Author Archives: kerr

On Israeli Nuclear Disclosure

I had a couple of thoughts the other week during a conference about Iran’s nuclear program. I will note that someone else has almost certainly done more thinking about this issue than I and that these thoughts are likely unoriginal. Any interested readers please weigh in.

I know that many people worry that Israeli disclosure of its nuclear weapons could destabilize the region, lead to nuclear or CBW proliferation, etc. Now, I have no more desire than anyone else for this social science experiment to be carried out, but I’m not sure that disclosure really would be so bad.

The reasoning is fairly simple – since both governments and the public in Israel’s neighborhood already assume that Israel has nuclear weapons, it’s not clear that Israeli disclosure would be a game-changer sufficient to compel regional governments to take the _very_ significant step of developing their own nuclear weapons.

To elaborate…

First, it seems unlikely that governments would make radical chanegs to their military forces, since their material security situations would remain unchanged.

Second, there would, one imagines, be a spike in public anger over Israeli disclosure, but, since the information wouldn’t be new, it’s not at all clear that such anger would be sufficient to produce what, again, would be pretty drastic changes in regional governments’ policies.

The most likely impact I can think of is that some countries may take additional steps to augment their conventional or CW arsenals, since those options are considerably easier than developing nuclear weapons.

Those steps would not be trivial, but my point is that public discussions of this topic often lack sufficient nuance.

2007 Iran NIE Still in Effect

I know that there has been a good deal of speculation regarding the current U.S. assessment of Iran’s nuclear program, “including from yours truly.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1864/dni-blair-on-iran However, it is useful to understand that the analysis in the relevant section of the most recent “Threat Assessment”:http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf is essentially the same as that contained in the “2007 NIE.”:http://odni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf This,as far as I know, will remain the case until a new one is issued – an event which reportedly “may happen soon.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1888/new-iran-nie And yes, that means that I no longer have the doubts that I expressed in “this post.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1864/dni-blair-on-iran

That’s it.

As an aside, I have never understood some people’s alleged inability to understand the 2007 NIE. Nor have I ever understood why the fact that Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program upsets some people so much.

New Iran NIE?

There’s no sourcing for the claim, as far as I can tell, but “Haaretz reported”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1067901.html a little while back that the Obama administration is planning to publish a new U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran soon.

New Iranian Centrifuges to be Installed

In the “discussions about”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1875/dammit Iran’s centrifuge installation patterns, I haven’t seen much mention of Gholamreza Aqazadeh’s “announcement”:http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=839756 that Iran plans to install a new generation of centrifuges at Natanz:

bq. “*New generation of centrifuges which are technologically more advanced than the previous generation will soon be installed* at Natanz nuclear facility,” Aqazadeh told a joint news conference with Russian nuclear agency chief Sergei Kiriyenko at the site of Bushehr nuclear reactor in southern Iran.

It may be that Iran is content to operate its IR-1 centrifuges until it’s ready to install the new generation. Having said that, lots of Iranian officials’ predictions about the nuclear program have had a troubled relationship with reality, so grain of salt and all that.

Iranian Companies to Approach With Caution

The UK has “a list”:http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/licensing-policy/end-use-control/page29307.html, current as of February.

According to the site,

bq. The entities included on the list are mainly based on the last 3 years’ experience of either invoking the WMD end-use control or refusing licences under it. In addition there are a few other entities for which we have not refused licences or invoked the control, but there is publicly available information indicating their *involvement in WMD programmes of concern.*

One footnote jumped out at me because it states that some of the listed entities “are included solely because they are listed in UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747 or 1803 concerning Iran.”

Not sure if this suggests that UK intel doesn’t have anything on those entities, but I thought it worth noting.

Everyone With Nukes, Except…

There is a school of thought in the nonproliferation/arms control/U.S. strategic policy debate that I think can be summed up this way:

In the future, the following international actors will pose credible nuclear threats: terrorists, poor countries, the other nuclear-weapon states, and at least some U.S. allies.

The United States, however, will not.

US-UAE 123

It has a bit of a ring, if you’re as dorky as a guy who runs an arms control blog.

Anyway, NPEC has had “the text”:http://www.npec-web.org/us-uae/20090115-UsUae-Revised123Agreement.pdf up for a while now, but I thought I’d point out two especially interesting features:

1. Article 12 states that the United States has the right to terminate the agreement if the UAE engages in enrichment or reprocessing or obtains ENR facilities.

2. The last paragraph of the Agreed Minute apparently makes the agreement a minimum standard for other 123 agreements with countries in the region, should the US negotiate them. Here’s the key part:

bq. the fields of cooperation, terms and conditions accorded by the United States of America to the United Arab Emirates for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be no less favorable in scope and effect than those which may be accorded, from time to time, to any other non-nuclear weapon State in the Middle East in a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.

Hey, the geeks shall inherit the earth…

Backchannel Iran Diplomacy

I’ve long thought that Iran may try use its influence over Iraq to extract concessions on its nuclear program. But a “BBC report”:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7901101.stm has UN ambassador Sir John Sawers saying that Iran tried to do exactly that before restarting uranium conversion:

“There were various Iranians who would come to London and suggest we had tea in some hotel or other. They’d do the same in Paris, they’d do the same in Berlin, and then we’d compare notes among the three of us,” he told the BBC.

“The Iranians wanted to be able to strike a deal whereby they stopped killing our forces in Iraq in return for them being allowed to carry on with their nuclear programme: *’We stop killing you in Iraq, stop undermining the political process there, you allow us to carry on with our nuclear programme without let or hindrance.’*

Also interesting is this admission from Nicholas Burns:

bq. “We had advocated regime change,” said Mr Burns. “We had a very threatening posture towards Iran for a number of years. It didn’t produce any movement whatsoever.”

The admission is obviously what is of interest, not the information.

ISIS v. ACW

A friendly back-and-forth can be found in the comments section of “this post.”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2192/iran-and-syria-reports

After ISIS contended that they had posted the reports first, Jeffrey responded as follows:

Your email to my inbox is time-stamped 10:44 am.

The time stamp on my post is 10:28.

The impressive feat, of course, is that you have actually read the report, which I cannot claim even at 4:20 pm.