The (last ever) round of nonproliferation sanctions levied under the “Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000”:http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15234.htm (referred to as INPA, although I still like “INA” more) on “28 July 2006”:http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2006_register&docid=%5BDOCID:fr04au06-119%5D is set to expire this coming Monday for the companies listed below.

*These three kids can play ball:*

* Cuba’s Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology
* India’s Balaji Amines
* India’s Prachi Poly Products

Just a note that INA sanctions against India’s Sabero Organics Gujarat Ltd and Sandhya Organics Ltd (“which ACW blogged about back in 2005”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/919/indian-firms-sanctioned-for-chemical-sale-to-iran) expired last December.

*These two kids from the DPRK will have to sit it out on the bench for a little (or a lot?) while longer:*

* Korea Pugang Trading Corporation
* Korean Mining and Industrial Development Corporation (KOMID)

Though their INA sanctions expire on Monday too, they are still sanctioned as part of “Executive Order 13382”:http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c22080.htm. The latter “enterprise” is also sanctioned according to provisions of the “AECA/EAA”:http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15232.htm, the “Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act or ISNA”:http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c20760.htm, and “Executive Order 12938”:http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15233.htm.

*And last but not least:*

* Rosoboronexport — though its INA sanctions expire, it has to wait for a clean slate until 28 December, when its “ISNA sanctions”:http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20071800/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2007/E6-22630.htm are set to run out. (Unless, of course, I was wrong “about the S-300”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1669/dreaming-of-an-s-300 and Rosoboronexport gets itself into trouble again.)

_Bye-bye INA!_

And if you have nothing better to do this weekend, you should check out the classic RAND treatment of nonproliferation sanctions authored by Richard Speier, “available here”:http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1285/.

As a follow-up to “an earlier post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1669/dreaming-of-an-s-300, where I called stories regarding a pending Russian export of S-300 systems to Iran “*hogwash*,” take a look at this:

*RUSSIAN S-300 MISSILES ARE NOT EXPORTED TO IRAN VIA BELARUS – BELARUS*

MINSK. July 24 (Interfax) – Russian anti-aircraft S-300 missiles have not been exported to Iran via Belarus, and the reports to that effect in some Belarusian media outlets citing the _Jerusalem Post_ are “*rubbish*,” Belarusian Defense Ministry spokesman Vyacheslav Remenchuk told Interfax on Thursday.

“*It’s no use to comment on this rubbish*,” he said.

He noted that a few days ago he made similar comments regarding a report in the _Sudan Tribune_ about alleged exports of Russian fighters to Sudan via Belarus.

Just sayin’. 🙂

Last one for the day… Since I will be missing it (_sigh_), I thought that I’d use this DIY CM video as a reminder of Thursday’s launch of *Dennis Gormley’s* “book on the threat of cruise missiles”:http://www.greenwood.com/psi/book_detail.aspx?sku=C9836. Yes, I am shamelessly “plugging it again”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1628/lesser-included-case-blogging. Event info “is here”:http://cns.miis.edu/cns/media/pr080626_missile_contagion.pdf.

You may remember the story of the New Zealand engineer Bruce Simpson, who a few years back decided to build a cruise missile in his garage using commercial off-the-shelf technology and distribute his “construction diary” to those “wanting to buy his know-how,” reportedly including individuals from Iran. Chapter 6 of “Gormley’s book”:http://www.greenwood.com/psi/book_detail.aspx?sku=C9836, on *tacit knowledge*, discusses this incident and its implications in great detail. One of the conclusions is that

bq. “Although Simpson had access to the all the materials needed to build a small missile, it is *not clear that he possessed all the specialized skills required to integrate subcomponents into a successful product*. Furthermore, *it should not be assumed that Simpson’s skills in building a pulse-jet engine can readily be transferred, absorbed, and successfully replicated by means of a $32 investment and several hours of time given over to a CD-ROM*.”

Enjoy!

Since were are on the _Moscow Defense Brief_, here a list of “contracts for export of Russian air-defense systems 1992–2007”:http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2008/item4/article2/ (note: *contracts*, not deliveries). *You’ll notice that there is no S-300 contract with Iran*. Rightly so, because “all that Iranian talk”:http://en.rian.ru/russia/20071228/94513968.html of a final contract was wishful thinking (or hogwash).

There is a great article in the most recent issue of the “_Moscow Defense Brief_”:http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2008/ by _Vedomosti_ newspaper correspondent Aleksey Nikolsky that discusses the reshuffling in the Russian defense industrial complex after Medvedev assumed the presidency. Some main points:

“On June 3, Medvedev effectively dismissed Yury Baluyevsky, Chief of the General Staff, for his conflict with Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. Baluyevsky is now Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, and was replaced by the former Chief of Armaments, Nikolai Makarov… Makarov’s old department will retain responsibility for little more than the maintenance of armaments in service, while *control over military-technical policy will be concentrated in the hands of Serdyukov’s immediate circle*.

There are no grounds to suppose that the rationale of these changes was to increase the efficiency of defense procurement. Rather, they were simply the consequence of the wave of appointments announced by *Medvedev*, who *maintained his mentor’s tradition of shuffling bureaucrats from one position to another without actually getting rid of anyone*.

By way of contrast, the fact that Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov has kept his position as the curator of the military-industrial complex is indeed significant… *Ivanov remains the principal and for the time being the only effective restraint on the ambitions of Russian Technologies to obtain a monopoly over the defense and several “near defense” industries as well*.

That said, the constructive side of Ivanov’s activity is less evident. For lack of any real powers, the *Defense Industrial Commission [Ivanov] chairs has proven unable to resolve any of the pressing issues facing the sector, in particular, those that involve strong private interests*…

[T]here is no evidence of the commission’s contribution to resolving the two largest problems facing Russian defense exports: Algeria’s rejection of the Mig-29 and delays in the modernization of the Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier for India. *When the formation of Russian Technologies is formalized with the signing of a presidential decree, it is likely that [Rosoboronexport’s Sergey] Chemezov will overtake Ivanov in terms of real influence over the defense industry*.”

I’ll blog more about Russia-India in a bit. Meanwhile, Nikolsky’s article, titled “Rites of Spring in the Defense Industry Complex,” is “available here”:http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2008/item1/article1/.

In Tyler Drumheller’s “_On the Brink: An Insider’s Account of How the White House Compromised American Intelligence_”:http://www.powells.com/biblio/17-9780786719150-0, the author (as many of you know) recounts the contentious email discussion within the IC about the validity of the Iraqi informant named Curveball.

The whole tale is pretty entertaining, but I particularly like the part where he mentions that he once had to tell one of his colleagues “that it might not be such a good idea to put ‘fuck you’ in an email.”

Happy Monday.

Yesterday’s “NNSA announcement”:http://nnsa.energy.gov/news/2075.htm that the last of Bulgaria’s spent HEU fuel was removed is great news. We updated the NTI “Soviet-origin HEU fuel repatriation table”:http://www.nti.org/db/heu/pastpresent.html#sovfuel to reflect the removal. Similarly, the “_Who Has What_”:http://www.nti.org/db/heu/HEU_Who_Has_What.pdf factsheet has updated numbers for both Bulgaria and Argentina. Check them out!

Have a fun weekend don’t forget the “_Nonproliferation Review_ event”:http://cns.miis.edu/cns/activity/080721_nprbriefing/index.htm on Monday!

*Got kids?* This summer you may want to consider sending them to Russia’s “*Atom Camp*”:http://www.rosatom.com/en/press-releases/10882_07.07.2008 which is

bq. “an excellent opportunity for the children to spend interesting and useful holidays, to improve their health, to find new friends and, most importantly, to *feel that they are part of the life of Smolensk NPP* and its satellite city, Desnogorsk.”

But the best part is that

bq. “*This year the children* will be involved in useful activities: particularly, they *will take part in a clean-up of the dam of the cooling pond of Smolensk NPP*.”

If you think that this may be too much for your little ones, you could always try something simpler… Like the DPRK’s “*Mangyongdae Children’s Camp*”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2008/200806/news06/14.htm#8, where

bq. “The campers … visit the old home of President Kim Il Sung in Mangyongdae and the wrestling ground, the study site and other revolutionary historical sites to learn from the glorious childhood of the President [as well as attend] the International Friendship Exhibition, where *they renew their great pride in having President Kim Il Sung and General Secretary Kim Jong Il whom the whole world reveres and respects*.”

But of course, you could also pack your car and do a “_Nuclear Family Vacation_”:http://www.chicagotribune.com/features/booksmags/chi-nathan-hodge-12jul12,0,94618.story (and no, don’t be thinking “Griswolds”:http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0085995/).

Le Nouvel Observateur “has it.”:http://globe.blogs.nouvelobs.com/media/00/02/cb7c0be018109bea88567d7c7839309b.pdf At first glance, I didn’t see anything terribly interesting. But maybe I’m missing something.

[via “Laura Rozen.”:http://www.warandpiece.com/blogdirs/007721.html ]

For the sake of self-promotion (not really), here is a “tiny piece on nuclear energy in Belarus”:http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/belarus-takes-a-second-look-nuclear-energy that the folks at the _Bulletin_ kindly edited and put up. I attempted to write about how Belarus’ president Aleksandr Lukashenko is trying to promote a nuclear power plant project to an audience quite “allergic” to nuclear energy after the Chernobyl accident.

I won’t deny that David Marples in his great “Jamestown columns”:http://www.jamestown.org/authors_details.php?author_id=189has has covered this issue in depth already (so has Alexei Breus of _NuclearFuel_, for that matter). In his writings, Marples uses polling data from the “beleaguered independent pollster NISEPI”:http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2369688 to show low public support for the NPP project in Belarus (“only *32.5%* in 2006”:http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371710).

Yet, I am fascinated by some polling data that seems to be coming from the Belarusian government, which *admits even lower public support for the nuclear power plant project* — *28.3%* in 2005. The source for the data is an obscure paper by Alexander Mikhalevich of the Belarusian National Academy of Sciences (NAS) titled “_Technical and Scientific Support of Nuclear Power Development in Belarus_”:http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/meetings/PDFplus/2007/cn142/cn142Papers/38_A_Mikhalevich.doc presented at “this 2007 IAEA Conference”:http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/meetings/cn142papers.asp.

Further, perhaps I am reading too much into how official Minsk has used this (and similar) data when I note in the _Bulletin_ piece that in its public relations campaign

bq. “the [Lukashenko] government *has repeatedly stressed* (like “here”:http://naviny.by/rubrics/inter/2008/05/08/ic_news_259_290276/ and “here”:http://www.belisa.org.by/en/news/stnews/manufacture/af2560a4b75f8890.html) *IAEA support for the [NPP] project* [because its] polling indicates that the Belarusian public trusts the information provided by the agency.”

You can get a sense of what I mean from one of the charts in the NAS paper, which I posted below. There you have it. Individuals close to the Lukashenko government admit that the public *trusts the IAEA (44%) much more than the Belarusian government (3%)*.

!/images/53.jpg!

Once again, “here is the NAS paper”:http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/meetings/PDFplus/2007/cn142/cn142Papers/38_A_Mikhalevich.doc. And while we are on the topic, you should check out the videos at the “IAEA In Focus:Chernobyl”:http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/Chernobyl/ section.