Category Archives: Iran

M Rubin on Iran

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Michael Rubin “takes issue today”:http://corner.nationalreview.com/post/?q=NTQyMzc1MWIwOWExMTE5YWU0ODVhZWMzYjNmNTE4Njk with “this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2000/m-rubin-and-iran-hackery.

I took issue with the idea he expressed in this “oped”:http://www.michaelrubin.org/5274/what-iran-really-thinks-about-talks, which can be summarized by these sentences:

bq. Iran’s responsiveness to diplomacy is a mirage. After two years of talks following exposure of its Natanz facility, Tehran finally acquiesced to a temporary enrichment suspension, a move which Secretary of State Colin Powell called “a little bit of progress,” and the EU hailed.

The only point I was trying to make is that Iran did compromise during its 2003-2005 negotiations with the E3. I provided some evidence which, I think, is relevant to the above point. Rubin says it’s not relevant, so maybe I’m missing the point of his article. In any case, he doesn’t refute it.

I also disagree that the interview with Rowhani supports his article’s contention. I still think that’s the case.

I will address his comments about my employer and my integrity in another post.

More About Centrifuge Lineage

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!/images/99.jpg!

Maybe you remember some earlier discussion of “Iran’s new-generation centrifuges”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1984/the-black-bellows. The IAEA introduced the subject to us back in “Feb. 2008”:http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/IAEA_Report_22Feb2008.pdf:

bq. 44. On 8 November 2007, Iran stated that it “agreed that exchanging of the new centrifuge generation information” would be discussed with the Agency in December 2007 (GOV/2007/58, para. 33). On 13 January 2008, the Director General and Deputy Director General for Safeguards visited an AEOI R&D laboratory at Kalaye Electric, where they were given information on R&D activities being carried out there. These included work on four different centrifuge designs: two subcritical rotor designs, a rotor with bellows and a more advanced centrifuge. Iran informed the Agency that the R&D laboratory was developing centrifuge components, measuring equipment and vacuum pumps with the aim of having entirely indigenous production capabilities in Iran.

So, just how “indigenous”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2002/p-is-for-persian are these designs, exactly? Do they have an identifiable lineage?

For glimmerings of insight into this question, we must turn to the indefatigable Mark Hibbs, who has had a few articles on related subjects in recent years.

According to MH in the Jan. 29, 2007 issue of _NuclearFuel_, Pakistan developed not just the by-now-familiar P-1, based on URENCO’s SNOR and CNOR machines, and not just the P-2, based on URENCO’s G-2, but also a P-3 and P-4, starting in the mid-1980s.

(As an aside, this might explain why Khan and his associates were prepared to start selling the earlier technology: it was obsolete. Old machines were being replaced, and those elements of the supply chain that were devoted to their components and materials (e.g., CNOR bearings) would no longer serve a purpose for Pakistan, KRL, or Khan — except to make some money.)

Hibbs writes:

bq. While individual segments of Pakistan’s aluminum P-1 model had a throughput of less than 1 SWU/year, P-2, which features two maraging steel rotor tube segments, had a throughput of about 5 SWU/yr. P-3, the first of two later centrifuges, according to the intelligence information, is a four-tube model with a throughput of just under 12 SWU/yr. A successor model, P-4, may have a throughput slightly over 20 SWU/yr, the information indicates.

It should come as no surprise, by now, that the P-3 and P-4 were based on URENCO models, the four-tube 4-M and the six-tube TC-10, also known as SLM, according to MH in the Feb. 15, 2007 issue of _Nucleonics Week._

It’ll certainly be interesting to learn how much the IR-4 — apart from having carbon-fiber rotors — resembles the P-3. Certainly, to judge by what Hibbs writes, the IAEA had its suspicions.

Another possibility, though, is that the IR-4 is basically an upgraded, carbon-fiber version of the P-2, owing nothing in particular to the P-3 or P-4.

As for the “more advanced centrifuge” mentioned by the IAEA last year, we’ll just have to wait and see.

_Edited lightly for clarity._

Iran and Kazakhstan: BFF?

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Lost in the noise over “National Nuclear Technology Day”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1982/more-about-irans-fmp was some of the diplomatic news around that time. The Syrian foreign minister visited Iran and affirmed Iran’s right to enrich uranium. Just a couple of days before, -so did- the President of Kazakhstan affirmed Iran’s right to “use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” during a visit there by Ahmadinejad. But that wasn’t all.

“According to Payvand News”:http://www.payvand.com/news/09/apr/1070.html:

President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev stressed Iran’s right on Monday to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The Kazak president made the statement after his private talks with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who arrived in Astana on Monday for a two-day official visit.

The two presidents attended a joint press conference after discussing ways to further develop Tehran-Astana relations and cooperation.

[snip]

Referring to the issue of establishing a nuclear fuel bank, a proposal backed by the US, Nazarbayev voiced Kazakhstan’s readiness to establish the bank.

“If a nuclear fuel bank is to be established, Kazakhstan has the ability to do so,” Nazarbayev said.

That’s interesting, because Iran has enrichment technology but precious little uranium, whereas “Kazakhstan has heaps and heaps of uranium”:http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/26/news/international/uranium_kazakhstan.fortune/, but no enrichment technology. (It currently “depends on Russia”:http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/kazakhstans-nuclear-ambitions for enrichment services.)

I’m not sure this is what the Obama Administration had in mind, actually…

Update: “according to the WSJ”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123894229162890323.html, the Obama Administration is considering precisely this option: a fuel bank based in Kazakhstan, with Iran as its most important stakeholder. The article says that the fuel bank would be open to countries that “renounce nuclear weapons,” but Iran, as an NPT NNWS, has done so; the question is whether the stakeholders renounce national nuclear fuel cycles. Otherwise, it’s a case of “having one’s yellowcake and eating it, too”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1883/having-ones-yellowcake-and-eating-it-too.

P is for Persian

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That’s what Iran’s IAEA rep Ali Asgar Soltanieh says, “according to Fars News”:http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8801291027:

bq. About Iran’s new centrifuges, Soltanieh said, “Previous centrifuges are not centrifuges of Pakistan class – they are “Persian” class (P-1, P-2 or IR-1, IR-2).

Yep. And in Libya, the P-1 was called the L-1.

Now, as Iranian nuclear-program howlers go, that doesn’t crack the top ten. But let’s recall all that LEU and HEU cross-contamination found on Iran’s first set of P-1s, some of Khan Research Labs’ castoffs. Would Mr. Soltanieh care to take credit for those traces, after all?

Once upon a time, of course, some devices not unlike the P-1 were called “SNOR and CNOR”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1401/when-did-pakistan-stop-stealing-urenco-designs. But now I’m rehashing ancient history.

M Rubin And Iran Hackery

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Whatever one thinks about the Iran nuclear situation, “this WSJ piece”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123958201328712205.html from Michael Rubin is pure hackery.

There are too many errors to bother with, but here are a few fun facts:

First, Tehran did fulfill many, though certainly not all, of its pledges in its 2003 and 2004 agreements with the E3. For example, Iran did cooperate with many aspects of the IAEA’s investigation and signed and implemented an additional protocol to its CSA.

Second, Iran did make several proposals to the E3 in 2005. I know it might be hassle to ferret them out, so “here they are.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals Oh, and there’s “this one”:http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/2003_Spring_Iran_Proposal.pdf from 2003 that I think 1 or 2 people may have mentioned before.

Farideh Farhi has “more.”:http://icga.blogspot.com/2009/04/on-irans-sincerity-in-nuclear-talks.html I’ve read an English translation of the Aftab News interview with Rowhani that Rubin quotes from (I am not at liberty to post it, unfortunately). Dr. Farhi is correct that it doesn’t come close to supporting Rubin’s claim that “Rowhani, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator at the time, acknowledged his government’s insincerity.”

Rubin is also the primary drafter of “this,”:http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/8448 in case anyone needs a reminder.

*Update:*

I realized that I was not clear about one issue: Iran’s well-known lack of enthusiasm for suspending its enrichment program does not equate to insincerity or an unwillingness to compromise. Whether talks are worth pursuing is a different issue.

Moussavi on the Nuclear Issue

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FT “interviews”:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a2466224-2824-11de-8dbf-00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=be75219e-940a-11da-82ea-0000779e2340.html leading Iranian presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Moussavi:

You recently said you would pursue détente with the west if you were elected. How are you going to have that approach with the US while not compromising on the nuclear programme?

I consider détente the principle to build confidence between Iran and other countries. I think the recent discourse, which differentiates between nuclear technology and nuclear weapons is a good one. The more this differentiation is emphasised, the greater the possibility of détente.

Would Iran agree to suspend uranium enrichment if you were president?

No one in Iran would accept suspension.

And you would not accept it, either?

No. The problem is that we had a bad experience with suspension. It was first done [2003-2005] to discuss issues and remove suspicion but it turned into a tool to deprive Iran of having access to nuclear technology. There is a bad memory in this regard.

How would you remove tensions then?

Progress in nuclear technology and its peaceful use is the right of all countries and nations. This is what we have painfully achieved with our own efforts. No one will retreat. But we have to see what solutions or in other words what guarantees can be found to verify the non-diversion of the programme into nuclear weapons.

What kind of solutions?

They can be reached in technical negotiations.

How influential can the president be in nuclear decisions while the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has the last say in this issue?

Decisions on nuclear technology definitely need to be based on a thorough consensus at the national level. Obviously, the role of the supreme leader is very determining.

So far, however, no solution has been found. How would your presidency help?

The issue doesn’t only depend on us. It will also depend on the discourse the Americans use and the issues they pursue. The more realistic they become and recognise Iran in this issue, naturally the better the ground will be prepared to find solutions.

Still working on that longer post.

Iran Talks: Definition of Terms

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I’ve “put this off”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1906/promissory-note for awhile, but it’s time: time to weigh the pros and cons of negotiation with Iran without preconditions. But before tackling this hefty matter, a clarification.

David Sanger’s “story in -Monday’s- Tuesday’s NYT”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/middleeast/14diplo.html floats a trial balloon, indicating that the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany – the hard core of the 5+1 group – are poised to shift ground on Iran strategy:

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration and its European allies are preparing proposals that would shift strategy toward Iran by dropping a longstanding American insistence that Tehran rapidly shut down nuclear facilities during the early phases of negotiations over its atomic program, according to officials involved in the discussions.

The proposals, exchanged in confidential strategy sessions with European allies, would press Tehran to open up its nuclear program gradually to wide-ranging inspection. But the proposals would also allow Iran to continue enriching uranium for some period during the talks. That would be a sharp break from the approach taken by the Bush administration, which had demanded that Iran halt its enrichment activities, at least briefly to initiate negotiations.

This overview subtly mischaracterizes the record. Suspension as a precondition for talks was a European policy before it was American. The Iran-E3 talks of 2003-2005 took place under conditions of “voluntary suspension.” What Iran’s “National”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1976/the-festival-of-unenriched-fuel “Nuclear”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1981/inside-irans-fmp “Technology”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1982/more-about-irans-fmp “Day”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1984/the-black-bellows commemorates, in fact, is the reversal of suspension.

The distinctly American position on Iran was something else: a refusal to engage in direct negotiations on the nuclear issues. But this difference between the U.S. and the E-3 was dissolved in May 2006 when Secretary of State Rice announced that “the U.S. would participate”:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5034920.stm in direct talks with Iran, once suspension is resumed. In other words, on the same terms as the Europeans. (In practice, this has meant “more than preliminary talks.” But that’s another story.)

What’s more, the UN Security Council has demanded that Iran suspend enrichment or reprocessing-related activities in five separate Resolutions. That’s apart from the question of negotiations, but the point is, we’re not talking about America Alone.

The Obama administration, it seems, has now led the E-3 away from this unified position, in favor of talks without preconditions. But this process — which started during the “Presidential campaign”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/27/AR2008062703099.html — hasn’t happened overnight or without difficulty, as indicated by the “occasional”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/21/AR2008062101658.html “report”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1064158.html.

OK, enough throat-clearing. Substance to follow.

Update: I should have mentioned that the “State Department”:http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/04/121682.htm and the “White House”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Briefing-by-White-House-Press-Secretary-Robert-Gibbs-4-14-09/ say that the position on Iran hasn’t changed… yet.

WTFMP?

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Can the “Esfahan FMP”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1982/more-about-irans-fmp make fuel for the Russian-made Bushehr light-water reactor, in the “unlikely”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1926/skepsis “event”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1959/dept-of-media-criticism that Russia were to cease supplying fresh fuel?

Deep in the “comments at ACW”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2225/irans-equinox-fmp-comes-online#comment, Harvard’s Matt Bunn says no:

bq. It’s highly unlikely that the Iranian statement that the plant can make fuel for Bushehr is correct. Making fuel for any particular reactor design requires knowledge of a bunch of fuel design details specific to that reactor design, which is typically proprietary. Iranian experts have told me that they originally expected Russia to license the fuel manufacturing technology to them for the VVER-1000 design at Bushehr, but Russia has refused to do so (preferring to keep the leash on Iran’s fuel supply in its own hands). Iran could potentially design and make unlicensed fuel for the reactor, but this could raise serious safety issues, and would certainly void any guarantees from Russia that Iran may have received regarding the safety and performance of the reactor. My guess is that they will be stuck relying on Russian fuel for years to come — which, of course, makes the argument that they need Natanz to ensure reliability of fuel supply very weak.

Somebody should tell Deputy AEOI chief Mohammed Saeedi, who in “recent televised comments”:http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8801231309, appeared to be saying that Iran could supply its own fuel for Bushehr. As if dreaming up some other purpose for indigenous LWR fuel, he also threw in this creative idea:

bq. He further pointed out that Iran could mull over plans to export nuclear fuel, saying that the move is allowed under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) rules and regulations.

I say go for it. Any number of Western governments stand ready to buy at a premium!

Update: Tongue out of cheek for just a moment, Iranian nuclear exports are forbidden by “UNSCR 1737”:http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf (2006). See numbered paragraph 7 at the top of page 4. This is probably why Saeedi pointedly refers to the NPT; lately, Iranian officials have decided that the NPT is valid and legitimate, but the decisions of the Security Council are not. Good to know, right?

And if you were wondering about that indigenous reactor, it’s still out there on the horizon somewhere:

Elsewhere, Saeedi announced that Tehran has successfully completed the preliminary designing of a 360-megawatt light-water reactor in the southwestern town of Darkhoveyn.

“Now we are in the conceptual planning of the reactor and preparing the specified site for Darkhoveyn (nuclear plant),” the Iranian official underlined.

But that’s a mere detail. Don’t let that stop you from making LWR fuel as soon as possible, AEOI. The completed assemblies will be a hit on the 4th annual National Nuclear Technology Day.

The Black Bellows

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An alert TW reader “points out”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1976/the-festival-of-unenriched-fuel#comment that, as anticipated, there was a “centrifuge-related announcement”:http://en.isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1315373&Lang=E on Iran’s 3rd National Nuclear Technology Day:

Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced on Thursday on the occasion of the 4th [sic] national day of nuclear technology that the country has tested two types of new high-capacity centrifuges.

The Head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Gholam Reza Aghazadeh said that the centrifuges were 5 to 6 times faster than the older ones. He gave no further details.

Some of us have been waiting for this announcement more or less since _last year’s_ NNTD, or before. You might recall a certain “open-source intel bonanza”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1849/ir-2s-on-display right around then. There was an odd, unresolved detail in Jeff’s analysis:

!http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/images/1082.jpg!

[snip]

The picture also contains a hand holding what looks, to me at least, like it might, might be a carbon fiber bellows — although I don’t have any reference images to compare.

A bellows, if you don’t know already, is a short cylinder meant to connect two lengths of rotor in a centrifuge. A notch (or “crimp”) allows the entire assemblage to withstand otherwise destructive vibrations when accelerating to (or decelerating from) operational speeds.

The IR-2 and IR-3 machines — prototype devices first mentioned in IAEA reports in “Feb. 2008”:http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/IAEA_Report_22Feb2008.pdf and “May 2008”:http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/IAEA_Iran_Report_26May2008.pdf, respectively — are said to have one rotor each. But there were “too many pictures”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1849/ir-2s-on-display from last NNTD seeming to depict “multi-rotor”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1851/iran-centrifuge-components machines — either disassembled or partly assembled — not to wonder.

One possible answer: because newer, multi-rotor centrifuge models were still to be fully assembled and tested. Seizing on key details in the Feb. 2008 IAEA report, plus the same mystery photo at the top of this post, ISIS flagged this possibility back in “May 2008”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/ISIS_Iran_IAEA_Report_29May2008.pdf:

According to the February 2007 [sic] IAEA safeguards report, inspectors visiting Kalaye Electric were given information on four different centrifuge designs, including two subcritical rotor designs, one or more supercritical rotor designs with bellows, and a more advanced centrifuge, which is undefined in the report. The IR-2 and IR-3 are the two subcritical centrifuges. The IR-2 is an experimental model that contains a single composite rotor made from carbon fibers. The other parts of the rotor assembly are modified P-2 components (see figure 1). The IR-3 is an experimental model that seeks to increase the enrichment output by increasing the centrifuge’s length somewhat and by varying the cooling of the centrifuge rotor (see figure 2).

[snip]

Although not mentioned in the [May 2008 IAEA] report, there appears to be a third advanced centrifuge at the pilot plant. It appears to have the same diameter as the IR-2 and IR-3 but to have double or triple the length of the IR-2. Thus, it would hold two or three rotor tubes, connected by bellows (see figure 5). Prior to Iran’s suspension of the Additional Protocol in 2006, Iranian officials told the IAEA they could not make P-2 bellows. Iran has apparently overcome this obstacle (see figure 6).

(Thanks to Paul for pointing this out.)

Information has been leaking out around the edges. The AP’s George Jahn “mentioned the IR-4”:http://www.iranfocus.com/en/nuclear/diplomats-iran-seeks-to-buy-banned-carbon-fiber-17389.html last month in a story about carbon-fiber importation. (Does this mean that the mysterious fourth new centrifuge doesn’t use carbon fiber? I suspect we’ll learn soon.)

And now the NCRI has “told the WSJ”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123928982470105267.html that the new machines are “being assembled” in the basement of a “reception center” at Natanz. Too bad they weren’t exhibited to the press this year.

Update: Back in February, the AEOI’s Agazadeh said that new-generation centrifuges would soon be installed at Natanz, as “Paul has pointed out”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1913/new-iranian-centrifuges-to-be-installed.

More About Iran’s FMP

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In case the “pictures”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1981/inside-irans-fmp aren’t enough, here are words to go with.

A number of claims about Iran’s Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) can be gleaned from the Iranian press. According to “Mehr News”:http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=857835:

bq. The FMP will produce 10 tons of nuclear fuel annually to feed the 40-megawatt Arak heavy water reactor and 30 tons for light water reactors such as the Bushehr power plant and other plants that Iran intends to build.

And according to an “earlier ISNA report”:http://isna.ir/Isna/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1307413&Lang=E, there will be multiple process lines to handle the different needs of the LWRs and the Arak HWR:

Solatsana also said all stages for producing nuclear fuel assemblies are carried out by Iranian experts and added Isfahan’s FMP has designed different tablet producing lines for different reactors.

Arak reactor needs 150 nuclear fuel assemblies.

As if to address the concerns raised “here”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1931/irans-equinox-fuel-manufacturing-plant-comes-online and more lately in the “news media”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1979/pk-in-the-lat, ISNA quotes an “AEOI official”:http://isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1315373&Lang=E, who assures us that, yes, the LEU will be made into LWR fuel:

The deputy head of the organization, Mohammad Saeedi also said Iran’s nuclear advancement serves the nation’s interests and on the other hand allays the West concerns by proving that its uranium enrichment aims to provide fuel for reactors.

Production of nuclear fuel assemblies in Isfahan’s Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP) must have ended the West ambiguities on Iran’s fuel cycle because it showed that the final purpose of Iran’s enrichment activities is to produce fuel assemblies for research and electricity-generating reactors of the country, he added.

We’re all looking forward to that.

Until that day arrives, here’s some recommended reading on the subject from “Ivanka Barzashka and Ivan Oelrich”:http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/04/1106.php at FAS, plus “Geoff Forden”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2254/on-the-technology-campaign-trail at ACW.

You may also wish to review “our”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1981/inside-irans-fmp “own”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1979/pk-in-the-lat “humble”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1976/the-festival-of-unenriched-fuel “offerings”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1935/another-on-arak “here”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1933/arakit-aint-no-natanz “at TW”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1931/irans-equinox-fuel-manufacturing-plant-comes-online.