Thought this might be of interest. According to the OPCW’s page on CW destruction,

Member countries cannot destroy chemical weapons in any way that they like. First of all, the principles and methods for the destruction of chemical weapons have to strictly follow the obligations of the Treaty: para. 12 of Part 4 A of the Verification Annex. On the second hand, the Convention stipulates that the destruction process cannot harm people or the environment.

Now, here are the most relevant portions of the Verification Annex…

Principles and methods for destruction of chemical weapons

12. “Destruction of chemical weapons” means a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons, and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions and other devices unusable as such.

13. Each State Party shall determine how it shall destroy chemical weapons, except that the following processes may not be used: dumping in any body of water, land burial or open pit burning. It shall destroy chemical weapons only at specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facilities.

14. Each State Party shall ensure that its chemical weapons destruction facilities are constructed and operated in a manner to ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons; and that the destruction process can be verified under the provisions of this Convention.

I’m sure I’m not the only one who’d like to know the contents of Syria’s declaration to the OPCW. According to the OPCW EC decision, Syria submitted

names, types, and quantities of its chemical weapons agents, types of munitions, and location and form of storage, production, and research and development facilities.

The EC decision calls on Syria to “supplement” its previous declaration with the following information:

the chemical name and military designator of each chemical in its
chemical weapons stockpile, including precursors and toxins, and
quantities thereof;

the specific type of munitions, sub-munitions and devices in its
chemical weapons stockpile, including specific quantities of each type
that are filled and unfilled; and

the location of all of its chemical weapons, chemical weapons storage
facilities, chemical weapons production facilities, including mixing
and filling facilities, and chemical weapons research and development
facilities, providing specific geographic coordinates;

I’ve wondered which Syrian delivery vehicles Damascus considers as part of its chemical weapons arsenal, since the government seems to have assigned many of them dual roles. Here’s the applicable part of the CWC definition of chemical weapons:

(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices.

Not sure that helps sort it out, at least for me. According to the OPCW, Syria has provided the additional information. It’ll be interesting to see what gets made public.

Very late to the party with the report, but I thought I’d do some housekeeping.

One aspect that I haven’t seen mentioned elsewhere (though I can’t say I’ve looked wicked hard) is the investigators’ security arrangements with Syrian opposition fighters. That may indicate something about possibilities for the destruction operation that’s about to commence.

Needless to say, the fact that the investigators kept working after coming under fire says a lot about them.

Someone recently pointed out to me that Charles Duelfer, of Iraq Survey Group and UNSCOM fame, has a blog.

Here is the UNSCR text.

The OPCW decision is here.

This was pretty funny:

Dear #ArmsTradeTreaty #ATT, congratulations on today’s signature! Best of luck in getting the ratification. Yours, #CTBT

— CTBTO (@ctbto_alerts) September 26, 2013

I’ve blogged about the UNSG’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons before, but I just ran across this September 5 document from UN ODA called Frequently Asked Questions about the United Nations Mission to Investigate the Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic.

ODA’s not much for brevity, it seems.

Anyhow, this portion explains one aspect of the mechanism which appears (at least to me) to be poorly understood:

What is the authority that grants the United Nations the right to investigate the
alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria?

UN General Assembly resolution A/RES/42/37C – adopted in 1987 – grants the
Secretary-General the authority to investigate alleged uses of chemical, biological or
toxin weapons. The mandate which is called the “Secretary-General’s Mechanism”
(SGM) was reaffirmed one year later by UN Security Council resolution 620 (1988).
Under the mandate, the Secretary-General is authorized to carry out investigations in
response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any UN Member State
concerning the possible use of chemical and biological weapons that may constitute a
violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of international law in
order to ascertain the facts of the matter and to report promptly the results of any such investigations to all UN Member States.

Destroying Iraq’s chemical weapons was sometimes a dangerous business. Check out these stories from UNMOVIC’s compendium:

During the inspection two incidents took place, which reminded the team that Al
Muthanna was an extremely hazardous site and that the recovery and destruction of
Iraq’s chemical weapons munitions (and agents) would be a protracted and dangerous
undertaking.

During this destruction work, a supposedly unfilled 122mm rocket warhead burst and a
nearby Iraqi worker was exposed to nerve agent. Owing to the prompt action of a
member of the inspection team the casualty was very quickly taken to the site hospital
where he received appropriate and timely treatment from Iraqi medical personnel. He
recovered over a period of a few days. A separate incident occurred in the case of the 30
chemical-filled ballistic warheads removed to Al Muthanna from Dujayl in two separate
shipments. In the first shipment, 14 warheads stated by the Iraqis to be filled with the
mixture of alcohols, and considered relatively harmless, were moved. Ten were opened,
found to contain the alcohols and were drained preparatory to destruction. At this point
the senior Iraqi official present said that the remaining four were filled with the nerve
agent sarin. Apparently these warheads had been moved during the night prior to
dispatch to Al Muthanna and the sarin-filled warheads had been confused with alcohol filled
ones.

It’ll be interesting to learn the condition of Syria’s stockpile. Lots of opinions without evidence right now.

I can’t vouch for everything in it, but the ICRC’s customary international humanitarian law project has a useful section on chemical weapons.

Perhaps they missed something, but that’s tough to believe.

Here it is. An enterprising linguist ought to compare it to the translation which came out earlier.