Sean-Paul Kelley was kind enough to “link”:http://agonist.org/sean_paul_kelley/20080906/india_pakistan_and_nukes to “this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1703/unsc-on-india-and-pakistan about UNSCR 1172.

One of his readers wrote in to say:

bq. “Sean-Paul, just fyi, I think that that comment you referred to by Paul misunderstands what the UNSC resolution in question in fact does (even for the UN the text is clear enough). It calls on India and Pakistan to become signatories to the NPT. If they were to have done so, then they would not be allowed to have weapons. They didn’t sign up, however, nor could that particular UNSC resolution or any other force them to do so.”

I’m honestly not sure what this person thinks I got wrong. Article 25 says what it says, but it is true that the council took no action to try and force India and Pakistan to accede to the NPT.

ACA has “it.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/Final+Version+of+Statement.pdf

I am still thinking about it, but Daryl has some “action.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3340/print This part jumped out at me:

The text of the NSG’s Sept. 6 statement on India — along with the national statements issued today by Austria, China, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and others — indicates that even if the NSG guidelines are not as clear as they should be or fail to include key provisions to reduce the adverse nonproliferation consequences, for all practical purposes:

– NSG states should not and will not likely engage in “full” nuclear trade with India;

– NSG states should and very likely would terminate nuclear trade with India if it resumes testing; and

– India’s compliance with it pre-2005 nonproliferation commitments and the implementation of bilateral trade with India will be reviewed on a regular (probably annual) basis by the NSG.

The rules are gone. Now what?

So what was happening about -15- 10 years ago? Well, the UNSC was adopting Resolution 1172 in response to New Delhi and Islamabad’s nuclear weapons tests.

The full text is “here”:http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/158/60/PDF/N9815860.pdf?OpenElement, but it’s worth pointing out that the council demanded that the two countries “refrain from further nuclear tests” and “become Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.”

The resolution also called on Islamabad and New Delhi

bq. immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, to confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them and to undertake appropriate commitments in that regard

One other interesting provision that I had forgotten about concerns the question of whether India and Pakistan could be nuclear-weapon states. Unsurprisingly, the answer is “No”:

bq. in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons India or Pakistan cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State.

Oh, the resolution also encouraged other countries to

bq. prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology that could *in any way* assist programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and welcomes national policies adopted and declared in this respect.

Interesting, given “recent events.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1699/nsg-approves-india-exemption

Here is Article 25 of the “UN Charter,”:http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ if anyone cares:

bq. The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Yes, it’s a Saturday, but it’s raining outside and I _could_ be playing World of Warcraft, so leave me alone…

Nothing on the NSG website about the exemption yet, but “this is”:http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/PRESS/2008-AUG-Press-Vienna.pdf what they said after the last meeting in August.

[ACA has the “August”:http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3274 and “more recent”:http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/Revised+NSG+Draft+for+Sept++4-5+Mtg.pdf versions of the proposed waiver language. They “also have”:http://www.armscontrol.org/projects/India/20060327_DraftNSGProposal the 2006 version.]

So far, it seems that India got a fairly clean exemption.

Anil Kakodkar, head of India’s DAE, “said”:http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/sep/06ndeal10.htm that the final NSG text doesn’t spell out consequences for New Delhi if it tests nuclear weapons:

bq. “There is no explicit mention of nuclear testing (in the NSG waiver),” he told reporters, making it clear that the exemption granted to India by the 45-nation cartel met all the requirements of the Department of Atomic Energy.

He also seemed to confirm something I “said before”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1699/nsg-approves-india-exemption – that India hasn’t made any new commitments on nuclear testing:

bq. “We have made *no legal commitment (on nuclear tests)*,” Kakodkar said, underlining that India has already made a unilateral, voluntary moratorium on conducting atomic tests.

“Reuters”:http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSL626795620080906?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=10215&sp=true seems to back Kakodkar’s statement, saying that the “final draft cited only the need for a special NSG meeting if India reneged on its commitments.”

At least one person complained that this is kinda weak:

“The problem here is that the NSG works only on the basis of consensus. So if India did another test the follow-up meeting could be reduced to a talkshop by any one member like the Americans,” said another diplomat.

“It’s not clear we could take action as a group.”

*Update:* Siddharth Varadarajan “seems to confirm”:http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com/2008/09/nsg-update-1415-deal-is-done-and-its.html the above:

bq. There are no post-conditions providing for automatic termination of supply if some member state feels India is not living up to its non-proliferation commitments. The NSG always has the right to consult and convene in case members feel this has happened but a decision to cut off supplies will have to be adopted by consensus. There are no separate restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing technology exports.

The _WSJ_ has “some action”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122070708407706859.html?mod=googlenews_wsj on the meeting:

The NSG talks Friday began constructively with delegations split between those that would accept a revised draft of a resolution text, and those that wanted tough language that would permit conditional nuclear exports to India, according to a diplomat familiar with the discussion. *Additional changes Friday morning and afternoon brought more delegations on board, but not all,* the diplomat said.

*In the late afternoon the delegates reconvened in an unusual evening session for what they hoped would be one last push to agree on a new revised resolution text, according to a diplomat with knowledge of the discussion.*

About 8:00 pm *the delegations were still far apart and split into smaller working groups, in the hope of later meeting again in full session for a final decision. During the evening, the U.S. intensified its diplomatic effort in a series of phone calls*, one diplomat said.

At *2:00 am and still without agreement, the meeting adjourned until 11:00 am when delegates returned to approve a resolution.*

Good times…