Category Archives: Iraq

A Swing of the Pendulum

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on “the risks of precipitous action”:http://www.pbs.org/kcet/tavissmiley/archive/200903/20090311_gates.html:

I think one of the biggest lessons learned in this is that if you are going to contemplate preempting an attack you had better be very, very confident of the intelligence that you have. And I think that the lessons learned with the failure to find the weapons of mass destruction and some of the other things that happened will make any future president very, very cautious about launching that kind of conflict or relying on intelligence.

He’s going to ask a lot of very hard questions, and I think that hurdle is much higher today than it was six or seven years ago. And my personal view is that any future president, this current president or any future president, while they have to retain [the option], if they have very solid evidence that we are about to be attacked that we be in a position to take action to prevent that.

I think, though, that the area first of all will be are we going to be attacked here at home as one of the thresholds, and then the quality of the intelligence would be another.

Call it the Gates Doctrine.

Iraq Memories: O’Hanlon in 2003 @ ACA

“Several”:http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/?last_story=/opinion/greenwald/2007/07/30/brookings/ “others”:http://atrios.blogspot.com/2007_07_29_archive.html#3544512441182964331 have been picking on Michael O’Hanlon and Ken Pollack for “their _NYT_ piece”:http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/30/opinion/30pollack.html?_r=3&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print about Iraq.

Without commenting on the piece itself, I would point out O’Hanlon “spoke about Iraq”:http://www.armscontrol.org/events/axisofevil_jan03.asp#ohanlon at a “January 2003 ACA event.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/events/axisofevil_jan03.asp I remember being struck by the fact that he offered a bunch of good arguments for NOT invading Iraq, didn’t really answer them, and said he would support invasion anyway.

C Powell on Iraq – Just Saying

I can’t blog as much as I would like to right now because I’m trying to keep my editor from hiring a hit man. So I’ll write about something I’ve been thinking about for a while.

If the SSCI ever gets to it, there’s something more I would like to know about the whole Iraq intel fiasco.

Shortly before the 2003 US-led invasion, I saw Colin Powell give “a speech”:http://geneva.usmission.gov/press2003/powellCSIS0305.htm at CSIS where he said that the UNMOVIC inspections weren’t working. For example, he dismissed Iraq’s destruction of its al-Samoud II missiles and argued that Iraq was planning to build more:

… from recent intelligence, we know that the
Iraqi regime intends to declare and destroy only a portion of its
banned al-Samoud inventory and that it has, in fact, ordered the
continued production of the missiles that you see being destroyed. Iraq has brought its machinery that produces such missiles out into the daylight for all to see. But *we have intelligence that says, at the very same time, it has also begun to hide machinery it can use to convert other kinds of engines to power al-Samouds II.*

… Even as he [Saddam Hussein] orders some to be destroyed, he is continuing with activities that will allow more to be produced.

Powell also claimed that Iraq was otherwise deceiving the inspectors by “moving weapons of mass destruction materials around the country to avoid detection.”

Specifically, he charged that

in late January, *the Iraqi Intelligence Service transported chemical and biological agents to areas far away from Baghdad, near the Syrian and Turkish borders, in order to conceal them, and they have concealed them from the prying eyes of inspectors.*

In early February, fearing that UNMOVIC had precise intelligence about storage locations, the *Iraqis were moving prohibited materials every 12 to 24 hours.* And in mid-February, concerned about the surveillance capabilities of the U-2 overflights that they finally were going to permit, *Iraq was transferring banned materials in old vehicles and placing them in poor, working class neighborhoods outside the capital.*

Given that the various investigations so far have not, as far as I know, addressed this speech, I would be very interested to know where this “intelligence” came from. Especially because it was crap.

Happy rest-of-weekend.

Iraq: Told You So

Jeffrey “pointed out a few days ago”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1467/1300-centrifuges-at-the-fep that we did, with respect to Iran’s centrifuges.

Because my ego needs more boosting, I will take this occasion to point out that, a couple of days before the invasion of Iraq, _Defense News_ published a (widely-read and obviously influential) piece in which I argued that it was not time to attack Iraq.

Specifically, I wrote:

Given the obvious risks and costs of military intervention, *it is worth looking for a way to disarm Iraq without going to war.* Any rush to use military force, especially without U.N. Security Council approval, would undermine one of Bush’s most compelling rationales for using military force against Iraq – preserving U.N. credibility.

[snip]

The problem is that, *despite its claims to the contrary, the Bush administration is not giving the inspection process sufficient opportunity to succeed. The inspectors have only recently begun to receive the helicopters, surveillance equipment and intelligence they need to do their job. The Security Council can certainly provide them with whatever additional resources are necessary.*

We must recall that weapon inspectors during the 1990s found and destroyed the vast majority of Baghdad’s weapons of mass destruction in the face of systematic Iraqi obstruction. Additional U.S. intelligence could help inspectors investigate other suspicious sites likely to reveal even more convincing evidence of ongoing activities related to weapons of mass destruction.

I think that people frequently forget the extent to which concerns about the length of time that the United States could keep troops deployed in the region drove the timetable for invasion. At the time, I wrote

bq. the large number of troops deployed to the Arabian Gulf region suggests *short-term military requirements are driving the timetable for action, rather than any threat Iraq poses*. Military experts disagree about how long a large number of troops can be kept in the theater, but it is clear that political and military pressure for action increases with the length of deployment.

Anyway, the rest of the article is at the bottom of the post.

“We were all wrong,” my ass. Let me “reiterate:”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/601/youre-out-of-your-element-tommy

bq. …those who supported the Iraq fiasco really need to STFU, stop lecturing the rest of us about foreign policy, sit in a corner, and think about what they did.

Not that I’m bitter. Happy Friday.

Time To Launch Iraq War Has Not Yet Arrived
Defense News March 17, 2003

By Paul Kerr

A cautionary voice needs to be injected into the chorus calling for war against Iraq. To be sure, the prospect for a peaceful solution to the Iraq crisis seems remote. The United States has provided compelling evidence Baghdad is not complying with its disarmament obligations under U.N. Resolution 1441, and President George W. Bush’s administration has suggested St. Patrick’ s Day as the deadline for compliance.

Given the obvious risks and costs of military intervention, it is worth looking for a way to disarm Iraq without going to war. Any rush to use military force, especially without U.N. Security Council approval, would undermine one of Bush’s most compelling rationales for using military force against Iraq – preserving U.N. credibility.

A genuine commitment to the U.N. process is required if Bush’s diplomatic efforts are to be seen as anything more than tactical maneuvers to facilitate a preconceived decision to go to war.

Fortunately, recent history suggests that such a commitment can compel Iraq to further comply with inspections if the Security Council applies united, unyielding pressure on Baghdad.

Largely ignored in the Iraq debate is that Baghdad significantly changed its position on weapon inspections during the last several months. Starting last spring, Iraq expressed to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan a willingness to discuss resuming weapon inspections, but only if the Security Council agreed to first address issues such as removing the no-fly zones and lifting economic sanctions. Annan and the Security Council correctly insisted that Iraq had to admit inspectors prior to any such discussion.

Iraq then surprised skeptics by deciding to admit inspectors in September. The Security Council then adopted a new resolution to compensate for weaknesses in the inspectors’ previous mandate. In November, Iraq again confounded expectations and accepted Resolution 1441, giving inspectors unprecedented access to suspected weapon sites. So far, Iraq has not impeded this access.

The inspectors’ March 7 report indicates this trend has continued. Although more certainly needs to be done, Iraq has increased its cooperation with inspectors in several respects. Baghdad has begun to destroy its prohibited al Samoud 2 missiles and allowed more unfettered interviews with weapon scientists.

These changes did not happen because Iraq is enthusiastic about disarming, but they did happen. If the Security Council insists that Baghdad comply fully with all its obligations under resolution 1441, including a complete accounting for its past chemical and biological weapon production, it may yet do so.

In this regard, Security Council meetings during the past several weeks have been encouraging, with all Permanent Five members emphasizing the importance of Iraqi cooperation with weapon inspections. They should intensify this pressure and make certain Iraq understands that its past strategies of dividing the Security Council will not succeed and inspections will not continue indefinitely without concrete results.

The problem is that, despite its claims to the contrary, the Bush administration is not giving the inspection process sufficient opportunity to succeed. The inspectors have only recently begun to receive the helicopters, surveillance equipment and intelligence they need to do their job. The Security Council can certainly provide them with whatever additional resources are necessary.

We must recall that weapon inspectors during the 1990s found and destroyed the vast majority of Baghdad’s weapons of mass destruction in the face of systematic Iraqi obstruction. Additional U.S. intelligence could help inspectors investigate other suspicious sites likely to reveal even more convincing evidence of ongoing activities related to weapons of mass destruction.

Inspectors may not be able to find all of Iraq’s prohibited weapons without its cooperation, but more discoveries can put additional pressure on Saddam to comply with Resolution 1441.

However, the large number of troops deployed to the Arabian Gulf region suggests short-term military requirements are driving the timetable for action, rather than any threat Iraq poses. Military experts disagree about how long a large number of troops can be kept in the theater, but it is clear that political and military pressure for action increases with the length of deployment.

There have long been enough troops in the region to make threats of force credible. Continued war preparations may create a self-fulfilling prophecy and undermine Bush’s claims that war can be avoided.

Make no mistake, Iraq must comply with Resolution 1441 and military force may eventually be required. As the administration itself has argued, arms control agreements are some of our most valuable tools for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have an interest in making sure leaders like Saddam Hussein take them seriously.

Fortunately, we can afford to wait at least a few months. Iraq does not present a short-term threat to the United States. The inspectors’ presence can deter weapon production, we control two-thirds of Iraq’s airspace, and Iraq’s military is considerably weaker than in 1991.

The administration says it has not yet decided to use military force and that war is not inevitable. Iraq’s negotiating behavior suggests that a bit of patience on the administration’s part may yield a peaceful solution.

Feith OSD Update

!/images/8.jpg!

The DoD released a “summary”:http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/DODIG_execsummary_020907.pdf of the report. Essentially, it says that Feith and Co. did shit that they should not have done, but it wasn’t illegal. OSD’s response can be found “here.”:http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/nation/16656258.htm?source=rss&channel=krwashington_nation [Via “Spencer Ackerman”:http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/002518.php ]

For more, read these articles from the “_WP_”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/08/AR2007020802387_pf.html and the “_NYT_.”:http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/10/washington/10feith.html?_r=1&oref=login Ackerman also has “some details”:http://www.tpmmuckraker.com/archives/002530.php about the SSCI’s investigation.

Given that one of the “slides”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/368/clowns-on-parade from their “Iraq is friends with al Qaeda” briefing is a poster child for Teh Stupid, the fact that “some of these same geniuses”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1209/npr-on-iran-intel are apparently doing what looks like “comparable work on Iran”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/09/AR2007020902294.html ought to make everyone feel, like, really great and stuff.

Original post is “here,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1347/d-feith-twofer BTW.

[ “Apologies to”:http://lefarkins.blogspot.com/2006/07/teh-stupid-make-it-stop.html LGM. ]

D Feith TwoFer

File this under “gossip,” but it’s entertaining.

From “Juan Cole:”:http://www.juancole.com/2007/02/3-month-record-for-us-troops-killed.html

State Dept. Official: “Doug, after the smoke clears, what is the plan?”

Feith: “Think of Iraq as being like a computer. And think of Saddam as like a processor. We just take out the old processor, and put in a new one–Chalabi.”

State Dept. Official: “Put in a new processor?”

Feith: “Yes! It will all be over in 6 weeks.”

State Dept. Official: “You mean six months.”

Feith: “No, six weeks. You’ll see.”

State Dept. Official: “Doug.”

Feith: “Yes?”

State Dept. Official: “You’re smoking crack, Doug.”

Feith: “Oh, so you’re disloyal to the President, are you?”

[Via “The Iron Mouth”:http://ironmouth.com/PermaLink,guid,b2203970-0496-4e6d-b1c7-58abe35cdf1a.aspx ]

More importantly, Larisa Alexandrovna of Rawstory “reports”:http://www.rawstory.com/news/2007/Pentagon_Inspector_General_to_release_investigation_0207.html that the Pentagon Inspector General might finally finish its report RE: the intel shop that Feith ran in OSD. That matters because the relevant portion of the SSCI’s investigation of the Iraq intel fiasco has been delayed by the IG’s investigation.

She writes:

bq. According to sources close to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the classified version of the Pentagon IG’s report will be released to committee members Friday. Two to three declassified pages may also be concurrently released to the public.

*Update:*

My apologies to any crack users offended by this post.

Wonks on TV

Jacqueline Shire appeared with “-a space alien-“:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1346/blogging-heads-tv Jeffrey on BloggingHeads TV. Take a “look”:http://bloggingheads.tv/video.php?id=180.

Lots of good stuff, but Jeffrey’s remark that members of the “everyone was wrong about Iraqi WMD” crowd need some “corner time” reminded me of “this post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/601/youre-out-of-your-element-tommy I wrote about T Friedman a while back.

Especially this part:

bq. … those who supported the Iraq fiasco really need to STFU, stop lecturing the rest of us about foreign policy, sit in a corner, and think about what they did.

Still true.

More blogging when I feel less ill and finish my _ACT_ work…

*Update:*

Jeffrey admits to stealing “that line about wonks wrong about Iraq WMD” from me. I will simply note that he also stole my Rush albums…not that he’ll admit _that_.

SSCI Iraq reports

Two of them are out.

There’s “one”:http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf comparing the IC’s prewar assessments with the postwar results on the ground and “another”:http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiinc.pdf about the IC’s use of INC-provided information.

UNMOVIC On Hussein’s WMD Motives

UNMOVIC released “a report”:http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/compendium_summary/s-2006-420-English.pdf a while back describing the commission’s lessons-learned from its work in Iraq.

The whole thing is pretty interesting…I would just highlight its explanation for Iraq’s slack cooperation with the inspectors:

It would appear that the following factors contributed to Iraq’s decision not to reveal such information to the United Nations:

(a) Preservation of valuable resources by minimizing the extent of
destruction, removal and rendering harmless of items, materials and facilities involved in proscribed programmes (particularly while it remained under comprehensive United Nations sanctions);

(b) Preservation of the ability to conduct clandestine work on some
proscribed missile projects and, possibly, intent to resume other proscribed programmes after the departure of the United Nations inspectors from Iraq;

(c) National security concerns led Iraq to prevent inspection teams from entering sensitive areas of governmental infrastructure, such as institutions of political leadership, military command and control facilities, special security apparatus and intelligence;

(d) Protection of the identity of senior members of the former regime who were involved in the decision-making process, supervision, control and implementation of proscribed weapons programmes;

(e) Safeguarding information relating to rationale and military doctrines for the deployment of proscribed weapons, including possible targets and chain of command, as well as political sensitivity concerning any evidence of the past use of chemical weapons by Iraq;

(f) Protection of information on the procurement network and foreign contacts in support of proscribed weapons programmes in order to shield providers of technology, items and materials, and also on what was specifically acquired by Iraq for these programmes;

(g) Concerns that other States could attempt to collect intelligence
information on Iraq within the framework of United Nations inspections.

58. It is not clear which of these factors dominated Iraq’s concealment policies. However, all of these, separately or in combination, predetermined the extent of Iraq’s declarations prior to 1995.

In other news, I am amazed to learn that the SSCI “lacks sweet Iraq reporting skills”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/06/AR2006090601920.html.

Department of Ass-Clownery

I recently ran across “this December article”:http://www.repubblica.it/2005/j/sezioni/esteri/nigergate/francia007/francia007.html
from La Repubblica which contains an interesting piece of information RE: the Iraq/Niger/uranium thing. [Translation and original link via the “Leftcoaster.”:http://www.theleftcoaster.com/archives/007051.php]

Members of the “Iraq really was uranium shopping” crowd, “such as Christopher Hitchens,”:http://www.slate.com/id/2139609/ frequently argue
(yes, present tense) that Niger has nothing else that Iraq would want. Therefore, these geniuses deduce, there was no other plausible reason for Iraqi officials to visit that country.

[Check out “more evidence”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/686/wilson-bashers-rove-defenders-hearing-you-talk-is-a-waste-of-silence of Hitchens’ penchant for being both obnoxious and spectacularly wrong on this subject.]

Enter former senior French intelligence official Alain Chouet, who
told La Repubblica that

bq. With a deep knowledge of Niger and of all the issues connected to yellowcake. My men stayed in Africa for a couple of weeks and, once back, they told me a very simple thing: ‘the American information on uranium is all bullshit’. When I read their report, I did not doubt their work nor, if you let me say so, my mind. I know Niger well but I can say that I have known Baghdad and Saddam even better. And I know that if Saddam had wanted to purchase yellowcake (which he already owned in great quantities) from Niger he would have never asked an Ambassador to open negotiations. Saddam did not trust anybody in his Foreign Office. He certainly didn’t trust his ambassadors around the world. For such a task he would have sent one of his sons. On the other hand, *we knew the reason of the journey of Iraqi Ambassador to the Holy See, Wissam Al Zahawie. He had to identify an African country ready to accept the storage of the regime’s hazardous toxic waste, in exchange for money. In fact Namibia, which had been used as a dumping ground by Iraq, had told Baghdad they couldn’t go on contaminating their soil.* I told the CIA the results of our mission in Niger. The Americans seemed very disappointed for what they had to hear. [_emphasis mine_]

Great…