There’s something I don’t quite understand about the nuclear fatwa: two Iranian officials have said that the fatwa was issued in November 2004, although one of those same officials apparently mentioned it in October 2003.

“This”:http://www.un.int/iran/statements/securitycouncil/articles/Dr.%20Zarif%20Statement%20befor%20the%20Security%20Council.%20Dec.%2023.2006.pdf December 2006 statement from Iran’s then-PermRep to the UN cites a _Kayhan_ article from November 2004. And the Rowhani “interview”:http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/05/qa-former-iran-nuclear-negotiator-bush-negotiation-bid-was-rebuffed.html about which I have “previously”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2221/rowhani-interview-2012-edition “blogged”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2225/rowhani-on-nuclear-weapons-fatwa-2012 also indicates that Iran’s Supreme Leader issued the fatwa in November 2004.

But an October 25, 2003 IRNA story (sorry can’t find it online) also mentions the fatwa. Its title?

bq. “Iran: Rowhani Says Khamene’i Considers Attempts To Access Nuclear Weapons ‘Religiously Illegal ‘ ”

Not sure I understand why this is the case, but there it is.

“This May 19 announcement”:http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2067#pr_link2067 from the Pakistani government
explains that

bq. Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Mohammad Asif Sandila today inaugurated the newly constructed Headquarters of the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC).

The Chief said that the occasion marked “the formal establishment of the Naval Strategic Force Command of Pakistan.” That might not be terribly remarkable, but I am intrigued by the description of the Strategic Force as

bq. the custodian of the nation’s 2nd strike capability

Not quite sure what that means…

One section of the “interview with Hassan Rowhani”:http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/05/qa-former-iran-nuclear-negotiator-bush-negotiation-bid-was-rebuffed.html, about which “I blogged”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2221/rowhani-interview-2012-edition a little while back, discusses the Supreme Leader’s fatwa against nuclear weapons.

For me, this is the most interesting part:

bq.. Did the content of the fatwa include both production of nuclear weapons and their use?

*When the SL discussed it, he mentioned production, storage, and use.* I believe it was in early November 2004 that the SL talked about it at the University of Tehran [where the capital’s Friday Prayers are held]. That was when we were on the verge of [signing] the Paris Agreement. The agreement mentioned Iran’s guarantees [to not produce nuclear weapons], but the European troika emphasized strong guarantees and strong commitments. *My first negotiation with the European ministers [following the fatwa] was on December 13, 2004, a month after the fatwa.* I told them that our most important discussion should be reaching an agreement about our guarantees, and your guarantees and strong commitments. […] In a negotiation session, the discussions were over the type of guarantees that the Europeans could give us. The representative of [Javier] Solana [then European Union foreign policy chief] suggested the word mohkam [strong], and our team accepted it. But our European counterparts did not appear happy with the suggestion of Solana’s representative. I told the three European ministers that they should know about *two explicit guarantees from our side, one of which is the fatwa of the SL. He issued the fatwa and declared the production nuclear weapons haram [forbidden]. This fatwa is more important to us than the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and its Additional Protocol, more important than any other law.*

Great quote from Season 7, Ep 6:

Amada Daniels to Ari Gold:

bq.. …this is like arms control — see, you’re like Iran and I need to take away your weapons because you’re reckless.

ISIS “has it.”:http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_Report_25May2012.pdf Sorry a few days late.

A bit late on this, I know, but Frontline’s “Tehran Bureau”:http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/ published a translation of an “interview”:http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2012/05/qa-former-iran-nuclear-negotiator-bush-negotiation-bid-was-rebuffed.html with Hassan Rowhani, the former head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.

Lots of good stuff…I especially like his account of the internal debate in Iran regarding the suspension of Tehran’s enrichment program. In addition to mentioning that “[m]ost people did not believe” that the IAEA BoG would refer Iran to the UNSC just for restarting the conversion facility at Esfahan, he says that the Supreme Leader initially ordered the conversion facility to be restarted was in April 2005, before Ahmadinejad was even elected. The account, honestly, is a little unclear, especially because Iran didn’t restart the facility until August of that year. Still interesting, though.

He also describes the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran’s attitude regarding the suspension:

bq.. The *AEOI was always in a hurry*, and had its own reasons. They had an organization and staff. They had hired engineers and some technical experts. Thus, when the activity was suspended, it was difficult for them. *Their thesis was that we should finish the job.* There was always a debate as to whether they could finish the job that they had begun. Since we were taking a first step along the nuclear path, and did not have prior experience, *the AEOI wanted to prove that it could finish the job, because it also faced some opposition.* I remember that a group of physics professors met with me and told me that Iran cannot do this [set up the nuclear fuel cycle]. They were saying that those who work on the project were our own students, and we believe this is not doable. The AEOI was also aware that it had opposition. Thus, *it wanted to prove that it could be done and encourage its own engineers.* Thus, naturally, they wanted to end the suspension [of Iran’s nuclear program, which lasted from October 2003 to August 2005]. But they did not want Iran’s nuclear dossier to be sent to the U.N. Security Council.

Via “this piece,”:http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-05-20/news/31779160_1_strong-beer-haywards-mount-shivalik we learn about Tactical Nuclear Penguin, said by its makers to be the world’s strongest beer. Apparently it was released about 18 months ago, but I hadn’t heard of it til now.

The details can be seen here:

I was reading the “Model Additional Protocol”:http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/1997/infcirc540c.pdf (INFCIRC/540) and thought I should point out that Annex II, titled “LIST OF SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT AND NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR THE REPORTING OF EXPORTS AND IMPORTS ACCORDING TO ARTICLE 2.a.(ix)” is a pretty good reference guide for ENR technology.

That is all.

Hey Peter…

My first editor at ACT, Peter Scoblic, is “leaving the SFRC”:http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/05/08/top_senate_staffer_joins_foreign_policy to become Foreign Policy’s new executive editor, according to Josh Rogin.

Congrats, man.

After I posted “this short bit”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2213/osirak-foreshadowing-1981-state-dept-edition about the 1981 Israeli attack on Osriak, an astute reader reminded me of a topic that I meant to blog about: Iran’s attack on the same reactor the previous year.

The National Security Archives posted “this October 1, 1980”:http://nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/iran-iraq1.pdf edition of the National Intelligence Daily which confirmed the attack.

The “post”:http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2012/03/09/document-friday-when-iran-bombed-iraqs-nuclear-reactor/#more-4872 also contains a good account (AFAIK, it’s good – I don’t know anything about the history) of the whole issue, so take a look.