Category Archives: DPRK

KCNA on Six-Party Statement

From 13 February, the key portions:

The talks that proceeded in a sincere atmosphere discussed the ways of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.

At the talks the parties decided to offer economic and energy aid equivalent to one million tons of heavy fuel oil in connection with the DPRK’s [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s] temporary suspension of the operation of its nuclear facilities.

And the DPRK and the United States agreed to solve their pending issues and kick off the bilateral talks aimed at opening full diplomatic ties.

At the just-concluded talks the parties agreed to have the sixth round of the six-party talks in the future.

Six-Party Joint Statement

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Here are some excerpts from the Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement. The full text can be found “here.”:http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t297463.htm

Any of this “sound familiar ?”:http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/af.asp

Credit to the administration for agreeing to this. Just remember that we almost certainly could have gotten this deal before the North Koreans tested a missile and a nuke.

In a way, I agree with “this statement”:http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0702/12/sitroom.03.html from John Bolton:

bq. This is the same thing that the State Department was prepared to do six years ago. If we going to cut this deal now, it’s amazing we didn’t cut it back then.

But anyway…

II. The Parties agreed to take the following actions in parallel in the initial phase:

1. The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK.

2. The DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement.

3. The DPRK and the US will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving pending bilateral issues and moving toward full diplomatic relations. The US will begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK.

4. The DPRK and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at taking steps to normalize their relations in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration, on the basis of the settlement of unfortunate past and the outstanding issues of concern.

5. Recalling Section 1 and 3 of the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005, the Parties agreed to cooperate in economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. In this regard, the Parties agreed to the provision of emergency energy assistance to the DPRK in the initial phase. The initial shipment of emergency energy assistance equivalent to 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) will commence within next 60 days.

The Parties agreed that the above-mentioned initial actions will be implemented within next 60 days and that they will take coordinated steps toward this goal.

III. The Parties agreed on the establishment of the following Working Groups (WG) in order to carry out the initial actions and for the purpose of full implementation of the Joint Statement:

1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

2. Normalization of DPRK-US relations

3. Normalization of DPRK-Japan relations

4. Economy and Energy Cooperation

5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism

The WGs will discuss and formulate specific plans for the implementation of the Joint Statement in their respective areas. The WGs shall report to the Six-Party Heads of Delegation Meeting on the progress of their work. In principle, progress in one WG shall not affect progress in other WGs. Plans made by the five WGs will be implemented as a whole in a coordinated manner.

The Parties agreed that all WGs will meet within next 30 days.

IV. During the period of the Initial Actions phase and the next phase, which includes provision by the DPRK of a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities, including graphite-moderated reactors and reprocessing plant, economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of 1 million tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO), including the initial shipment equivalent to 50,000 tons of HFO, will be provided to the DPRK.

The detailed modalities of the said assistance will be determined through consultations and appropriate assessments in the Working Group on Economic and Energy Cooperation.

*snip*

VII. The Parties agreed to hold the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks on 19 March 2007 to hear reports of WGs and discuss on actions for the next phase.

Here’s a “possible indication”:http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0702/12/sitroom.03.html regarding the merits of this plan:

BOLTON: This is a very bad deal. And I’m hoping that the president has not been fully briefed on it and he still has time to reject it.

It’s bad for two reasons. First, it contradicts fundamental premises of the president’s policy he’s been following for the past six years. And second, it makes the administration look very weak at a time in Iraq and dealing with Iran it needs to look strong. So I hope with few hours yet to go the president might yet reject it.

*Update:*

ACA “press release here.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2007/20070213_NKAgreement.asp

Weekly Standard Wankathon

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Michael Goldfarb wrote “this post”:http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2007/01/the_nuclear_connection.asp about the _Telegraph’s_ “North Korea/Iran nonsense.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1333/wankery-department-of He said nice things about Jeffrey and me, but I think he’s being kind of dishonest. Or he may just fail to understand what we wrote.

The main problem is that he implies that Jeffrey and I were skeptical about the story (true) but have since deemed it more plausible (false). He also claims (falsely) that additional evidence has made the claim more plausible. [Here’s Jeffrey’s “original post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1375/super-villain-team-up on the subject.]

Lest there be any ambiguity, allow me to clarify: I still think that the _Telegraph_ piece is bullshit.

Anyway, Goldfarb wrote:

The report was met with some skepticism–the estimable Dr. Jeffrey Lewis went so far as to call Coughlin a “super-hack.” Paul Kerr, another well-respected expert, also mocked the report, pointing out that the Iranian program is designed around the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) as weapons fuel, while the North Koreans used plutonium for the core of their weapon.

Now we have a report from Bill Gertz alleging intense cooperation on ICBM missile development between the two remaining members of the axis of evil. Also, Paul Kerr has changed his tune after consulting with a number of physicists who explained that the Iranians could still learn a great deal from the North Korean test, despite the use of HEU instead of plutonium. Lewis, too, seems less certain that such collaboration is unlikely.

First, the “Gertz piece”:http://washingtontimes.com/national/20070130-122437-6559r.htm he refers to is about missile, not nuclear, cooperation.

Second, I’m not sure where Goldfarb gets the idea that either Jeffrey or I have changed our minds regarding the _Telegraph_ article. For one thing, Jeffrey only wrote one post on the subject. The post that Goldfarb identifies as Jeffrey’s second is actually a “cross-post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1377/what-can-you-learn-from-a-weapon-test that I put up at ACW.

Furthermore, he cites “this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1334/does-data-from-a-pu-weapon-test-help-an-heu-weapons-program as evidence that I have “changed my tune.” But that post only indicates that Iran could perhaps benefit more from North Korean test data than I had previously suspected. That doesn’t mean that North Korea is actually providing such data.

Third, this sentence is just inaccurate:

bq. In Kerr’s opinion, the only way to significantly shorten that estimate [the IC’s 5-10 year estimate] was if the North Koreans sold weapons-grade fuel, presumably plutonium, to the Iranians.

I never wrote that, though it is true that supplying fissile material to Iran would shorten that timeline, as could several other forms of assistance. I would also note that the Coughlin piece says nothing about a Pu-transfer to Iran.

Last, Goldfarb failed to mention my other arguments for disregarding Coughlin’s article. You can “read them”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1333/wankery-department-of for yourself.

*Update:*

Goldfarb “responded.”:http://www.weeklystandard.com/Weblogs/TWSFP/TWSFPView.asp#1236 I’m glad he made clear where our opinions end and his begin.

Personally, I find this sentence to be troubling, for obvious reasons:

bq. We must assume the worst about these two regimes, and any evidence that confirms those assumptions ought to be treated as serious, rather than dismissed out of hand.

Whatever. Absence of evidence is absence of evidence. “Some guy wrote it in the paper” is not evidence.

What Can You Learn From A Weapon Test?

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I did an “interview with RFA”:http://www.rfa.org/korean/simcheongbodo/2007/01/24/nk_reported_support_iran_nuke/ a few days ago about the alleged nuclear cooperation between Iran and North Korea (which I blogged about “here”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1333/wankery-department-of.)

During that interview, I said:

bq. I don’t know if Iran has nuclear weapons program or not. But if it does that program is using highly enriched uranium for the explosive material. North Korea’s program is based on plutonium. So it’s unclear how much Iran could use whatever information they got from N.Korea.

Because I was unclear on that issue, I asked a couple of physicists. It seems that data from the test of a Pu implosion device actually could be pretty helpful to a weapons program using HEU.

One physicist told me that:

bq. With the caveat that I have never seen classified bomb design info, I would think that the only big difference between the two implosion devices is that the core of the HEU device would be somewhat bigger than the core of the Pu device because about 25 kg of HEU would be needed in comparison to 8 kg of Pu. So, the weapons scientists would have to scale up the HEU device. This would require calculating how to rearrange the conventional explosives that squeeze the HEU core.

Those calculations are apparently not terribly difficult for a competent physicist.

Another said:

bq. The results of the Pu test would validate (or invalidate) the computer models and techniques used to design, manufacture, and test the device. In particular, I would think that a successful Pu test would give a country substantial experience that would apply directly to key components of an HEU device, such as the HE assembly and related electronics and the initiator.

Glad I qualified what I said to that reporter.

*Update:*

Based on a conversation I had with a colleague, I should clarify that I am talking about the extent to which data from testing a Pu-based implosion device could help a state trying to build a similar HEU-based device. Obviously, Iran could simply choose to build a gun-type device out of HEU.

That colleague also pointed out that the design data of an implosion device would be just as important as the test data.

Wankery, Department of

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There was a “story”:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/01/24/wiran24.xml a few days ago in the _Daily Telegraph_ alleging that

North Korea is helping Iran to prepare an underground nuclear test similar to the one Pyongyang carried out last year.

Under the terms of a new understanding between the two countries, the North Koreans have agreed to share all the data and information they received from their successful test last October with Teheran’s nuclear scientists.

Thing is, the piece doesn’t seem to have a whole lot in the way of, you know, evidence:

A senior European defence official told The Daily Telegraph that North Korea had invited a team of Iranian nuclear scientists to study the results of last October’s underground test to assist Teheran’s preparations to conduct its own — possibly by the end of this year.

There were unconfirmed reports at the time of the Korean firing that an Iranian team was present. Iranian military advisers regularly visit North Korea to participate in missile tests.

Now the long-standing military co-operation between the countries has been extended to nuclear issues.

As a result, senior western military officials are deeply concerned that the North Koreans’ technical superiority will allow the Iranians to accelerate development of their own nuclear weapon.

“The Iranians are working closely with the North Koreans to study the results of last year’s North Korean nuclear bomb test,” said the European defence official.

“We have identified increased activity at all of Iran’s nuclear facilities since the turn of the year,” he said.

“All the indications are that the Iranians are working hard to prepare for their own underground nuclear test.”

Uh-huh. I talked about the story in “this RFA interview.”:http://www.rfa.org/korean/simcheongbodo/2007/01/24/nk_reported_support_iran_nuke/

[By the way, the North Koreans subsequently “reacted:”:http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/01/27/koreas.nuclear/index.html

bq. Their assertion is nothing but a sheer lie and fabrication intended to tarnish the image of the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] by charging it with nuclear proliferation,” a spokesman for North Korea’s Foreign Ministry, quoted by the state-run KCNA news agency, said Saturday.]

Anyway, the article has a few other problems.

First, I don’t know anyone who thinks Iran can conduct a nuclear test within a year. The article does say that

bq. Intelligence estimates vary about how long it could take Teheran to produce a nuclear warhead. But defence officials monitoring the growing co-operation between North Korea and Iran believe the Iranians could be in a position to test fire a low-grade device — less than half a kiloton — within 12 months.

But there’s no reason why the cooperation between North Korea and Iran discussed in the article would impact the US IC’s “5-10 year estimate.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_10/IAEAIranIntel.asp My understanding is that that estimate applies to Iran’s ability to produce HEU…North Korea’s program uses plutonium.

Second, I wrote “this piece”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_01-02/IranNK.asp about Iranian/North Korean missile cooperation for the last issue of _ACT_. When I was doing the research/reporting for it, I didn’t come across much about nuclear cooperation between the two countries.

SecState Rice “apparently agrees:”:http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/79360.htm

QUESTION: North Korea and Iran question. A report in the Daily Telegraph newspaper citing a senior European defense official who is nameless as saying that he believes that North Korea is providing assistance to Iran to conduct underground nuclear tests. Do you have any reason to believe that there’s anything to that?

RICE: I’ve only seen the report too, and I don’t even — I don’t know what it’s based on. I don’t see that it’s based on anything that I’ve seen.

Additionally, the _NYT_ in October “reported”:http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/13/world/asia/13trace.html?ex=1318392000&en=acbae84d30465ced&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss that

Last year the White House ordered a study of whether North Korea might share some nuclear fuel with Iran, but the report was inconclusive.

Some administration officials say they doubt that the North Koreans would take the risk. Others, including Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, argue that the North’s record indicates that it proliferates any weapon in its arsenal. For example, it has long supplied missiles to Iran, and there have been suspicions, but no evidence, of nuclear cooperation between the countries as well.

Wanking in public is dangerous. Just saying.

*Update:*

“Jeffrey’s take”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1375/super-villain-team-up is funnier. A little.

Greatest. Song. Title. Ever.

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Speaking of “music”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1327/2-minutes-to-midnight, according to a “KCNA article”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2007/200701/news01/19.htm#9 titled “Great Vitality of Music-based Politics:”

bq. The music-based politics of the Workers’ Party of Korea has brought about a great turn in the development of the Korean revolution and its validity and indestructible vitality is being displayed to the fuller as the days go by. Kim Jong Il, who set forth a unique idea that a genuine music should meet the demand of the times and contribute to the mission of the times in the early period of his revolutionary activities, has wisely led the work of creating famous art pieces representing the times at each stage of the revolutionary development.

Of all those songs, this one is too good to be true:”All Servicepersons and People Will Become Human Bullets and Bombs.”

Lest you think that music doesn’t matter, the article adds:

Startling miracles and labor feats are being made in many units from the beginning of the year. These are unthinkable apart from brisk mass cultural and artistic activities.

The working people of Korea are registering signal successes in all working sites of the socialist construction such as the agricultural and power, coal-mining, metal industry and rail transport sectors, singing louder the songs of struggle and advance.

The music-based politics is certain to bring earlier the building of a great, prosperous powerful nation.

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