Nothing on the NSG website about the exemption yet, but “this is”:http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/PRESS/2008-AUG-Press-Vienna.pdf what they said after the last meeting in August.
[ACA has the “August”:http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3274 and “more recent”:http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/Revised+NSG+Draft+for+Sept++4-5+Mtg.pdf versions of the proposed waiver language. They “also have”:http://www.armscontrol.org/projects/India/20060327_DraftNSGProposal the 2006 version.]
So far, it seems that India got a fairly clean exemption.
Anil Kakodkar, head of India’s DAE, “said”:http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/sep/06ndeal10.htm that the final NSG text doesn’t spell out consequences for New Delhi if it tests nuclear weapons:
bq. “There is no explicit mention of nuclear testing (in the NSG waiver),” he told reporters, making it clear that the exemption granted to India by the 45-nation cartel met all the requirements of the Department of Atomic Energy.
He also seemed to confirm something I “said before”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1699/nsg-approves-india-exemption – that India hasn’t made any new commitments on nuclear testing:
bq. “We have made *no legal commitment (on nuclear tests)*,” Kakodkar said, underlining that India has already made a unilateral, voluntary moratorium on conducting atomic tests.
“Reuters”:http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSL626795620080906?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=10215&sp=true seems to back Kakodkar’s statement, saying that the “final draft cited only the need for a special NSG meeting if India reneged on its commitments.”
At least one person complained that this is kinda weak:
“The problem here is that the NSG works only on the basis of consensus. So if India did another test the follow-up meeting could be reduced to a talkshop by any one member like the Americans,” said another diplomat.
“It’s not clear we could take action as a group.”
*Update:* Siddharth Varadarajan “seems to confirm”:http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com/2008/09/nsg-update-1415-deal-is-done-and-its.html the above:
bq. There are no post-conditions providing for automatic termination of supply if some member state feels India is not living up to its non-proliferation commitments. The NSG always has the right to consult and convene in case members feel this has happened but a decision to cut off supplies will have to be adopted by consensus. There are no separate restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing technology exports.