Andreas Persbo has a “great post”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2008/05/pokhran-ii.html up marking the 10th anniversary of India’s 1998 tests of several nuclear weapons. He has Google Earth placemarks and everything, so check it out.

I will humbly note my “recent post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1608/indian-nuclear-test-1994-edition on India’s aborted 1994 nuclear test.

Wow. K Santhanam, the former director of India’s Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses who played what C Ferguson “called”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/Ferguson.asp a “leadership role” during New Delhi’s 1998 nuclear weapons tests, told “Times Now”:http://timesnow.tv/NewsDtls.aspx?NewsID=6911 television that India canceled a 1994 nuclear test at the last minute.

Interesting topics include: New Delhi’s perception of other nuclear threats at the time, steps that India took to conceal test preparations, and domestic political considerations.

The full text of the interview, broadcast April 1, is below, with relevant portions in bold.

Srinjoy: Why compelled India to think of testing a nuclear bomb in 1994?

Santhanam: First of all you had *the clandestine programme of Pakistan; there was an increasing evidence of collaboration, co-operation, collusion between China and Pakistan, in nuclear weaponry. Specifically the trigger development which technology the Chinese had.* Secondly, other international factors came into play. You may remember The Glen and Symington amendments under which economic and military aid to Pakistan was stopped because of Pakistan’s Nuclear programme despite having certified.

For a variety of reasons we have lived with a nuke China, would it be possible for India to live with a nuke Pakistan, with a history of conflicts? So, the matter was analysed by a special group of experts, drawn from various disciplines as to what exactly should be done and the committee submitted its report to the then PM Narsimha Rao. *This was the build up, so obviously the direction was step by step be prepared to consider conducting tests and exercising the nuke option.*

Srinjoy: What went into the preparation for the test?

Santhanam: *There were two shafts in Pokhran dug during 1981-82 and they had been sealed because no further work was likely to occur. These two shafts were reactivated, we had to blow out the concrete lid and then pump out all the water, do all the repair work.* Brilliant job was done by the engineer in adverse circumstances.

Since we had a lull, so to say, *after December 1994 we came across abandoned wells in the area, the villagers had left because there was no water, deep enough wells, we could use them without inviting attention of digging a new one which the satellites would pick up. So these three wells in an area called Navtala, where identified, they were repaired, then made suitable to receive the device.*

Srinjoy: About the 1994 situation *how were they detected by the Americans*, what led to their detection?

Santhanam: *One must be aware that the resolution of the cameras, whether it is the US satellite or the Russian satellites these days is such that they can easily detect, especially in daylight,* night time the resolution is always poor. The phrase is change detection.

Srinjoy: So what happened after the detection what made the government back off?

Santhanam: Let me say the decision to conduct a test is ultimately political. We must acknowledge that fact because the technical factor is only one factor, amongst a host of other elements leading to a decision making at the highest level.

Srinjoy: How did it happen…*did the White house call? How does it actually happen on the ground?*

Santhanam: *It involves the White house; it involves the US embassy in Delhi. It also involves the Indian government and our embassy in Washington. It’s a tight dance.*

Srinjoy: What happened after that?

Santhanam: We were quite clear that *if work is resumed at these sites there is likely to be detection by satellites.* We were clear this would be detected and it was detected by the US satellite and they had conveyed their concerns to New Delhi. This was as you approach the end of 1994. There was another internal development that of parliamentary elections. *The concern was that if you conduct the test in November-December. It could be construed as a way of influencing the results of the elections* by saying that we are a firm government, we know how to attend to our national security needs, but the timing would have invited a lot of criticism. *The consensus was that ‘let’s hold’. After it is over we will revisit the case.*

Interestingly, Bhubnesh Chaturvedi, former Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office confirmed that India canceled the tests because of the elections:

bq. We had the capacity to do it, but we did not do it, because the elections were near. We did not want the successive government to bear the brunt. If the government would have continued in power, we could have done it.

A transcript of the interview is “here”:http://timesnow.tv/NewsDtls.aspx?NewsID=6911. You can download a copy “here.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/file_download/11

Shri Shyam Saran, Special Envoy of Inida’s Prime Minister, recently gave a presentation about the US-India deal that, IMO, is one of the best summaries of New Delhi’s reasons for wanting the deal.

I don’t have a direct link to the speech, but “this one”:http://mea.gov.in/ is for the Ministry of External Affairs site. The whole thing can be downloaded “here.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/file_download/8

Some excerpts are below:

Let me share with you the mandate which Prime Minister gave to us as negotiators when we took up this initiative with the United States. *Since 1974, India had been the target of an increasingly selective, rigorous and continually expanding regime of technology-denial, not only in the nuclear field but encompassing other dual use technologies as well. It was our aim to seek the dismantlement of these inequitable regimes, which would become progressively more detrimental and significantly impact upon India�s maturing economy, as its key sectors, required constant technological upgradation.*

In pursuing this objective, we were acutely aware of the following:

(i) The multilateral technology-denial regimes whose targeting of India we sought to end such as the Nuclear Suppliers� Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) would *require the United States to take the initiative as the principal initiator and leader of these regimes, and also because it remains the world�s pre-eminent source of new and innovative technologies.*

(ii) Since our PNE in 1974, *technology denial was first limited to nuclear-related technologies and then progressively expanded to cover a growing range of dual-use technologies. For this historical reason, it was clear to us that unless we tackled the nuclear issue, we would not be able to obtain access to other useful technologies. It is only by turning the nuclear key that we would be able to open the door to enter global trade in dual use and sophisticated technologies.*

There was another important consideration behind the initiative we took in July 2005. We were becoming increasingly aware that we would face a progressively more depleted market for conventional energy resources. Concerns over climate change would act as a further constraint on us. We had to adopt a strategy of diversifying our energy mix, with a graduated shift from fossil fuels to non-fossil fuels, from non-renewable to renewable sources of energy and from conventional to non-conventional sources of energy. Nuclear energy occupies a key place in this strategy and for good reasons. Despite the technology denial regimes which we had to contend with, our scientists had succeeded in putting in place a comprehensive, sophisticated and innovative nuclear industry, with a highly trained manpower able to sustain a major expansion in nuclear power. *Our constraints in this regard were availability of domestic uranium and a technological capability still limited to smaller capacity reactors of about 700 MW, when the world was moving to 1600 MW reactors. If we were to envisage a major expansion in nuclear power in the medium term, to say 60,000 MW plus by the year 2030, then import of higher capacity reactors and uranium fuel, would be necessary.*

This in no way detracts from the continued pursuit of Dr. Bhabha�s visionary 3-stage nuclear energy development programme, which may yield significant results in the longer term. But *in the short and medium-term, a significant expansion of nuclear power is only possible if the constraints we face on import of uranium and of large-capacity reactors, are removed.*

Furthermore, it is not really correct to put indigenous development and international collaboration as antithetical to one another. In fact they are integrally linked. Each cycle of international collaboration prepares the ground for higher level of indigenous development. A higher level of technological sophistication then enables a much more discriminatory and productive new cycle of technological collaboration and eventually partnerships. Let us not forget that Dr. Bhabha himself vigorously promoted international cooperation in nuclear energy which enabled India to lay the foundation of our current nuclear programme. He was, in his time, one of the most highly respected scientists among the international nuclear community.

Let me repeat, *the mandate to the negotiators was:*

*(i) to seek the dismantlement of the multilateral technology denial regimes targeting India;*

*(ii) to seek an accelerated development of our nuclear power generation capability to enable a significant contribution to India�s energy security in an environmentally sustainable manner.*

The negotiators were also given a firm guideline: *in seeking to achieve the above objectives, we should not accept any limitation whatsoever on our strategic weapons programme, which must remain inviolate and fully autonomous.* In practical terms, this implied that

(i) our strategic weapons programme would be outside the purview of any international safeguards regime or any form of external scrutiny;

(ii) *our ability to further develop and produce such weapons would not be constrained in any manner;* and

(iii) *we would retain our legal right to conduct a nuclear test should that, at any time in the future, be deemed necessary in our over-riding national interest.*

[snip]

The July 18 Joint Statement was then translated into more elaborate and specific arrangements in a Separation Plan, presented to Parliament in March 2006 and in the text of a bilateral cooperation agreement, or the so-called 123 Agreement, between India and the U.S., concluded in July 2007.

In working out these arrangements, the mandate given to the negotiators was to stay within the parameters of the July 18 Joint Statement and to ensure that there would be no repeat of the Tarapur experience. *In practical terms this meant ensuring that there would never again be a threat of reactor operations being disrupted due to a suspension of fuel supplies. We would also need to ensure that India has the right to reprocess foreign origin spent fuel. In both these respects, the U.S. aided Tarapur nuclear facility had suffered and this hung over the negotiations as a negative legacy. There had been U.S. unilateral suspension of fuel supplies, just as there had been a refusal to allow India to reprocess spent fuel, which kept accumulating as hazardous waste, which the U.S. was also not willing to take back.*

This is the background to the multi-layered fuel supply assurances which were spelt out in the Separation Plan, and incorporated in toto in the 123 Agreement. This is also the reason why India was prepared to engage in difficult and sometimes frustrating negotiations to ensure its upfront entitlement to reprocess foreign origin spent fuel. Eventually, the U.S. side agreed to India�s demand.

The negotiators have been criticized by some for having agreed to permanent IAEA safeguards on its civilian facilities. Our position right from the outset had been that *we have no problem with permanent safeguards provided there are permanent supplies of fuel. The multi-layered fuel supply assurances are unique in international nuclear negotiations and include India�s right to take �corrective measures�, should any disruption still occur despite these assurances. India�s entitlement to build strategic reserves of fuel for its civilian reactors, to last the lifetime of such reactors, is also unique.* Frankly, I do not think that we could have secured any better safeguards for our interests.

Criticism has been leveled at various provisions of the Hyde Act and it is argued that irrespective of what the 123 Agreement may say, we would be subject to the several onerous provisions of the Act.

Let me clarify that the operative heart of the Hyde Act, incorporates three permanent and unconditional waivers from relevant provisions of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In layman terms, the Hyde Act allows the U.S. Administration to engage in civil nuclear cooperation with India, waiving the following requirements:

(i) that the partner country should not have exploded a nuclear explosive device in the past; this waiver is necessary because India exploded a series of nuclear explosive devices in May 1998;

(ii) that the partner country must have all its nuclear facilities and activities under full-scope safeguards; this waiver is necessary because India has a strategic programme which would not be subject to international safeguards; nor would its indigenous R&D programme; and

(iii) that the partner country is not currently engaged in the development and production of nuclear explosive devices; this waiver is required precisely because there is no freeze or capping of India�s strategic weapons programme. It is an acknowledgement that we will continue to develop and produce additional strategic weapons.

Irrespective of what else the Hyde Act may contain, *these 3 permanent and unconditional waivers are extremely significant because they acknowledge that India has an ongoing strategic programme. No restraint on this programme is envisaged as a condition for engaging India in civil nuclear energy cooperation. This is a significant gain for India and should not be lost sight of. Just juxtapose this with the UNSC Resolution 1172 of June 6, 1998, which called upon India to stop, roll-back and eliminate its strategic programme and join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.*

*There are, of course, several extraneous and prescriptive provisions in the Hyde Act which we do not agree with and in negotiating the 123 Agreement we have been more than careful to exclude such provisions. If the U.S. Congress considers the 123 Agreement, as currently drafted, as being in contravention with their own understanding of the Hyde Act, the agreement would be voted down. That would be the end of the matter. If, however, the U.S. Congress does approve the 123 Agreement, then this would confirm that the provisions of the Agreement are what would govern the commitments of the two sides.*

*While there has been intense focus on the Indo-US bilateral agreement, much of the commentary on the subject has lost sight of the multilateral regime whose adjustment in favour of India is what we are aiming at. Our objective is not merely to seek the U.S. as a partner. Our objective is to enable India to have a wide choice of partners in pursuing nuclear commerce, and high technology trade. But we cannot attain this objective without the U.S. taking the lead on our behalf.* Yes, Russia and France are countries which are friendly to India and extremely keen to engage in nuclear commerce with us. However, there should be no doubt that neither they nor others will make an exception for India unilaterally unless the Nuclear Suppliers Group adjusts its guidelines in the same manner as the U.S. is prepared to do. Whatever be the reservations that have been expressed about our relations with the U.S., *no other friendly country, member of the NSG has the necessary standing to lead the process of opening up the existing multilateral regime to accommodate India. The U.S. is in a unique position precisely because it initiated these restrictive regimes in the first place and also because it remains the pre-eminent source of new sensitive technologies.*

You’ve likely seen it, but “here is”:http://www.indianembassy.org/newsite/press_release/2007/Oct/12.asp the Indian embassy’s statement about the 123 agreement:

bq. The Prime Minister also explained to President Bush that certain difficulties have arisen with respect to the operationalisation of the India – US civil nuclear cooperation agreement.

The Press Trust of India reported a bit more detail on 16 October. Apparently US Ambassador to India David Mulford got some more information from External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee during a meeting the previous evening:

During the 45-minute meeting, *Mukherjee is understood to have conveyed to Mulford the political compulsions the UPA [United Progressive Alliance] government have in not going ahead with the deal for now, but expressed the determination to push it through at later stage.*

The US envoy articulated his country’s main concern about the future of the deal in the wake of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s remark at the Hindustan Times Leadership summit here that non-implementation of the agreement was not the end of life.

Not sure how much determination the Indians are conveying, but there it is.

I haven’t gone through it in much detail yet, mainly because I don’t want to spoil my vacation. But “here it is”:http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/aug/90050.htm in all its horror. The whole thing is in comments. [Via “Lacacis.”:http://www.lacacis.org/ ]

Here’s a fun game – do a search for the word “test” and see what you find. Yeah.

Daryl Kimball and Fred McGoldrick expressed their thoughts on the agreement “here.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2007/20070803_IndiaUS.asp Essentially, India got the store.

I’m glad they pointed out that India’s record regarding even its past meager non-pro commitments has been pretty poor:

bq. India has been outside the international nuclear mainstream since it *violated the peaceful use commitments it made to Canada and U.S. by using a Canadian-supplied reactor and U.S.-supplied heavy water to conduct its 1974 nuclear bomb test,* refused to sign the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and conducted additional nuclear tests in 1998.

Lastly, I would just like to add something to what Matt Yglesias/Steve Clemons “said”:http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2007/08/community_standards.php (“via Atrios.”:http://atrios.blogspot.com/2007_07_29_archive.html) The pre-war performance of a lot of the DC FoPo establishment Iraq debacle was obviously horrible, but the US-India deal is also a prime example of that establishment being pretty pathetic…more Prominent People and Organizations could have said and done a lot more to raise awareness about this catastrophe but didn’t.

One anecdote: I know for a fact that one Important Foreign Policy Dude, just days after defending the nuclear deal on television, said at an off-the-record event that the deal would put a serious hurt on the NPT.

To the river…

*Update:*

FAS has “some analysis here.”:http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/08/india_gets_a_deal.php#more