Author Archives: kerr

OLC on the ABMT

As you probably know, the Obama administration “released”:http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/olc-memos.htmsome old Office of Legal Counsel memos a few weeks back.

“One of them”:http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memoabmtreaty11152001.pdf, dated 15 November 2001, is titled _Memorandum Regarding Authority of the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the ABM Treaty_. I asked a FoKerr who wished to remain anonymous for their thoughts on the memo.

Those thoughts are below, edited for clarification and to protect the innocent. The 1997 MOU referred to near the beginning is “this one”:http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/ad-mou.htm, which would have made Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine parties to the treaty. The MOU has never been submitted to the Senate.

I’ve read the whole memo, and I think my head is about to explode. I thought they were dealing mostly with the MOU on succession because that’s where they start. Their opinions on the MOU seem to be that, since it never entered into force, the ABM Treaty remained in force as a bilateral Treaty between the U.S. and Russia. I think this is accurate. They return to the MOU at the end of the memo and seem to be laughing at Clinton for his decision to submit it to the Senate as an amendment to the Treaty. They don’t think he needed to do that because it was his right, as President, to declare the Treaty to be multilateral. They are missing some significant history here. Clinton didn’t agree to submit the MOU because he thought he needed advice and consent. He did it because Helms et al wanted a crack at defeating it, and the Treaty, and had threatened other Presidential priorities (and START II) if he didn’t submit it. It was a political decision, not a legal one.

Also, the memo makes it clear that they are not addressing the Members of Congress who just wanted the Treaty to lapse, they are addressing those who wanted to have a Senate vote on the U.S. plan to withdraw. They conclude (correctly, I think), that the President can withdraw from a Treaty without Senate advice and consent. So, I’m with them up to there. If Bush wanted to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, he could do so.

But then they start to lose me and make my head ache. They get into the issue of suspension, particularly suspension of some, but not all of the Treaty. It seems that they were asked if the Pres could do this so that he could avoid withdrawing while proceeding with his missile defense tests. At the time that we were negotiating with the Russians about modifying or redefining some of the Treaty provisions, or having both sides withdraw together (which is what Bush really wanted) because we were coming up on some missile defense tests that would have violated the Treaty (using Aegis radars to track a long-range missiles). So we either had to violate, redefine the provision, or withdraw from the Treaty.

And Yoo decided the President could just suspend that provision (and others that interfered with upcoming tests) without withdrawing from the Treaty. Now my head explodes. From a political perspective, one could see this as a way to pressure the Russian’s to accept our proposals for broader changes to the Treaty, by showing them that we were ready to go all the way, and if they wanted to save anything, they should agree to our proposals. But I don’t think Yoo approved it as a negotiating tactic. I think he saw it as a part of the President’s right to break the law. He argued, earlier in the memo, that Treaties weren’t exactly like laws because the President controlled the negotiating and ratification process (the Senate provides advice and consent, the Pres ratifies and exchanges instruments of ratification) and didn’t need congressional approval to withdraw. All true. But, once the Senate provides its advice and consent and the President exchanges instruments of ratification, the Treaty is the law of the land. If the President doesn’t like it, he can withdraw, but to choose just to ignore parts of it? Not so much. The examples in the memo are cases where we suspended participation after the other side had done something to violate or alter the Treaty first. We suspended provisions in response. Yoo takes that to mean we can suspend them whenever. That’s what’s known, in arms control parlance, as VIOLATING THE TREATY. I guess the Pres could choose to do that, but, he can’t claim its just a temporary suspension. IT’S A VIOLATION, with all the attendant consequences.

Apparently, Bush did not want to bear the international consequences of withdrawing from the Treaty, until they were convinced (rightly) that those consequences would be minimal. And he had tests coming up fast on the calendar, so he had to do something. And a partial suspension seemed to be the answer.

This is like the signing statements, where he signed the bill, making it the law of the land, then said which parts of it he would choose to ignore. Its the law, unless I decide I don’t want to obey. Or, put another way, its like the Senate provides A&C to the CTBT, and the President deposits the instruments of ratification, then gives a speech saying its a wonderful Treaty, but I plan to suspend Article I so we can carry out a nuclear test explosion next month. When we finish that test, we’ll un-suspend the Article, at least until we decide to test again.

Kind of blows up Yoo’s argument that suspension is less awful than withdrawal because it doesn’t alter the structure or substance of the Treaty….

The precedent set by a partial suspension would have made it impossible for us to ever negotiate another arms control treaty. Who would sign up with us, knowing that we reserved the right to violate at will by “suspending” parts of the Treaty?

Last post ’til I return…

Arak…It Ain’t no Natanz

Following up on Josh’s “post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1931/irans-equinox-fuel-manufacturing-plant-comes-online … I understand the concerns that Einhorn and others have about the Arak reactor, but as a proliferation threat it’s not equivalent to the Natanz facility. That’s because enrichment facilities can produce fissile material, but you need a reprocessing facility to separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel. Iran says that it isn’t gonna build a reprocessing facility and, from what I understand, such facilities are considerably harder to hide than centrifuge facilities.

Just saying.

Deja Vu: Differences Between U.S. and Israeli Intel on Iran

Reading this _NYT_ “article”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/weekinreview/15SANGER.html the other day reminded me of this portion of a “piece”:http://armscontrol.org/act/2006_10/IAEAIranIntel I wrote about 2-1/2 years ago:

By contrast, Israeli government estimates suggest that Iran could master the enrichment process within six to 12 months and produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapon in as little as three years, according to a knowledgeable Western official.

Asked about *differences between the two government’s estimates, [then-DNI John] Negroponte said that both countries “basically operate from the same knowledge base” but that Israel will “sometimes…give you the worst-case assessment.”*

The transcript of that interview is “here”:http://www.dni.gov/interviews/20060901_interview.pdf. Not that this has been going on for a while or anything…

IAEA BoG Approves Indian Additional Protocol

I’m sure a 20-something pundit is blogging Something Very Important, but you can take a minute to learn that Ye Olde IAEA Board of Governors recently “approved”:http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sir_table.pdf the Additional Protocol to India’s IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

Siddharth Varadarajan has some “action.”:http://svaradarajan.blogspot.com/2009/03/india-and-additional-protocol.html

More on Israeli Disclosure

Reacting to “this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1919/on-israeli-nuclear-disclosure, an astute reader observes that

bq. Without that taboo [of disclosure], some Israeli officials would make nuclear threats fortnightly. If you think it’s hard to deal with the Iranians now, just imagine if some Israeli loose cannon were threatening to annihilate Tehran on a routine basis.

The reader also cited a “piece”:http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/31/opinion/edcohen.php written by Avner Cohen a couple of years back. Note the part about “away from politics”:

Israel is now uniquely distinguished among all nuclear states in its
legacy of extreme nuclear caution, keeping nuclear affairs low
profile, nearly invisible and away from politics.

One more reason why the rise of nuclear Iran is so perilous is that it threatens to change the subtle nuclear ground rules in the Middle East that were built upon the nuclear legacy of the 1967 war. This legacy is a reminder of why a nuclear Iran must be prevented. If Iran’s goes nuclear, then Israel’s reluctant style of being nuclear will no doubt be replaced by a major nuclear arms race throughout the Middle East.

I hadn’t thought much about the potential domestic Israeli implications or their ramifications. I’m still not sure that Israeli nuclear threats would result in more nuclear weapons states in the region; such threats would indeed represent a qualitative change in regional countries’ security situation, but those governments would still face some serious constraints, regardless of Tel Aviv’s actions. Also, it’s not clear that the security situation would change _so much_ that states would develop nuclear weapons; my impression is that many governments may already view Israel’s nuclear weapons as a threat.

Still, the point is very well taken. And, as I said, I don’t want this science project to be undertaken.

More on US-UAE 123

Miles asked a good question about an observation in “this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1894/us-uae-123 about the “US-UAE 123 agreement.”:http://www.npec-web.org/us-uae/20090115-UsUae-Revised123Agreement.pdf

I wrote:

The last paragraph of the Agreed Minute apparently makes the agreement a minimum standard for other 123 agreements with countries in the region, should the US negotiate them. Here’s the key part:

the fields of cooperation, terms and conditions accorded by the United States of America to the United Arab Emirates for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be no less favorable in scope and effect than those which may be accorded, from time to time, to any other non-nuclear weapon State in the Middle East in a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement.

Miles asked,

bq. Paul, are you sure you are interpreting the UAE agreed minute correctly? I seem to read it that the UAE can renegotiate should the US conclude a less restrictive agreement with someone else.

Miles is talking about the part of the Agreed Minute which states that, in the event that the US does conclude a more favorable agreement with another regional state, Washington will, at the UAE’s request, consult with the UAE “regarding the possibility of amending” the US-UAE agreement so that its terms will be as favorable as the new agreement.

Anyhow, it is, in my view, reasonable to believe that the Agreed Minute does establish a new standard for future such agreements, unless one thinks that the United States intends to do something to violate the US-UAE agreement.

On Israeli Nuclear Disclosure

I had a couple of thoughts the other week during a conference about Iran’s nuclear program. I will note that someone else has almost certainly done more thinking about this issue than I and that these thoughts are likely unoriginal. Any interested readers please weigh in.

I know that many people worry that Israeli disclosure of its nuclear weapons could destabilize the region, lead to nuclear or CBW proliferation, etc. Now, I have no more desire than anyone else for this social science experiment to be carried out, but I’m not sure that disclosure really would be so bad.

The reasoning is fairly simple – since both governments and the public in Israel’s neighborhood already assume that Israel has nuclear weapons, it’s not clear that Israeli disclosure would be a game-changer sufficient to compel regional governments to take the _very_ significant step of developing their own nuclear weapons.

To elaborate…

First, it seems unlikely that governments would make radical chanegs to their military forces, since their material security situations would remain unchanged.

Second, there would, one imagines, be a spike in public anger over Israeli disclosure, but, since the information wouldn’t be new, it’s not at all clear that such anger would be sufficient to produce what, again, would be pretty drastic changes in regional governments’ policies.

The most likely impact I can think of is that some countries may take additional steps to augment their conventional or CW arsenals, since those options are considerably easier than developing nuclear weapons.

Those steps would not be trivial, but my point is that public discussions of this topic often lack sufficient nuance.

2007 Iran NIE Still in Effect

I know that there has been a good deal of speculation regarding the current U.S. assessment of Iran’s nuclear program, “including from yours truly.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1864/dni-blair-on-iran However, it is useful to understand that the analysis in the relevant section of the most recent “Threat Assessment”:http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf is essentially the same as that contained in the “2007 NIE.”:http://odni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf This,as far as I know, will remain the case until a new one is issued – an event which reportedly “may happen soon.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1888/new-iran-nie And yes, that means that I no longer have the doubts that I expressed in “this post.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1864/dni-blair-on-iran

That’s it.

As an aside, I have never understood some people’s alleged inability to understand the 2007 NIE. Nor have I ever understood why the fact that Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program upsets some people so much.