China recently issued its Working Paper on the Nuclear Submarine Cooperation under AUKUS which describes the AUKUS submarine project as “nothing but an act of nuclear proliferation.”

A couple of days later, Australia circulated a non-paper titled Update on Cooperation under the AUKUS Partnership which informs us that

No decisions have been taken regarding the structure of our future cooperation under AUKUS, or a suitable verification arrangement for the IAEA to meet its technical objectives regarding Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines. We expect to be able to announce further details following the consultation period, which concludes in March 2023.

Here’s a DAE chart:

From an August 5 letter from Pakistan to the UNSC:

the absence of any dialogue on the peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute and the ever-present threat of conflict between two nuclear-armed States, the international community cannot allow the situation in Indian illegally occupied Jammu and Kashmir to deteriorate further with the attendant threat to international peace and security.

More from that 2018 report:

In the past, there has been open disagreement in Nato about its nuclear deterrence policy. This was particularly apparent in 1979 when Nato made its dual-track decision. The countries that had reservations about the decision expressed this through dissenting footnotes in various subsequent Nato declarations. This footnote policy significantly weakened the influence of the countries concerned on Nato policy, and undermined unity within the Alliance.

In 2018, Norway’s Parliament “requested the Government to review the consequences for Norway of ratifying the recently adopted Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.” Here’s the report.

Here’s the assessment:

The Government attaches great importance to Norway’s Nato obligations. Nato membership is the cornerstone of Norway’s security and defence policy, and the Alliance must not be undermined. Ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons by Norway or by any of the other Nato Allies would cause divisions in the Alliance. This would primarily serve the interests of countries that pose a security threat to Norway and other Nato members.

Norway and Nato share the goal of achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons. This process will depend on the participation of all countries that have nuclear weapons. If Nato were to abandon its own nuclear deterrence but nuclear-weapon states outside the Alliance did not, this would make Norway and the Alliance vulnerable and create a dangerous strategic imbalance. Given the strategic importance of nuclear weapons in security policy, the Treaty has limited potential as a tool for applying political pressure.

Here’s a map from DAE.

Statement open for endorsement by all States parties to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

We reaffirm that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea cannot and will never have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty,

From 1996.

This portion about nuclear deterrence is perhaps of current interest:

Here’s a good 2022 piece titled “Targeting Al Shifa: Explaining an Intelligence
Failure.” I’m not in a position to validate these claims, but I found this section helpful:

Here’s one: