The UN SEcurity Council adopted Resolution 1803 yesterday. The text can be found “here”:http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9268.doc.htm and the relevant excerpts are below. The vote was 14-0-1 (Indonesia abstained).

Relevant Excerpts:

[The Security Council]

“3. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I to resolution 1747 (2007) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3(b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006);

“4. Underlines that nothing in paragraph 3 above requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007), including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

“5. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex II to this resolution as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

“6. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;

“7. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annexes I and III to this resolution, and any persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them and to persons and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

“8. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:

(a) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006), of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in sections 1 and 2 of the Annex to that document, and sections 3 to 6 as notified in advance to the Committee, only when for exclusive use in light water reactors, and where such supply, sale or transfer is necessary for technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices as provided for in paragraph 16 of resolution 1737 (2006);

(b) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in 19.A.3 of Category II of document S/2006/815;

“9. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial support contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

“10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

“11. Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspect the cargoes to and from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

“12. Requires all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a written report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances, results and other relevant details;

“13. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;

“14. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the measures imposed in resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution;

“15. Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote resumption of dialogue, and consultations on the basis of their offer to Iran, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue which would allow for the development of all-round relations and wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and inter alia, starting direct talks and negotiation with Iran as long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA;

“16. Encourages the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks;

“17. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by the present resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

“18. Requests within 90 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

“19. Reaffirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in the paragraph above, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;

(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), and in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

It’s out. Shockingly, ISIS “posted it.”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEA_Iran_Report_22Feb2008.pdf I’ll write some more about it soon, but they have “an issue brief”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/ISISIssueBriefIran22Feb2008.pdf as well.

While I’m on the subject, check out “the report”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/ISIS_Iran_P2_7Feb2008.pdf they wrote about Iran’s IR-2 centrifuge. For more on that subject, check out “these two”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2008/02/irans-ir-2-centrifuge.html excellent “posts”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2008/02/irans-new-toy-continued.html by Andreas Persbo.

“STFU, wingnuts.”:http://dni.gov/press_releases/20071208_statement.pdf

Quick post from a cool little coffee shop/flower shop/art gallery in Littleton, NH.

Barbara Slavin argued at a “recent CAP event”:http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12/iran_event.html that people interested in Iran ought to take a look at the 1981 Algiers Accords.

I agree. “Here they are.”:http://www.parstimes.com/history/algiers_accords.pdf

*Update:*

Link fixed. Also, per the recommendation of a reader, I should point out that Barbara Slavin emphasized the below portion of the agreement when she spoke. It’s interesting, given subsequent U.S. policies:

The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.

Miles tells me that the _WSJ_ published his response, first blogged “here,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1558/j-schlesinger-on-iran to J Schlesinger’s piece on Iran. Sub. Req., so no link as of yet.

And “vote for”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1557/arms-control-person-of-the-year ACA Arms Control Person of the Year.

*Update:*
-“Here’s the link,”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119862828617249709.html courtesy of a loyal reader.-

You can tell I have other things to do…

Anyhow, I said “in this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1552/the-iran-niehow-long-until-a-nuke that

bq. …it looks as if the time frame for Iran to build a nuclear weapon in the new NIE is the same as the one in the 2005 NIE. But I think the new estimate might actually suggest that the time frame is slightly longer.

Well, the first glance was right; according to a transcript of a BG briefing about the NIE that was given by some senior intel officials, the time frame in the 07 estimate is the same as the one given two years before.

I don’t think I can post my copy of the transcript, but anyone is welcome to share if they have one.

An anonymous FoKerr sent this to me a little while back. S/he is, I hope, forgiving.

A handful of reactions.

The overall conclusions are plausible in light of the public record of events.

Unfortunately, the conclusions are confusingly stated at some points, and seem bound to mislead the casual reader. It is not as apparent as it ought to be that the major elements of Iran’s clandestine military nuclear program are identical to those of its overt civilian nuclear program. Nor were they willingly surfaced; they were “taken public” as a way of sustaining them only after others had made them public.

Skeptics can be forgiven for observing that the IC has just moved from one “high confidence” conclusion to another “high confidence”
conclusion opposed to the first, without explaining clearly what went amiss the first time, or why we readers should now have high
confidence ourselves. Despite some clear efforts at change in recent years, the IC appears (to this outsider, at least) to face cultural and methodological problems in the handling of confidence and uncertainty that threaten both the clarity and credibility of
important products. But, with the caveats given above, that does not necessarily make the broad conclusions of the document wrong.

The conclusions of the NIE have been embraced by many whom you’d think wouldn’t be so eager to credit the administration with a success (albeit one recognized only belatedly), let alone with having read Iranian intentions correctly at the time of the “Axis of Evil” speech. This reaction appears motivated by excessive fears of imminent armed conflict, influenced by an Iraq analogy. In practice, the main lines of U.S. policy on Iran actually have been to pursue a combination of broadly multilateral, unilateral, and “coalition” sanctions, while making an occasional show of force to reassure skittish allies.

It is very difficult for the IC to reverse itself on such sensitive
issues, so respect is due to those who did so regardless.

Nevertheless, by virtue of its subject matter, the NIE is a policy
statement as much as anything else. Its conclusions were such that it would have leaked had it not first been released. And its release has thrown a spanner into the works of the diplomatic process. By intention or by accident, the IC has asserted itself as an autonomous actor in the U.S. policy community, akin to the Federal Reserve Bank.

This NIE was ordered up by Congress in the last defense budget bill. The 2005 version — apparently a “memo to holders” (i.e., a partial update, not a full-blown NIE) — appears to have been initiated by the IC leadership itself. The administration seems never to have regarded the IC as a useful tool, and has effectively conceded its management to others. That may explain, in part, how we have come to the present circumstances.

A few days ago, James Schlesinger had a “piece”:http://opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110011011 in the _WSJ_ about the Iran NIE. I particularly liked this part:

Exclusive reliance on hard evidence not infrequently results in deliberately blinding oneself to the most obvious explanation of what has occurred. The classic example of this failing occurred during the Vietnam War, when intelligence analysts stubbornly refused to accept that enemy supplies were pouring through Sihanoukville ostensibly on the grounds that there was no hard evidence. (Actually, there was an agent’s report that revealed the activity, but it was dismissed as insufficient.) Intelligence based on hard evidence requires supplementation by other forms of intelligence.

“Failures of imagination,” to which the 9-11 Commission referred, can come in a variety of modes.

Personally, I can’t think of anything bad that could happen from the IC engaging in speculation about another country’s nuclear program.

My babbling aside, _ACT_ editor Miles Pomper composed a more thoughtful response, which you can read below. I plan to feature more of Miles’ work in the near future.

I agree with much of the thrust of what James Schlesinger wrote in his column (“Stupid Intelligence on Iran,” Dec. 19). The recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear programs—and even more so the press coverage of that assessment— did not give sufficient weight to the danger posed by Iran’s uranium enrichment program (nor its missile programs I would add) in its narrow emphasis on an apparent 2003 halt in Iran’s weaponization activities.

However, Secretary Schlesinger is inaccurate and misleading in his analysis of the factors that may have led to Iran’s 2003 decision.

First of all, it is highly unlikely that Col. Moammar Gadhafi’s decision to abandon Libya’s nuclear program would have affected a 2003 Iranian decision to halt weaponization activities. The Libyan decision was not announced until late December 2003. Even less credible is the possibility that Iran’s decision could have been affected by the exposure of A.Q. Khan’s nuclear technology network and his subsequent confession. After all, Khan’s confession occurred in February 2004.

At the same time, Schlesinger ignores a crucial factor that likely proved more important to the 2003 Iranian decision—international inspections of Iran’s previously secret enrichment facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had been informed of Iran’s fuel cycle intentions in September 2002 and their existence was first publicly disclosed by a U.S. non-governmental organization in December 2002. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaredei first toured those facilities in February 2003 and the subsequent agency inspections led to a torrent of damaging disclosures about Iran’s program and to Iran’s reluctant agreement to grant the agency the power to conduct broader inspections beyond declared nuclear facilities.

Under these circumstances, it would have been surprising if Iran had not taken steps to hide its nuclear weapons activities most uniquely suited to weapons production. After all, discovering such activities—unlike the continuation of the dual-use enrichment program—would have represented a clear and unambiguous violation of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and required a swift referral to the UN Security Council.

Therefore, rather than attributing the Iranian decision solely to “the successes of American policy and arms” during that period, Schlesinger might have considered giving at least some credit to the international agency that may, in fact, have been more influential.

At first glance, it looks as if the time frame for Iran to build a nuclear weapon in the new NIE is the same as the one in the 2005 NIE. But I think the new estimate might actually suggest that the time frame is slightly longer.

One the last page of the “current NIE,”:http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf there’s a chart comparing the two estimates. The last row discusses the date by when Tehran could produce enough HEU for a nuke. On this point, the two estimates are essentially the same. The 2005 NIE says that Iran could do it “by the end of this decade”; the 2007 NIE says that “the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009.”

But the row above that is more interesting. It shows that, according to the 2005 NIE, the IC judged it “unlikely” that Iran would “make a *nuclear weapon*… before early-to-mid next decade.” The corresponding box for the 2007 NIE, however, says that “the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of *producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon* is late 2009…”.

After noting that this date is “very unlikely,” the chart explains that

bq. We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon
*sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.)*

That row is the only one that talks about weaponization. And only for the 2005 NIE. As we all know, there’s a distinction between these two things.

It’s a bit hard to compare these two estimates, but it _looks like_ the new one is positing a slightly longer time frame to a weapon than the previous estimate – it’s now early-to-mid next decade for Iran to acquire enough HEU for a weapon, as opposed to developing the actual weapon.

In addition to the lack of a weaponization date in the 2007 NIE, it’s hard to compare the two estimates because the 2005 NIE doesn’t compare the likelihood of different timeframes for weapons development. It’s possible that the 2005 estimate was a worst-case scenario and the time by which Tehran was _likely_ to have a nuke was later.

p=. *Covert Enrichment*

In any case, we should pay attention to the fact that the 2007 NIE is assessing the dates by which Iran could be capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon. However, the NIE says that

bq. We assess with moderate confidence that *Iran probably would use covert facilities*— rather than its declared nuclear sites—*for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon.*

I agree with this assessment…I find the notion that Iran would pull out of the NPT to be very unlikely, though I wouldn’t rule it out. If Tehran were to go this route, it would (for obvious reasons) take considerably more time to produce the relevant fissile material.

In other news, I was remiss before in failing to point out that Carah Ong has several good posts on the issue at “her place.”:http://irannuclearwatch.blogspot.com/

It’s never the evidence, is it?

bq. Bolton: Well, I think it’s potentially wrong, but I would also say, *many of the people who wrote this are former State Dept employees who during their career at the State Dept never gave much attention to the threat of the Iranian program. Now they are writing as (fingers quote) ‘members of the intelligence community’ the same opinions that they’ve had four and five years ago.*

Five years ago was 2002. But, you know, details…

[via “C&L”:http://www.crooksandliars.com/2007/12/04/bolton-not-swayed-in-the-slightest-by-the-nie-on-iran/ ]