archives: March 2007

North Korea Hearts the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

I am busy, but this is pretty good.

From the “_Chosun Ilbo_:”:

bq. When North Korea’s chief nuclear negotiator Kim Kye-gwan met his U.S. counterpart Christopher Hill in New York on March 5, a source familiar with U.S.-North Korean relations says, Kim asked Hill to “treat us the way you treat India.”


*Update:* Big ups to the “Robot Economist.”:

Libya CW

Jeffrey has a great “post”: up about Libya’s once-suspected CW facility at Tarhuna.

I would add that the “report”: from the _Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction_ contains a “chapter”: about US intel on Libya’s NBC weapons. The report doesn’t mention Tarhuna specifically, but some of its findings are interesting – particularly in light of the issues Jeffrey highlighted.

For example, the report says that

bq. The Intelligence Community’s central judgment that Libya possessed chemical weapons agents and chemical weapons aerial bombs was correct, but Libya’s *actual chemical agent stockpile proved to be smaller in quantity than the Intelligence Community estimated.*

One wonders if that overestimate has something to do with the false belief that Tarhuna was a CW production facility. One sentence in this paragraph _might_ indicate that such is the case:

bq. *Analysts based their estimates of Libya’s chemical weapons capabilities on assessments of chemical production capabilities and access to precursors.* Analysts judged that Libya had produced, at most, roughly 100 metric tons of mustard agent. 10 They also believed that Libya had produced small quantities of sarin, 11 but assessed that this would have been of very low quality and therefore would have degraded quickly. 12 Analysts generally did not believe that Libya had chemical warheads for missile delivery, but they assessed that Libya could probably weaponize existing chemical agents in some fashion. 13 They further concluded that Libya had produced approximately 1,000 250-kg aerial chemical weapons bombs. 14

But who knows?

Anyway, the report also has some apparently-relevant (given the discussion of aerial imagery) commentary regarding the effectiveness of “technical collection techniques:”

The Intelligence Community’s performance with regard to Libya’s chemical and biological programs was more modest, due in part to *the limited effectiveness of technical collection techniques against these targets.*

As discussed above, the Intelligence Community possessed some limited information suggesting that Libya was continuing work on limited chemical and biological programs. *The overall paucity of intelligence on these programs, however, may be attributed in no small measure to the general ineffectiveness of technical collection efforts.*

That being said, *it should be noted that there are few distinguishing characteristics that enable the identification of chemical or biological facilities through imagery or other technical means.*

Happy Monday.

UNSC Resolution 1747

The UNSC “adopted it”: today. A joint statement from the P5+1 is “here.”:

The full text (with assorted national statements) can be found “here”: and is below (with the exception of Annex II, which is a description of the June 2006 P5 +1 proposal).

Have a good rest-of-weekend.

p=. ***

“The Security Council,

“Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, and its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006, and reaffirming their provisions,

“Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States parties, in conformity with articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

“Recalling its serious concern over the reports of the IAEA Director General as set out in its resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006),

“Recalling the latest report by the IAEA Director General (GOV/2007/8) of 22 February 2007 and deploring that, as indicated therein, Iran has failed to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006),

“Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to seek a negotiated solution,

“Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

“Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

“Recalling the requirement on States to join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council,

“Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

“Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

“1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);

“2. Calls upon all States also to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of that resolution;

“3. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution and resolution 1737 (2006), including where article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

“4. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annex I to this resolution;

“5. Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;

“6. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms to Iran, and in the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilising accumulation of arms;

“7. Calls upon all States and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes;

“8. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above;

“9. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;

“10. Welcomes the continuous affirmation of the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), attached in Annex II to this resolution, which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), and acknowledges with appreciation that this offer to Iran remains on the table, for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;

“11. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA, which is internationally recognized as having authority for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, in accordance with its Statute, to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme;

“12. Requests within 60 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

“13. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;

(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 12 above shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1737 (2006) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

“14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Resolution Annex I

Entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities

1. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) (aka Ammunition Industries Group) (AMIG controls 7th of Tir, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in Iran’s centrifuge programme. AMIG is in turn owned and controlled by the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006))

2. Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC) and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) (Parts of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran’s (AEOI) Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities. AEOI is designated under resolution 1737 (2006))

3. Kavoshyar Company (Subsidiary company of AEOI, which has sought glass fibres, vacuum chamber furnaces and laboratory equipment for Iran’s nuclear programme)

4. Parchin Chemical Industries (Branch of DIO, which produces ammunition, explosives, as well as solid propellants for rockets and missiles)

5. Karaj Nuclear Research Centre(Part of AEOI’s research division)

6. Novin Energy Company (aka Pars Novin) (Operates within AEOI and has transferred funds on behalf of AEOI to entities associated with Iran’s nuclear programme)

7. Cruise Missile Industry Group (aka Naval Defence Missile Industry Group) (Production and development of cruise missiles. Responsible for naval missiles including cruise missiles)

8. Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International (Bank Sepah provides support for the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and subordinates, including Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006)

9. Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO, which has purchased equipment on AIO’s behalf for the missile programme)

10. Ya Mahdi Industries Group (subordinate to AIO, which is involved in international purchases of missile equipment)

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps entities

1. Qods Aeronautics Industries (Produces unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), parachutes, paragliders, paramotors, etc. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has boasted of using these products as part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)

2. Pars Aviation Services Company (Maintains various aircraft including MI-171, used by IRGC Air Force)

3. Sho’a’ Aviation (Produces micro-lights which IRGC has claimed it is using as part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)

Persons involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities

1. Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (Senior Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) scientist with links to the Institute of Applied Physics, working closely with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, designated below)

2. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi (Senior MODAFL scientist and former head of the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). The IAEA have asked to interview him about the activities of the PHRC over the period he was head but Iran has refused)

3. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)

4. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre, which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)

5. Mohsen Hojati (Head of Fajr Industrial Group, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)

6. Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (Head of SBIG, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)

7. Naser Maleki (Head of SHIG, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Naser Maleki is also a MODAFL official overseeing work on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile programme. The Shahab-3 is Iran’s long range ballistic missile currently in service)

8. Ahmad Derakhshandeh (Chairman and Managing Director of Bank Sepah, which provides support for the AIO and subordinates, including SHIG and SBIG, both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps key persons

1. Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie (Deputy Commander of IRGC)

2. Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC Joint Staff.)

3. Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi (Commander of IRGC Ground Forces)

4. Rear Admiral Morteza Safari (Commander of IRGC Navy)

5. Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (Commander of Bassij resistance force)

6. Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani (Commander of Qods force)

7. General Zolqadr (IRGC officer, Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs)

NYT On Bob J

Jeffrey “notes”: that the _NYT_ did a “piece”: on Bob Joseph, who recently left the State Department.

I realize that this illustrates my penchant for lost causes, but I need to point out an error in the piece RE: the PSI.

Joseph helped to draft the PSI, which, according to the _Times_,

bq. *hit early pay dirt in the fall of 2003, intercepting a cargo ship bound for Libya with nuclear centrifuges built by Abdul Qadeer Khan’s nuclear smuggling network*…[the operation] led to Mr. Joseph’s biggest success: working with American and British intelligence officials to persuade Libya to give up its nuclear program, which helped break up Mr. Khan’s network.

Unfortunately, the BBC China operation was not a PSI operation. Wade “wrote”: in the summer of 2005 that

John Wolf, who served as assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation from 2001 to 2004, told Arms Control Today May 25 that the BBC China operation was “separate” from PSI. He said the incident stemmed from previous efforts to track and uncover the Khan network.

A foreign official familiar with the operation corroborated Wolf’s version of the event. “The BBC China operation was carried out in the spirit of PSI, but it was not a PSI operation,” the official informed _Arms Control Today_ May 31.

I’ve blogged about this “before.”: Incidentally, this isn’t the first time that the author of the _NYT_ piece, David Sanger, has “gotten this issue wrong.”: also “got it wrong”: a while back.

BTW, here’s “an article”: I wrote about the Libyan case a few years ago.

Happy Saturday.

J-Bolt On The Daily Show

Watch it “here.”: Stewart actually gets him to laugh more than once.

Macao on BDA

The Monetary Authority of Macao issued a “press release”: the other day in response to the US Treasury Dept’s “announcement”: RE: BDA.

Here’s the text:

The Monetary Authority of Macao (AMCM) is aware of the latest announcement on a final rule concerning Banco Delta Asia as a ‘primary money laundering concern’. Regarding the decision of the United States Department of the Treasury, AMCM expresses its deep regret. The MSAR Government will soon make an official response.

In response to the development, Banco Delta Asia will continue to be under the management of the MSAR Government. Under any circumstances, the MSAR Government will take necessary measures to protect the interests of depositors and safeguard the stability of the financial system.

Original post “here.”:

Export Law Blog

Export controls are a very important component of our nonproliferation policy that I do not find all that interesting to study. Fortunately, at least four other people are interested enough in it to start a blog about the subject.

I give you the “Export Law Blog,”: which is run by 4 people from Powell Goldstein LLP. Good stuff.

Blelvis Sighting

Tonight in Mt Pleasant.

“Lots of other people”: have seen him too. “This guy”: got his story, at least part of it:

bq. The date was August 17, 1977, and Elvis Presley had died the previous afternoon at his home in Memphis. The Boy Who Would Be Blelvis sat in his room listening to the local black station, but they were playing nothing but Elvis Preseley hits. Nonplussed, he flipped to another station. More Elvis. (I remembered the day Jerry Garcia died: I had thought the friend who gave me the bad news was pulling my leg until he flipped on the radio, and we heard the Dead on every station.) He flipped again, and stopped. The radio was playing Treat Me Nice. “Not bad,” the future Blelvis mused. Next came You’re So Square, Baby I Don’t Care. He was hooked. The very next day, he ran out to buy his first Elvis album: A Legendary Performer: Volume 1. The rest is history.

Treasury Dept and BDA

Jeffrey has a “post”: summarizing the Nelson Report’s take on the potential implications of Treasury’s recent decision RE: Banco Delta Asia for the six party talks.

According to Treasury’s press release, which can be found “here”:,

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today finalized its rule against Banco Delta Asia SARL (BDA) under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. When the final rule takes effect in 30 days, U.S. financial institutions will be prohibited from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts for or on behalf of BDA. This action bars BDA from accessing the U.S. financial system, either directly or indirectly.


The Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in September 2005 found BDA to be of “primary money laundering concern” under Section 311 and issued its proposed rule, citing the bank’s systemic failures to safeguard against money laundering and other financial crimes.

The U.S. Treasury has since been engaged in an ongoing investigation of BDA with the cooperation of Macanese authorities. The information derived from that investigation and the failure of the bank to address adequately the full scope of concerns described in the proposed rule has laid the groundwork for today’s action.

Over the past 18 months, the Macanese authorities have taken substantial steps to strengthen Macau’s anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regime, notably by passing a new law to strengthen these controls and standing up the jurisdiction’s first-ever Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). Today’s regulatory action is targeted at BDA as an institution, not Macau as a jurisdiction.

“We are pleased that Macau has made important progress in strengthening its anti-money laundering controls and safeguarding the Macanese financial system. However, Banco Delta Asia’s grossly inadequate due diligence and systematic facilitation of deceptive financial practices have run too deep for the bank to be allowed access to the U.S. financial system,” said Levey.

A copy of the final rule can be found “here.”: