I get the feeling that this was meant in jest, but according to “this”:http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d183 1974 memo of a meeting between US and Pakistani officials, Henry Kissinger had the following exchange with then-Prime Minster Zulfikar Ali Bhutto:

bq.. Bhutto:But don’t you come from New Delhi thinking that India is really expansionist?

Kissinger: After seeing India, I am thinking about *supplying nuclear weapons*, not only conventional arms, to *Pakistan and even Bangladesh!*

p. Likewise, I assume the below exchange between Kissinger and then-Paksitani Foreign Minster Aziz Ahmed (described in “this”:http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve08/d210 1975 MEMCON) wasn’t serious, but I don’t know enough about the history of the bilateral relationship to be certain:

bq.. Ahmed: We have submitted to you two lists of arms we need.

Kissinger: I hope the *nuclear weapons are on the second list.*

Ahmed: *They are on the third list;* we have the Pershing on the second list.

Kissinger: The Pershing issue is a big fraud. We never had any intention of giving it to Israel in any foreseeable time frame. The people who are pushing all this are the pro-Israelis who want to lock us into commitments to Israel. But you didn’t want it anyway.

Ahmed: No, *only the nuclear weapons.*

Kissinger: *The 1960 models are in surplus now so we should be able to give you some* —but I had better watch what I say since there is no telling what you might report back to Bhutto.

From “the same”:http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb377/ National Security Archives trove, comes “this”:https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/347018-doc-5-4-9-81-state-dept-draft-paper.html April 1981 State Dept paper about nuclear proliferation.

There’s a lot there, but for now, I’ll highlight this passage about a possible Iraqi nuclear weapons program:

bq. Iraq is a current example of this process. It is an NPT party,
and we have no direct evidence that it intends to develop a nuclear
explosive option. However, the fact that it is acquiring (generally
safeguarded) sensitive technology and equipment in the absence of a nuclear power program, when taken with its petroleum reserves, which cast doubt on the need for nuclear power for development for the foresee- able future, and its radical political orientation, has begun the same kind of regional and international counter reaction that would be expected if its imminent intention to proliferate were established. As could be predicted, the reaction has been strongest from Israel – then state with the greatest political/security concern over an incipient Iraqi explosive capability, and secondarily from ourselves as guarantors of Israeli security. *Long before Iraq is actually capable of a nuclear explosion we may have an Israeli counter action that poses grave regional problems.*

That was quite an observation, given “the events”:http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/TheOsirakAttack.pdf which occurred about 2 months after the report.

I could keep this up for a while.

Following on “this post,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2208/more-on-india-and-enrichment I feel compelled to note a snippet from “another document”:https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/347020-doc-7-6-25-81-inr-report.html from the National Security Archives “trove”:http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb377/ that I mentioned before.

According to the June 1981 INR report,

bq. [India] currently lacks sufficient enriched uranium for a larger weapons program.

That’s consistent with the 1979 document I “wrote about,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2206/indian-weapons-grade-heu which states that India “produces weapons grade uranium.”

Carry on.

I mentioned it once before in “this post,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2176/nukemap but Alex Wallerstein’s “Restricted Data blog”:http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/ really is the dog’s danglers.

There’s all manner of great stuff, including the “list of documents”:http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/document-list/ for download.

In the somewhat less-serious category, there are posts such as “this one”:http://nuclearsecrecy.com/blog/2012/04/20/friday-images-nevada-test-sites-arnold-opsec-videos/ about USFG reminders to safeguard sensitive information. Specifically, it contains

bq. a *series of OPSEC videos* the DOE Nevada Operations Office put together in what looks like the late 1980s or early 1990s, featuring *the hapless character “Arnold OPSEC.”* They are little film clips (non-animated) demonstrating poor, dumb Arnold OPSEC as he accidentally divulges classified information through clumsy practices.

This “video”:http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/films/media/mpg/arnold/22.mpg of a guy with a mobile phone the size of a cinderblock is particularly silly.

A little while back, I was looking through “this”:http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf 1992 DoD report about the 1991 Gulf War and discovered this line on p. 150:

bq. Intelligence estimates varied, but the planning assumption was that Iraq could produce a rudimentary nuclear weapon by the end of 1992, if not sooner.

ACA’s Peter Crail saved me some work with “this post”:http://armscontrolnow.org/2012/04/30/u-s-position-on-iran-enrichment-more-public-recognition-than-policy-shift/#more-2885 illustrating that the P5+1 have, according to their stated policies, been wiling to consider an Iranian enrichment facility for 5+ years now.

As Peter says:

bq. the potential to discuss with Iran the conditions under which it could continue enrichment is not new. In fact, it is built into the proposals that the P5+1 have offered Iran since 2006, spanning the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations.

*Update “here”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2212/yet-more-on-indian-enrichment*

As a follow-up to “this post,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2206/indian-weapons-grade-heu I thought I’d post some other related documents from the “National Security Archive.”:http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

Obviously, this is a subject I’ve been reading about a little.

Two documents concern India’s centrifuge program. According to “this 1982”:http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB187/IN31.pdf assessment, “New Delhi is conducting research into centrifuge enrichment” for nuclear power reactors.

“This”:http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB187/IN34.pdf 1988 assessment says that, according to India, New Delhi had “mastered the enrichment process using an ‘experimental centrifuge’.” The assessment describes the centrifuge as “probably similar to a “Zippe”:http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4857123 centrifuge.”

Interestingly, “this”:http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB187/IN30.pdf 1982 document mentions Indian research on the “Laser Isotope Separation (LIS) method of uranium enrichment,” something I don’t recall hearing about previously. The assessment states that India hadn’t gotten further than “separating sulphur isotopes.”

I didn’t include videos in “this post,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2205/pakistan-shaheen-1a-test so a few are below.

This gives a stationary view of the missile:

This one has more complete video of the flight:

I don’t quite know what to make of this one:

*Updates* “here”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2212/yet-more-on-indian-enrichment and “here”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2206/indian-weapons-grade-heu

Well. The “National Security Archive”:http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ released a “trove of documents”:http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb377/ the other day about US efforts (mainly during the 1980s) to constrain Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.

I haven’t looked at all of them yet, but “one”:https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/347012-doc-1-6-6-79.html from 1979 states that India “produces weapons grade uranium.” Perhaps the other documents contain more details, but this one doesn’t.

More on India’s enrichment program “here”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2166/aq-khan-and-indian-centrifuges and “here.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2158/india-on-enrichment

A bit behind the curve on this one, but Pakistan tested its Shaheen 1A IRBM a few days ago. According to “this press release,”:http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2012/4/25 the missile is “an improved version of Shaheen-1 with improvements in range and technical parameters” and is “capable of carrying nuclear and conventional warheads.”

As far as Pakistan’s doctrine goes, DG SPD Lieutenant General Khalid Ahmed Kidwai said only that the missile will “further consolidate and strengthen Pakistan’s deterrence abilities.”