“Here’s a copy”:http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm of UNSC resolution 1696. Qatar didn’t vote for it…everyone else did.
Here are the three most important paragraphs:
â€œ7. Requests by 31 August a report from the Director General of the IAEA primarily on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the above provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration,
â€œ8. Expresses its intention, in the event that Iran has not by that date complied with this resolution, then to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary,
â€œ9. Confirms that such additional measures will not be necessary in the event that Iran complies with this resolution,
A copy of Chapter VII of the UN Charter can be found “here.”:http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm
Here’s what Article 41 says:
bq. The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
I love this part of today’s “BW piece by Joby Warrick:”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/29/AR2006072900592_pf.html
Current and former administration officials say that compliance with the treaty hinges on intent, and that making small amounts of biowarfare pathogens for study is permitted under a broad interpretation of the treaty. Some also argue that the need for a strong biodefense in an age of genetic engineering trumps concerns over what they see as legal hair-splitting.
“How can I go to the people of this country and say, ‘I can’t do this important research because some arms-control advocate told me I can’t’?” asked [Penrose “Parney”] Albright, the former Homeland Security assistant secretary.
I guess he could consider that whole “law” thing that such advocates are probably thinking about, but whatever.
FYI, Jonathan Tucker “dropped some relevant knowledge”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Tucker.asp about the lab in question a couple years ago.
Eben Kaplan wrote “a piece”:http://www.cfr.org/publication/11061/preventing_ballistic_surprises.html a few weeks ago about the PSI. Overall, it’s not bad. But it contains an all-too-frequent error.
bq. Among the PSI’s most notable successes was the 2003 interception of a shipment of nuclear centrifuge parts from the A.Q. Khan network to Libya.
Bzzzt. The BBC China wasn’t a PSI operation. I blogged about this before “here.”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/624/psi-lacks-sweet-libya-skills As an aside, David Sanger recently made the same mistake “in this piece,”:http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0F14FC34540C768DDDAE0894DE404482 calling the interdiction the PSI’s “best-known success.”
Interestingly, Ron Suskind’s “new book”:http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0743271092/sr=8-1/qid=1154120532/ref=pd_bbs_1/104-0701527-6319916?ie=UTF8 contains an account of the CIA’s involvement in the Libyan disarmament effort. Essentially, Suskind reports that the CIA had turned Urs Tinner, who then told the agency about the shipment. Not a PSI operation.
To be fair, the BBC China mistake doesn’t really affect what appears to be Kaplan’s main argument, which is that intelligence-sharing and interdiction are good.
But it does call into question the PSI’s effectiveness for the simple reason that the Bush administration hasn’t been offering any specific evidence that the initiative works. That’s kind of a big deal, especially given that the Bush administration has pushed PSI as a substitute for arms control.
OK, stop being a dork and go do whatever it is you do…
The President of Pakistan has repeatedly said that Pakistan is not making a bomb and has no intention of making a bomb. We have not only made this commitment solemnly, we are prepared also to accept international safeguards on a non-discriminatory basis.
From “Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme,” published by Pakistanâ€™s Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 1986
It goes on to explain that Pakistan’s nuclear program is solely for the purpose of heading off an energy crisis.
The House “approved this atrocity”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060727/ap_on_go_co/us_india_nuclear_2;_ylt=Ar7kgf9SNbxPtqc7PKbWBs5A7AkB;_ylu=X3oDMTBiMW04NW9mBHNlYwMlJVRPUCUl yesterday. Great first day back from vacation.
But since the deal will strengthen the nonproliferation regime and definitely has nothing to do with campaign contributions, selling weapons to India, or containing China, I’m not worried.
OTOH, “this”:http://pandagon.net/2006/07/15/oh-no-you-didnt-sully/ is truly frightening.
My utility belt tells me it’s to the bar, Batman…
“The final bill is here.”:http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h5682rh.txt.pdf