Can the “Esfahan FMP”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1982/more-about-irans-fmp make fuel for the Russian-made Bushehr light-water reactor, in the “unlikely”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1926/skepsis “event”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1959/dept-of-media-criticism that Russia were to cease supplying fresh fuel?

Deep in the “comments at ACW”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2225/irans-equinox-fmp-comes-online#comment, Harvard’s Matt Bunn says no:

bq. It’s highly unlikely that the Iranian statement that the plant can make fuel for Bushehr is correct. Making fuel for any particular reactor design requires knowledge of a bunch of fuel design details specific to that reactor design, which is typically proprietary. Iranian experts have told me that they originally expected Russia to license the fuel manufacturing technology to them for the VVER-1000 design at Bushehr, but Russia has refused to do so (preferring to keep the leash on Iran’s fuel supply in its own hands). Iran could potentially design and make unlicensed fuel for the reactor, but this could raise serious safety issues, and would certainly void any guarantees from Russia that Iran may have received regarding the safety and performance of the reactor. My guess is that they will be stuck relying on Russian fuel for years to come — which, of course, makes the argument that they need Natanz to ensure reliability of fuel supply very weak.

Somebody should tell Deputy AEOI chief Mohammed Saeedi, who in “recent televised comments”:http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8801231309, appeared to be saying that Iran could supply its own fuel for Bushehr. As if dreaming up some other purpose for indigenous LWR fuel, he also threw in this creative idea:

bq. He further pointed out that Iran could mull over plans to export nuclear fuel, saying that the move is allowed under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) rules and regulations.

I say go for it. Any number of Western governments stand ready to buy at a premium!

Update: Tongue out of cheek for just a moment, Iranian nuclear exports are forbidden by “UNSCR 1737”:http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf (2006). See numbered paragraph 7 at the top of page 4. This is probably why Saeedi pointedly refers to the NPT; lately, Iranian officials have decided that the NPT is valid and legitimate, but the decisions of the Security Council are not. Good to know, right?

And if you were wondering about that indigenous reactor, it’s still out there on the horizon somewhere:

Elsewhere, Saeedi announced that Tehran has successfully completed the preliminary designing of a 360-megawatt light-water reactor in the southwestern town of Darkhoveyn.

“Now we are in the conceptual planning of the reactor and preparing the specified site for Darkhoveyn (nuclear plant),” the Iranian official underlined.

But that’s a mere detail. Don’t let that stop you from making LWR fuel as soon as possible, AEOI. The completed assemblies will be a hit on the 4th annual National Nuclear Technology Day.

An alert TW reader “points out”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1976/the-festival-of-unenriched-fuel#comment that, as anticipated, there was a “centrifuge-related announcement”:http://en.isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1315373&Lang=E on Iran’s 3rd National Nuclear Technology Day:

Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced on Thursday on the occasion of the 4th [sic] national day of nuclear technology that the country has tested two types of new high-capacity centrifuges.

The Head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Gholam Reza Aghazadeh said that the centrifuges were 5 to 6 times faster than the older ones. He gave no further details.

Some of us have been waiting for this announcement more or less since _last year’s_ NNTD, or before. You might recall a certain “open-source intel bonanza”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1849/ir-2s-on-display right around then. There was an odd, unresolved detail in Jeff’s analysis:

!http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/images/1082.jpg!

[snip]

The picture also contains a hand holding what looks, to me at least, like it might, might be a carbon fiber bellows — although I don’t have any reference images to compare.

A bellows, if you don’t know already, is a short cylinder meant to connect two lengths of rotor in a centrifuge. A notch (or “crimp”) allows the entire assemblage to withstand otherwise destructive vibrations when accelerating to (or decelerating from) operational speeds.

The IR-2 and IR-3 machines — prototype devices first mentioned in IAEA reports in “Feb. 2008”:http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/IAEA_Report_22Feb2008.pdf and “May 2008”:http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/IAEA_Iran_Report_26May2008.pdf, respectively — are said to have one rotor each. But there were “too many pictures”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1849/ir-2s-on-display from last NNTD seeming to depict “multi-rotor”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1851/iran-centrifuge-components machines — either disassembled or partly assembled — not to wonder.

One possible answer: because newer, multi-rotor centrifuge models were still to be fully assembled and tested. Seizing on key details in the Feb. 2008 IAEA report, plus the same mystery photo at the top of this post, ISIS flagged this possibility back in “May 2008”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/ISIS_Iran_IAEA_Report_29May2008.pdf:

According to the February 2007 [sic] IAEA safeguards report, inspectors visiting Kalaye Electric were given information on four different centrifuge designs, including two subcritical rotor designs, one or more supercritical rotor designs with bellows, and a more advanced centrifuge, which is undefined in the report. The IR-2 and IR-3 are the two subcritical centrifuges. The IR-2 is an experimental model that contains a single composite rotor made from carbon fibers. The other parts of the rotor assembly are modified P-2 components (see figure 1). The IR-3 is an experimental model that seeks to increase the enrichment output by increasing the centrifuge’s length somewhat and by varying the cooling of the centrifuge rotor (see figure 2).

[snip]

Although not mentioned in the [May 2008 IAEA] report, there appears to be a third advanced centrifuge at the pilot plant. It appears to have the same diameter as the IR-2 and IR-3 but to have double or triple the length of the IR-2. Thus, it would hold two or three rotor tubes, connected by bellows (see figure 5). Prior to Iran’s suspension of the Additional Protocol in 2006, Iranian officials told the IAEA they could not make P-2 bellows. Iran has apparently overcome this obstacle (see figure 6).

(Thanks to Paul for pointing this out.)

Information has been leaking out around the edges. The AP’s George Jahn “mentioned the IR-4”:http://www.iranfocus.com/en/nuclear/diplomats-iran-seeks-to-buy-banned-carbon-fiber-17389.html last month in a story about carbon-fiber importation. (Does this mean that the mysterious fourth new centrifuge doesn’t use carbon fiber? I suspect we’ll learn soon.)

And now the NCRI has “told the WSJ”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123928982470105267.html that the new machines are “being assembled” in the basement of a “reception center” at Natanz. Too bad they weren’t exhibited to the press this year.

Update: Back in February, the AEOI’s Agazadeh said that new-generation centrifuges would soon be installed at Natanz, as “Paul has pointed out”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1913/new-iranian-centrifuges-to-be-installed.