There’s no sourcing for the claim, as far as I can tell, but “Haaretz reported”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1067901.html a little while back that the Obama administration is planning to publish a new U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran soon.
New Iranian Centrifuges to be Installed
In the “discussions about”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1875/dammit Iran’s centrifuge installation patterns, I haven’t seen much mention of Gholamreza Aqazadeh’s “announcement”:http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=839756 that Iran plans to install a new generation of centrifuges at Natanz:
bq. “*New generation of centrifuges which are technologically more advanced than the previous generation will soon be installed* at Natanz nuclear facility,” Aqazadeh told a joint news conference with Russian nuclear agency chief Sergei Kiriyenko at the site of Bushehr nuclear reactor in southern Iran.
It may be that Iran is content to operate its IR-1 centrifuges until it’s ready to install the new generation. Having said that, lots of Iranian officials’ predictions about the nuclear program have had a troubled relationship with reality, so grain of salt and all that.
Iranian Companies to Approach With Caution
The UK has “a list”:http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/licensing-policy/end-use-control/page29307.html, current as of February.
According to the site,
bq. The entities included on the list are mainly based on the last 3 years’ experience of either invoking the WMD end-use control or refusing licences under it. In addition there are a few other entities for which we have not refused licences or invoked the control, but there is publicly available information indicating their *involvement in WMD programmes of concern.*
One footnote jumped out at me because it states that some of the listed entities “are included solely because they are listed in UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747 or 1803 concerning Iran.”
Not sure if this suggests that UK intel doesn’t have anything on those entities, but I thought it worth noting.
Shooting At Kwangmyongsong-2
It’s a very bad idea. Here is why.
Today, North Korea released information to international agencies showing where it expects the first and second stages of “Unha-2”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1877/kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong to fall. “Geoff Forden”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2220/dprks-stay-clear-zones has a picture. The “International Civil Aviation Organization”:http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/2009/pio200902_e.pdf has a more elaborate version that includes civil air routes and other details. (See the second page of the PDF.)
What this shows us is a planned launch due east over Japan, dropping the first stage in the Sea of Japan, the second stage in the Pacific.
Currently, neither Japan or the United States has any known ability to shoot down a launch vehicle as it is boosting. There are plans, but the reality is still a way off, according to “MDA”:http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/mdalink.html. So if an intercept is attempted, it won’t be an intercept of Unha-2 (the rocket). It will be an intercept of Kwangmyongsong-2 (the satellite), once it has already passed over Japan, perhaps when it’s already in orbit.
In the past, the United States has maintained that its own satellites are equivalent to its sovereign territory. That’s a stance that’s difficult to maintain if one doesn’t honor it oneself. So entirely apart from the “legal issues”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2214/shooting-down-dprks-satellite-launch-its-legal surrounding North Korean missile activities — and setting aside “how the NKs might react”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1897/shooting-down-north-koreas-launch — it would simply be making a very bad precedent for the U.S. to make an unprovoked attack on a foreign satellite, one that would undercut the security of the most space-dependent nation on Earth.
Let’s think about this a little before doing anything rash, OK, folks?
Playing the Gargoyle Card
Here’s some more about the “S-300PMU1 (Gargoyle) not going to Iran”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1910/dvorkin-weighs-in-three-things-not-to-do. Or, if you prefer, С-300ПМУ1 not going to Иран.
According to “Interfax”:http://treli.ru/newstext.mhtml?Part=3&PubID=25315, the delivery of advanced air defenses from Russia to Iran may be postponed indefinitely. Whatever that means:
Implementation of the multimillion dollar contract for the delivery of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to Iran, which was concluded more than three years ago, may be postponed indefinitely. Experts believe that the primary deterring factor here is the emerging opportunity for improving relations between Russia and the US after the arrival of the new administration.
So… indefinitely, maybe, for now. Depending.
Belated addition: a “musical bonus”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kn481KcjvMo.
Dvorkin Weighs In: Three Things Not To Do
Vladimir Dvorkin, former -commander- _Director of the Research Institute_ of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, is “quoted by Interfax”:http://www.militarynews.ru/ cautioning against the following bad things:
* Shooting down a North Korean space launch
“I subscribe to the view that North Korea may try to launch a delivery vehicle to put a satellite in orbit. It [the launch] will also serve as a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska.”
“As far as we are aware, Japan intends to take measures which will include the use of Standard-3 sea-based interceptor missiles,” he said, warning that such developments could lead to a “serious conflict situation.” Dvorkin said that American and Japanese counteractions could “cause China concern.”
* Underestimating Iran
Discussing Iran’s missile program Dvorkin said: “It has always been clear to me that Iran’s missile program is underestimated. Iran stopped using outdated missile technologies a long time ago.” In his view, “it is quite clear” that Iran is capable of building a missile reaching all of Europe.
Dvorkin suggested that Iran was close to building a nuclear weapon, Interfax-AVN said. He was quoted as saying that he “saw no reason why Iranian scientists should not be able to do it; perhaps they are short of highly-enriched weapons-grade uranium.”
“If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon it may trigger a snowball effect,” with the number of countries seeking a nuclear weapon going up sharply, a “total collapse” of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and “not just a regional but a global catastrophe,” Dvorkin said.
* Selling advanced air defenses to Iran
Asked to comment on media reports about an alleged deal on the supply of Russian S-300 air defense systems to Iran, Dvorkin said he wasn’t aware of “any such contract” but warned that giving Iran S-300 could cause serious tensions in Moscow’s relations with both Israel and the USA, Interfax-AVN said.
He is also quoted as suggesting that U.S.-Russian strategic arms talks will be complicated by the U.S. warhead upload capability.
Related items:
* Ted Postol proposes replacing existing missile defenses with “UAV-based boost-phase systems”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/opinion/12postol.html?_r=1&ref=opinion. As I read it, these systems ideally would be based in Russia.
* Richard Weitz reviews the the “S-300 question”:http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3425.
Sarkozy on NATO
Video of the French president’s address to the “Foundation for Strategic Research”:http://www.frstrategie.org/ is “here”:http://www.elysee.fr/webtv/allocution-lors-du-colloque-de-la-fondation-pour-la-recherche-strategique-la-france-la-defense-europeenne-et-l-otan-au-xxieme–video-3-1044.html.
If there are any good bits for nuclear wonks, I’ll try to post the English text when I see it.
In the meantime, dig those hand gestures.
Update: Reader Ferdinand, with sharper eyes than mine, has spotted the “document complet”:http://www.elysee.fr/download/?mode=press&filename=11.03__Conclusion_colloque_Defense_Otan.pdf. Thanks, Ferdinand!
Everyone With Nukes, Except…
There is a school of thought in the nonproliferation/arms control/U.S. strategic policy debate that I think can be summed up this way:
In the future, the following international actors will pose credible nuclear threats: terrorists, poor countries, the other nuclear-weapon states, and at least some U.S. allies.
The United States, however, will not.
Blogging to Resume Shortly
I’ve had internet issues at home, but Verizon suggested a fix that actually worked, so I’m back up.
Promissory Note
Back before Paul doubled my salary, he made an “insightful little observation”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1850/iran-thought-not-so-deep about negotiating with Iran without first insisting on suspension of enrichment.
This has got me thinking. Perhaps it’s time to lay out as many pros and cons as can be thought of, and see how they stack up.
It’s not going to happen right away, but stay tuned.