More on Iran and Centrifuges

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Jeffrey beat me to the punch with “this post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1457/iran-enriching-on-industrial-scale about Iran’s announcement that it has begun industrial-scale enrichment.

I agree that there’s little new to this. I can add little value to what Jeffrey wrote, but I will try.

First, Iran almost certainly does not have 3,000 centrifuges installed. Some important facts:

* Iran missed its stated goal of installing 3,000 centrifuges by March 2007.

* Iran “told the IAEA”:http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-08.pdf that it would “continue progressively with the installation of…18 cascades of [sic] the 3000-machine hall and to bring them gradually into operation by May 2007.”

* Press reports from late March indicate that Iran wasn’t even close to 3,000. For example, Michael Adler from AFP reported 29 March that a “diplomat said Iran had installed six cascades of 164 centrifuges each at Natanz and was test-running four of the cascades.”

Similarly, George Jahn from AP wrote 31 March that

bq. Two diplomats on Friday said that Iran had already linked up more than 900 of the devices and was ready to introduce uranium gas in them, starting the process of enrichment on a larger scale than previous attempts.”

FWIW, I have also heard from reliable source that Iran has a little under 1,000 centrifuges installed at the facility.

p=. *Iran Enriching Uranium?*

Is Iran enriching uranium in the larger Natanz facility? Well, Larijani “seemed to indicate”:http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSBLA82551420070409?src=040907_1302_TOPSTORY_nuclear_nation&pageNumber=1 that this is the case. And it’s certainly possible that Tehran’s claim to have begun fuel production means that Iran has now begun running the cascades with UF6.

But I remain curious. According to the IAEA,

bq. Iran informed the Agency of its plan to start feeding UF6 into the cascades installed at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) by the end of February 2007

I have seen no press reports since then saying that Iran has begun enriching uranium, though I certainly may have missed something. Adler reported that “Iran has not yet put in the uranium feedstock gas used to make enriched uranium.”

And I am still interested in this bit from “the IRNA story”:http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-22/0704093757194438.htm Jeffrey linked to that quoted the AEOI’s Mohammad Saiedi:

bq. He [Saiedi] declined to comment on whether Iran’s entry into the stage of fuel production on industrial scale meant injection of gas to 3,000 centrifuges.

p=. *Exaggerating Size*

Jeffrey listed several reasons for Iran to exaggerate its claims. I would add one more. As I “told Elaine Shannon,”:http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1608169,00.html

bq. Iran has been creating facts on the ground as part of its negotiating strategy…The further along the program, the more of it they will be able to keep in the future — so their thinking goes.

It’s also worth mentioning that, given the technical difficulties with Iran’s enrichment program, I think today’s industrial-scale enrichment claim is really one of the few benchmarks of progress that Iran can point to publicly, at least for now.

p=. *So What is Industrial-Scale Enrichment?*

Jeffrey addressed this issue already, but I thought I’d highlight what Saiedi himself said:

…asked how many centrifuges were needed for start fuel production at the industrial level, Saiedi said, “We enter the industrial stage after passing the pilot stage.”

When questioned about number of centrifuges Iran used in the pilot stage, Saiedi said, “Our pilot stage included two cascades of 164 centrifuges; we passed the stage and entered the industrial level.” In response to a reporter who said installation and operation of more than 3,000 centrifuges meant entry to the industrial level from the IAEA viewpoint, Saiedi said, “That’s the view of you reporters.”

Now to look for houses in Montana…

Iran and Bushehr

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Just wanted to add a little to a “good post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1444/policy-changes-podvig-on-russia-and-bushehr from Jane about the Bushehr project. Specifically, I think that discussions of Russian motivations for completing the reactor frequently ignore Russia’s desire to maintain/establish its reputation as a reliable nuclear supplier for -countries other than Russia- potential customers outside of Iran.

As Pavel Podvig says in the “_BAS_ column”:http://www.thebulletin.org/columns/pavel-podvig/20070326.html that Jane cites:

*Rosatom most likely understands that abandoning Bushehr now would deal a serious blow to its reputation as a commercial partner.* In this situation, resorting to delays and hoping that the situation will somehow resolve itself is the only option.

I think there’s a lot to this…I first thought of it when I heard Vladimir Orlov’s “presentation”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/2005conference/2005_conference.htm#Iran at the most recent Carnegie conference. He didn’t make the supply credibility argument but did point out that the project isn’t worth all that much to Russia:

bq. Economically, we are not gaining much from nuclear cooperation with Iran. I’m sorry, but the numbers, the amounts we were discussing about only Bushehr content are much lower than they were publicized. And probably in the mid-90s that was something not of little importance for the Russian impoverished ministry of atomic energy. Currently, the situation in Russia and its economic growth is quite different, so actually what we got from Iran economically from Bushehr is not that much attractive.

I would be remiss if I didn’t point out Jane’s argument that Russia has already done a few things to damage its reputation as an energy supplier:

bq. Russia’s cut off of gas to Ukraine in January 2006 and of oil through Belarus in January 2007 has partners hesitating in relying too much on Russia in the future. Regardless of whose fault these dispute really were, Russia clearly has the capacity and the will to cut off very significant energy flows in times of disagreement.

This is in the context of fuel supply, rather than reactor construction, but it’s a good point.

Orlov, BTW, added this amusing anecdote:

bq. …[a] senior Russian official once asked – I think in the 101st time – but what finally Russia feels about nuclear cooperation with Iran. Are you still partners? He was probably so exhausted with that question, he said, oh yes. We, of course, are partners with Iran. From the times of Mr. Griboyedev, we are partners with Iran. And of course, without the context, it could be difficult to understand what it means. The context was simple. Mr. Griboyedev is a famous Russian poet of the 19th century who was also diplomat decapitated by Mog in Teheran. So we are of course strategic partners, but with some footnotes, right?

Happy Friday.

Me on Radio Agonist

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I haven’t listened to it, so I have no idea how much I rambled. The IR theory part especially drew on some very old memories.

Anyway, Sean-Paul and Ian are really nice guys and the podcast can be found “here.”:http://agonist.org/sean_paul_kelley/20070405/radio_agonist_with_paul_kerr

N Korean Radio and Iranian Enrichment

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I’m not sure this has anything to do with anything, but I just found this bit of a 21 March North Korean radio broadcast:

On 16 March, during an interview with a daily, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki reiterated, once again, his country’s right to peaceful use of nuclear energy.

He said that Iran has the right to use nuclear energy for a peaceful purpose and uranium enrichment activity is a central issue for his country.

Given that, he stressed that his government will continue to promote uranium enrichment activity and Iran will never give up its basic right whatever price it has to pay.

It _is_ an example of the North Koreans watching what the Iranians do…not trivial, given the lack of available public evidence.

Kahuta and SWU Capacity

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Andreas Persbo has a “good post”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2007/03/entering-kahns-little-den.html up at his place on the subject.

This is a decent summary:

bq. But what is the capability of this plant today? Well, figures are both unreliable and, in addition, some sixteen years out of date. It is *sometimes assumed in the literature that the facility has some 3,000 centrifuges operating at any given moment, and that the capacity of the plant is somewhere between 9,000 and 15,000 separative work units.* These figures rely on open source information compiled and assessed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (Albright, et al., 1997). The authors of the study readily admit that “the number of operating machines at any one time is highly uncertain. Part of the confusion is that Pakistan has installed considerably more machines than it has successfully operated. In 1986, it was reported that Kahuta had 14,000 centrifuges.” (See p. 275). Yet, *the claim that the plant is capable of a meager 15,000 SWU’s resurface time and time again.* Over the last couple of weeks, I have been compiling a Google Earth placemark of the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory, cross-checking with public imagery analysis to get a complete picture of the facility. Almost immediately, *I suspected that the 15,000 SWU figure might be grossly misleading.*

The argument is a little involved, so read the whole thing. I was glad to see that he gave proper credit to “Jeffrey and Mark Hibbs.”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1399/p3-and-p4-centrifuge-data

Weekly Standard Wankathon II

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Michael Goldfarb, the “_Weekly Standard_ dude” I mentioned “here,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1392/rok-intel-on-yongbyon-reactor “commented”:http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2007/04/absence_of_evidence.asp on my “post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1392/rok-intel-on-yongbyon-reactor about the US IC’s assessment that Iran and North Korea are not collaborating on nuclear weapons.

According to Goldfarb, the US IC and I believe that

bq. an absence of evidence that the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs are collaborating is, in fact, evidence of absence.

I’ve actually emailed with Goldfarb a bit in the past and he seems like a pretty nice guy. But this is really a bit silly. As I “previously wrote”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1337/_weekly-standard_-wankathon about a similar Goldfarb post:

bq. Absence of evidence is absence of evidence. “Some guy wrote it in the paper [or on the internets]” is not evidence.

I find the prevalence of this sort of “we should assume the worst” nonsense in wingnutistan to be an interesting phenomenon. I’d like to find time to write more about it, but I will note two things here.

*First,* Goldfarb’s post contains an example of a weird moral component that is frequently found in his ilk’s evaluations of potential threats from unsavory governments:

bq. I mean, we haven’t actually seen Kim Jong-Il handing plutonium to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, so I’m sure they’ve confined their collaboration to the development of missile systems.

He then implies that I and the US IC are giving “these rogue regimes the benefit of the doubt.”

To me, this sort of sneering rhetoric implies that one is a bad person if one doesn’t believe the worst about bad governments. Remember that Goldfarb doesn’t have an actual argument, just a label for the governments in Tehran and Pyongyang.

*Second,* examining evidence through such a lens conveniently excuses ignorance – why know anything about Iran and North Korea when you think you should believe “even discredited reports”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1375/super-villain-team-up of nuclear collaboration between the two?

*Update:*

Elevated from the comments…

I should have pointed out “this post”:http://roboteconomist.blogspot.com/2007/03/what-nonproliferation-means-to-them.html by the Robot Economist, as well as “this article”:http://www.democracyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6517 by Jofi Joseph.

ROK Intel on Yongbyon Reactor

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An unnamed ROK intel official was quoted in a 19 March Yonhap News Service story about the status of North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear reactor.

As of that day, the reactor was “operating normally,” according to “a ranking official at the National Intelligence Service.”

Even if this information is a little outdated, I think it’s worth noting that, according to the NIS official, “a constant stream of steam spotted from its cooling tower” showed that the reactor was still operational.

The official added that

“Whether the Yongbyon reactor is in operation or not can be determined by the existence of the cooling tower steam. Depending on some operational and weather conditions, however, such steam may not be visible”…

“Therefore, North Korea’s suspension of the Yongbyon reactor will be confirmed by the halt of the cooling tower steam or on-the-spot inspection by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors,” he explained.

I will add that it’s more accurate to say that the IAEA _will_ monitor the shutdown, per the “13 February agreement.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1353/six-party-joint-statement

The cooling tower signature is, of course, well known. See, for example, “this ISIS brieifng”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/dprkplutonium.pdf about North Korea’s plutonium production.

IC on Iran – NK Nuclear Cooperation

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Greetings from Dallas.

While working on an article for _ACT_, I read a 27 February SASC hearing during which Sen. Collins asked Admiral McConnell and General Maples about reports that Tehran and Pyongyang were cooperating on nuclear weapons research.

Short answer: No.

That’s pretty much the long answer too. Here’s the exchange:

SEN. SUSAN COLLINS (R-ME): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, in your testimony you describe Iran and North Korea as the states of most concern to us. Both are determined, it appears, to pursue nuclear capability. We hope that the recent agreement with North Korea will help in that regard.

You’ve described Iran as, quote, “determined” to develop nuclear weapons.

*Do you have evidence that North Korea is assisting Iran in developing its nuclear capabilities?*

*ADM. MCCONNELL: No, ma’am, I’m not aware of anything.* Let me turn to my colleagues, if they are. I don’t know of anything — any connection between the two.

*SEN. COLLINS: General?*

*GEN. MAPLES: No, ma’am.*

SEN. COLLINS: The reason I ask is there was a CRS report that was issued back in October of last year that says the evidence suggests that North Korea has had extensive dealings with Iran on missiles and other weapons. But General?

GEN. MAPLES: That’s correct, they have had extensive interaction on the development of missile systems. And Iran, in fact, has purchased missiles from North Korea.

SEN. COLLINS: But *there’s no concern that North Korea may be helping Iran develop nuclear capabilities?*

*GEN. MAPLES: There is a concern, but we haven’t seen –*

*SEN. COLLINS: But no evidence to support it?*

*ADM. MCCONNELL: No evidence, that’s correct, Senator.*

Check out posts from “Jeffrey”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1375/super-villain-team-up “and me”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1333/wankery-department-of about the subject. I also “made fun of”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1337/_weekly-standard_-wankathon a _Weekly Standard_ dude for criticizing them.

North Korea Hearts the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

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I am busy, but this is pretty good.

From the “_Chosun Ilbo_:”:http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200703/200703280023.html

bq. When North Korea’s chief nuclear negotiator Kim Kye-gwan met his U.S. counterpart Christopher Hill in New York on March 5, a source familiar with U.S.-North Korean relations says, Kim asked Hill to “treat us the way you treat India.”

Niiiiiiice.

*Update:* Big ups to the “Robot Economist.”:http://roboteconomist.blogspot.com/2007/03/nonproliferation-lols-30-march-2007.html

Libya CW

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Jeffrey has a great “post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1440/targhuna-cw-facility up about Libya’s once-suspected CW facility at Tarhuna.

I would add that the “report”:http://www.wmd.gov/report/report.html from the _Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction_ contains a “chapter”:http://www.wmd.gov/report/report.html#chapter2 about US intel on Libya’s NBC weapons. The report doesn’t mention Tarhuna specifically, but some of its findings are interesting – particularly in light of the issues Jeffrey highlighted.

For example, the report says that

bq. The Intelligence Community’s central judgment that Libya possessed chemical weapons agents and chemical weapons aerial bombs was correct, but Libya’s *actual chemical agent stockpile proved to be smaller in quantity than the Intelligence Community estimated.*

One wonders if that overestimate has something to do with the false belief that Tarhuna was a CW production facility. One sentence in this paragraph _might_ indicate that such is the case:

bq. *Analysts based their estimates of Libya’s chemical weapons capabilities on assessments of chemical production capabilities and access to precursors.* Analysts judged that Libya had produced, at most, roughly 100 metric tons of mustard agent. 10 They also believed that Libya had produced small quantities of sarin, 11 but assessed that this would have been of very low quality and therefore would have degraded quickly. 12 Analysts generally did not believe that Libya had chemical warheads for missile delivery, but they assessed that Libya could probably weaponize existing chemical agents in some fashion. 13 They further concluded that Libya had produced approximately 1,000 250-kg aerial chemical weapons bombs. 14

But who knows?

Anyway, the report also has some apparently-relevant (given the discussion of aerial imagery) commentary regarding the effectiveness of “technical collection techniques:”

The Intelligence Community’s performance with regard to Libya’s chemical and biological programs was more modest, due in part to *the limited effectiveness of technical collection techniques against these targets.*

As discussed above, the Intelligence Community possessed some limited information suggesting that Libya was continuing work on limited chemical and biological programs. *The overall paucity of intelligence on these programs, however, may be attributed in no small measure to the general ineffectiveness of technical collection efforts.*

That being said, *it should be noted that there are few distinguishing characteristics that enable the identification of chemical or biological facilities through imagery or other technical means.*

Happy Monday.