Category Archives: Iran

Iran NIE – Told You So

As you all know, the “public version of the Iran NIE”:http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf came out yesterday. PDDNI Kerr’s statement is “here.”:http://dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_statement.pdf You can read S Hadley’s statement “here”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071203-5.html and a transcript of his press briefing yesterday “here.”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071203-10.html

Kerr explained that the NIE was made public because

bq. The Intelligence Community is on the record publicly with numerous statements based on our 2005 assessment on Iran. Since our understanding of Iran’s capabilities has changed, we felt it was important to release this information to ensure that an accurate presentation is available.

I wish they’d now declassify the 2005 NIE. And more than 4 pages of this one, for that matter. Especially because it covers a bunch of topics in which I am interested:

This Estimate focuses on the following key questions:

• What are Iran’s intentions toward developing nuclear weapons?

• What domestic factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?

• What external factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?

• What is the range of potential Iranian actions concerning the development of nuclear weapons, and the decisive factors that would lead Iran to choose one course of action over
another?

• What is Iran’s current and projected capability to develop nuclear weapons? What are our key assumptions, and Iran’s key chokepoints/vulnerabilities?

Anyway, the below part of the NIE has received the most attention:

bq. *We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program;* we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that *the halt,* and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, *was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.*

I actually made this same argument about a year ago in a “BAS article.”:http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/747720r27638k367/fulltext.pdf I also argued that

bq. …the very fact that Iran has previously offered several concessions, as well as curtailed some nuclear activities, should signal to the international community that Tehran has not necessarily committed itself to building nuclear weapons — and that there are those within the regime who are reluctant to risk political and economic isolation.

Nyah-nyah.

But it wasn’t just me…people like the “_ACW_”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1722/ic-iran-stopped-nuke-program-in-fall-2003 and “G Perkovich”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19747&prog=zgp&proj=zme,znpp also told you so.

I’ll have a bit more to say about the NIE, but I wanted to get this info up and be obnoxious.

Lastly, I apologize to my 5 or so readers for how ass-tacular this blog has been in recent months. I assure you that my time has been -utterly wasted- well-spent on other stuff.

P5 +2 Statement on Iran

It’s a little old, but I thought I’d post the recent “statement”:http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=12614 from the P5+2 about Iran.

Nothing all that remarkable, but here it is:

1. The proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear program remain a source of serious concern to the International Community, as expressed very clearly in UNSC Resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747.

2. We are committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and underline the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations. We seek a negotiated solution that would address the international community’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. We reiterate our commitment to see the proliferation implication of Iran’s nuclear program resolved, and have therefore met today to reaffirm our commitment to our dual track approach.

3. We remain ready to engage with Iran in negotiations on a comprehensive long-term agreement to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. Creating the conditions for such negotiations requires that Iran fully and verifiably suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as required by UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747. The Security Council has offered Iran the possibility of “suspension for suspension” – suspension of the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as verified by the IAEA. We call upon Iran to accept that offer and allow for negotiations in good faith.

4. We urge Iran to engage in a dialogue to create the conditions for negotiations based on our June 2006 proposals for a long-term comprehensive agreement, based on mutual respect, that would reestablish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program and open the way to wider cooperation between Iran and all our countries. *We have asked Dr. Javier Solana, the European Union’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, to meet with Dr. Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, to lay the foundation for future negotiations.*

5. We welcome the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all questions concerning Iran’s past nuclear activities. *We call upon Iran, however, to produce tangible results rapidly and effectively by clarifying all outstanding issues and concerns on Iran’s nuclear program, including topics which could have a military nuclear dimension,* as set out by the relevant IAEA Resolutions and UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747 and by providing all access required by its Safeguards Agreement and Subsidiary Arrangement and by implementing the Additional Protocol.

6. Full transparency and cooperation by Iran with the IAEA is essential in order to address outstanding concerns. We reiterate our full support for the IAEA and its staff in the execution of its verification role and for the role of the UN Security Council. We look forward to DG El Baradei’s November report to the IAEA Board of Governors on the level, scope, and extent of Iran’s cooperation and transparency.

7. In view of the fact that Iran has not fulfilled the requirements of UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747, including the suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing activities, *we agree to finalize a text for a third UN Security Council Sanctions Resolution under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations with the intention of bringing it to a vote in the UN Security Council unless the November reports of Dr. Solana and Dr. El Baradei show a positive outcome of their efforts.*

I do wonder what a “positive outcome” would be.

Ahmadinejad = Bon Jovi ?

p{float: right; margin-left: 10px}. !/images/29.jpg!

I’m not sure this cultural reference means what “this blogger”:http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1170359814775&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull for the _J Post_ thinks it means.

According to this post, Columbia University President Lee Bollinger missed a chance to embarrass Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during the latter’s recent visit to the campus. I’ll spare you the details, but the post argues that

bq. At a time when US objectives should be making every effort to sway Muslim public opinion over to its side, American stupidity has morphed the Iranian president into the *Persian Bon Jovi.*

Wow. Even I feel young now.

Turning Ahmadinejad into Bon Jovi would, in my mind, be a US PR victory. The “Persian Steve Albini” would, I think, be a much better metaphor for the _JP_ blogger. But what do I know?

Speaking of Mr. Albini, here’s some live Big Black:

Yet More on Iran and IAEA Work Plan

UNSG Ban Ki-moon provided further evidence that people shouldn’t be sweating the Iran-IAEA cooperation “agreement”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1511/text-of-iaea-iran-agreement quite so much. [Previous post “here.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1516/more-on-iran-and-the-iaea ]

According to “Reuters,”:http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN1021946820070910 Ban said that Iran has to sack up and comply with all of the UNSC’s requirements:

“I know that there was an agreement between the IAEA and Iran on the future work plans on this,” Ban said in his first reaction to the agreement. “I know that there are some different understandings or expectations.”

“What is important at this time is that, *in addition to what IAEA has been negotiating and discussing with the Iranian government, the Iranian government should fully comply with the Security Council resolutions* — that is the core,” Ban said.

OK, maybe I paraphrased a little.

Iran and the 3K Centrifuges

Andreas Persbo “posted”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2007/09/tale-of-3k-centrifuges-third.html on a subject I was thinking of blogging about: Ahmadinejad’s “recently-reported”:http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSL0479215320070904 claim that Iran has 3,000 centrifuges.

Andreas seems to conclude what I was thinking: the assertion could be technically sorta true if you massage the numbers a bit.

He says:

bq. According to an article by Mark Heinrich, Agency inspectors visited the Natanz facility on 3 September 2007 and found two more modules “being hooked up”, which would *bring the total number of centrifuges operating with hexafluoride gas, under vacuum, or being in various stages of construction to 2,952.*

More on Iran and the IAEA

Following up on “this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1513/yet-another-iaea-report-on-iran from the other day, it looks as if the IAEA is making efforts to defend the recent work program between the agency and Tehran.

For example, “the AP,”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070907/ap_on_re_eu/nuclear_agency_iran_2;_ylt=AthoT36TNB7zstPpTRYZR6FSw60A “Reuters,”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070907/wl_nm/iran_nuclear_elbaradei_dc_2;_ylt=Ahvyt6_9QsLUz74Xd3hyRXRSw60A and “AFP”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070907/wl_mideast_afp/irannuclearpolitics_070907193630;_ylt=AtkMVCvBLhwMDbMD1dTQxpRSw60A are reporting about a briefing that IAEA DG ElBaradei gave to reporters about the arrangement.

I found this section of the Reuters story especially noteworthy:

*He [ElBaradei] said critics had misread the pact in suggesting it ruled out future IAEA inquiries if new suspicions about Iranian activity arose, and lifted pressure on Iran to grant wider inspections or heed U.N. resolutions demanding it stop uranium enrichment,* a process that can be used to make atom bombs.

“There have been back-seat drivers putting in their five cents saying this is not a good working arrangement,” he told reporters invited into his Vienna office for a briefing.

*”Iran can never get a pass (on their nuclear behavior) until we decide to give them a pass. They may say (in public statements) that their file is now closed, but that is up to us.*

Similarly, he said, according to AFP, that

bq. the IAEA has made clear “privately and publicly that *we will continue and have the right to give any questions in the future*.”

These strike me as reasonable answers to the criticisms about the arrangement, but we’ll see what happens.

In any case, I’ve never really understood what the “the IAEA should be tougher” crowd really wants ElBaradei to do. At this point, the action RE: consequences for Iran’s noncompliance with its IAEA obligations is at the UNSC.

Yet Another IAEA Report on Iran

Now that I have no reliable internet access at home, I am an even worse blogger.

Anyhow, I’m late to the party, but both “Andreas Persbo”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2007/08/iaea-report-on-iran.html and “ISIS”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IranIAEAreportAugust30.pdf (not “this”:http://www.isistheband.com/ISIS.aspx ISIS) have copies of the latest IAEA report about Iran. [ISIS also has an “issue brief”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IranIssueBrief30August2007.pdf about the report.]

In addition to the latest news about Tehran’s enrichment escapades, the report also describes the “recent deal”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1511/text-of-iaea-iran-agreement between the agency and Iran. I was suspicious that the document relased a few days before might have contained a bit of Iranian spin on the arrangement. But apparently not.

Speaking of that deal, I have a ton of respect for David Albright and Jackie Shire who, along with various others, have “described”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/flawedagreement.pdf the arrangement as “flawed.” But I don’t see what the fuss is about.

It’s true that the arrangement has its problems, but I don’t see anything in it that precludes the IAEA from fully pursuing its investigation of Iran’s nuclear programs. For one thing, the relevant UNSC resolutions, which require Tehran to resolve the outstanding nuclear issues, ratify its additional protocol, and suspend enrichment, remain in force. For another, the sanctions that have already been imposed won’t be lifted without Iran’s compliance.

Additionally, the language in ElBaradei’s report suggests that the IAEA intends to be pretty serious about its investigation:

bq. Naturally, the *key to successful implementation of the agreed work plan is Iran’s full and active cooperation with the Agency, and its provision to the Agency of all relevant information and access to all relevant documentation and individuals to enable the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues.* To this end, the Agency considers it essential that Iran adheres to the time line defined therein and implements all the necessary safeguards and transparency measures, including the measures provided for in the Additional Protocol.

I’m inclined to give the agency a chance.

More On IAEA-Iran Agreement – Pu Question Resolved?

Following up on “this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1511/text-of-iaea-iran-agreement, it looks like the IAEA and Iran have agreed to resolve each of the various outstanding issues in phases. Although there is a timetable of sorts, it appears as though Tehran is insisting that the agency resolve each question completely before Iran fully cooperates with the IAEA on other outstanding matters.

The questions concerning Tehran’s past plutonium experiments are a good example.

First, a brief aside: the document seems to make some news, asserting that the IAEA has resolved its outstanding concerns:

bq. In order to conclude and close the file of the issue of plutonium (Pu), the Agency provided Iran with the remaining questions on 23 July 2007. During a meeting in Iran between representatives of the Agency and Iran, Iran provided clarifications to the Agency that helped to explain the remaining questions. In addition, on 7 August 2007, Iran sent a letter to the Agency providing additional clarifications to some of the questions. On *20 August 2007 the Agency stated that earlier statements made by Iran are consistent with the Agency’s findings, and thus this matter is resolved.*

The document goes on to say that this resolution “will be communicated officially by the Agency to Iran through a letter.”

Second, the next portion of the agreement has a timetable for Tehran and the IAEA to resolve the outstanding issues concerning its P-1 and P-2 centrifuges. But Iran’s adherence to that timeline

bq. assumes that the Agency *announces the closure of the Pu-experiments outstanding issue by 31 August 2007, and its subsequent reporting in the Director General’s report to the September 2007 Board of Governors.*

This whole deal sounds really complicated, but maybe it’s a way for the world to find out WTF Iran has been up to.

I would point out, though, that Tehran’s adherence to its additional protocol would make the world feel a lot better because it would deal with _current_ enrichment-related R&D.

*Update:*

_AFP_ reports that the IAEA and Iran are on the same page RE: the plutonium issue:

bq. A UN official told AFP the *document reflected both the IAEA’s and Iran’s views* and that the question of whether Iran had experimented with plutonium more recently than it had stated and that there was plutonium unaccounted for had been resolved.

Text of IAEA-Iran Agreement

The IAEA has “released the text”:http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf of the “work plan agreed between Iran and the IAEA.”

I love the title:

bq. Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues.

Details later.

[ Thanks to _AL_ for the tip. ]

*Update:*

I should point out that the “agreement” is actually a document that Iran sent to the IAEA for circulation. The agency’s interpretation of the agreement may differ.