It’s out. Shockingly, ISIS “posted it.”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEA_Iran_Report_22Feb2008.pdf I’ll write some more about it soon, but they have “an issue brief”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/ISISIssueBriefIran22Feb2008.pdf as well.

While I’m on the subject, check out “the report”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/ISIS_Iran_P2_7Feb2008.pdf they wrote about Iran’s IR-2 centrifuge. For more on that subject, check out “these two”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2008/02/irans-ir-2-centrifuge.html excellent “posts”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2008/02/irans-new-toy-continued.html by Andreas Persbo.

“STFU, wingnuts.”:http://dni.gov/press_releases/20071208_statement.pdf

Quick post from a cool little coffee shop/flower shop/art gallery in Littleton, NH.

Barbara Slavin argued at a “recent CAP event”:http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12/iran_event.html that people interested in Iran ought to take a look at the 1981 Algiers Accords.

I agree. “Here they are.”:http://www.parstimes.com/history/algiers_accords.pdf

*Update:*

Link fixed. Also, per the recommendation of a reader, I should point out that Barbara Slavin emphasized the below portion of the agreement when she spoke. It’s interesting, given subsequent U.S. policies:

The United States pledges that it is and from now on will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs.

Miles tells me that the _WSJ_ published his response, first blogged “here,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1558/j-schlesinger-on-iran to J Schlesinger’s piece on Iran. Sub. Req., so no link as of yet.

And “vote for”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1557/arms-control-person-of-the-year ACA Arms Control Person of the Year.

*Update:*
-“Here’s the link,”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119862828617249709.html courtesy of a loyal reader.-

You can tell I have other things to do…

Anyhow, I said “in this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1552/the-iran-niehow-long-until-a-nuke that

bq. …it looks as if the time frame for Iran to build a nuclear weapon in the new NIE is the same as the one in the 2005 NIE. But I think the new estimate might actually suggest that the time frame is slightly longer.

Well, the first glance was right; according to a transcript of a BG briefing about the NIE that was given by some senior intel officials, the time frame in the 07 estimate is the same as the one given two years before.

I don’t think I can post my copy of the transcript, but anyone is welcome to share if they have one.

An anonymous FoKerr sent this to me a little while back. S/he is, I hope, forgiving.

A handful of reactions.

The overall conclusions are plausible in light of the public record of events.

Unfortunately, the conclusions are confusingly stated at some points, and seem bound to mislead the casual reader. It is not as apparent as it ought to be that the major elements of Iran’s clandestine military nuclear program are identical to those of its overt civilian nuclear program. Nor were they willingly surfaced; they were “taken public” as a way of sustaining them only after others had made them public.

Skeptics can be forgiven for observing that the IC has just moved from one “high confidence” conclusion to another “high confidence”
conclusion opposed to the first, without explaining clearly what went amiss the first time, or why we readers should now have high
confidence ourselves. Despite some clear efforts at change in recent years, the IC appears (to this outsider, at least) to face cultural and methodological problems in the handling of confidence and uncertainty that threaten both the clarity and credibility of
important products. But, with the caveats given above, that does not necessarily make the broad conclusions of the document wrong.

The conclusions of the NIE have been embraced by many whom you’d think wouldn’t be so eager to credit the administration with a success (albeit one recognized only belatedly), let alone with having read Iranian intentions correctly at the time of the “Axis of Evil” speech. This reaction appears motivated by excessive fears of imminent armed conflict, influenced by an Iraq analogy. In practice, the main lines of U.S. policy on Iran actually have been to pursue a combination of broadly multilateral, unilateral, and “coalition” sanctions, while making an occasional show of force to reassure skittish allies.

It is very difficult for the IC to reverse itself on such sensitive
issues, so respect is due to those who did so regardless.

Nevertheless, by virtue of its subject matter, the NIE is a policy
statement as much as anything else. Its conclusions were such that it would have leaked had it not first been released. And its release has thrown a spanner into the works of the diplomatic process. By intention or by accident, the IC has asserted itself as an autonomous actor in the U.S. policy community, akin to the Federal Reserve Bank.

This NIE was ordered up by Congress in the last defense budget bill. The 2005 version — apparently a “memo to holders” (i.e., a partial update, not a full-blown NIE) — appears to have been initiated by the IC leadership itself. The administration seems never to have regarded the IC as a useful tool, and has effectively conceded its management to others. That may explain, in part, how we have come to the present circumstances.