Here’s an ACT interview with Adam Scheinman.

I’m sure that others have delved into the US position concerning past REVCON commitments. This is what he said on the matter:

ACT: In 2010 the review conference agreed to an action plan on all three pillars of the treaty, including Article VI. Does the administration recognize those past commitments as still valid? Will it seek to update those goals, particularly Article VI, through the consensus document?

Scheinman: I think this issue of past commitments, which is talked about quite a bit, is a bit of a red herring. It’s important to understand that only the terms of the treaty are legally binding on states-parties and that any commitment recorded at review conferences in a consensus document are political. They reflect what seems achievable or desirable at the time they were made. Now, it’s certainly the case that many of the actions in review conference final documents remain relevant and certainly important. Others are past their shelf life. There’s a call in previous documents for fully implementing the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty, which hasn’t been in force for two decades now. Other actions are important, but were the product of the time, when conditions for action were more favorable.

That’s certainly the case in terms of U.S.-Russian arms control opportunities in the early post-Cold War period and also in connection with the Oslo Middle East peace process in the mid-1990s. What I will say is that we remain firm in our support for legal undertakings in the NPT, as I hope all parties are, and in our support for realistic arms control and disarmament measures. We also recognize the political importance of implementing commitments made in past documents. But security conditions change in unpredictable ways, and so it’s probably more productive if we take a forward-looking approach and not lose time debating the history.

Here’s a study from CACDA about the AUKUS subs project. Here’s an excerpt concerning an Australian nuclear weapons program:

In 1967, then Prime Minister Holt and the Defense Council of Australia arranged a research program to assess the possibility of Australia to manufacture nuclear weapons independently and the arrangements with its allies. In January 1968, new Prime Minister Gorton explicitly refused to sign the NPT, and at the same time launched an ambitious nuclear weapons program that included spending on building nuclear reactors and uranium enrichment plants, producing weapons-grade plutonium and weapons-grade HEU for nuclear warheads, and strengthening its nuclear research talent pool. The then Australian Foreign Minister McMahon supported joining the NPT and pressured Prime Minister Gorton through the UK and the US. Australia finally approved the NPT in January 1973, and since then Australia’s status as a non-nuclear-weapon state was formally fixed in legal form.

Here’s a list of UK defense reviews as they concern facilities in Scotland.

Here’s a recent parliament discussion about CND:

Dr Julian Lewis:

This week marks the passing of that doughty Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament campaigner ex-Monsignor Bruce Kent. While paying their due respect, will the Government nevertheless reassert the fact that, as long as other countries have nuclear weapons, Britain must never give up its nuclear deterrent.

Mr Wallace:

I remember, in my formative years politically, asking the late Mr Bruce Kent a question when I was at school. I do not think I asked the question very well, and I do not think he answered it very well, either. The reality is that Britain’s position is one of multilateral disarmament. It is not a position of unilateral nuclear disarmament.

This volume contains the charts and backup material presented to the Atomic Energy Commission and Air Force on June 14, 1962 concerning General Electric’s Nuclear Materials and Propulsion Operation (formerly the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Department), during its work on the development of a nuclear power plant for manned aircraft.

I got this a while back.

Announcement here.

Recently, Pakistan’s Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Nadeem Raza described Pakistan’s deterrence policy:

Pakistan is a confident and responsible nuclear power. It pursues the policy of full-spectrum deterrence within the precincts of credible minimum deterrence. Our national security and safety architecture meets all national and international obligations and caters for all kinds of scenarios.

Not sure I’d heard “full-spectrum deterrence within the precincts of credible minimum deterrence.”

Here is the original.

Useful excerpt from this interview with Thomas Pickering:

The second piece of that was perhaps more important and more productive and that was the bilateral contact between Gore and Chernomyrdin that had to do with dealing with a number of the harder subjects and doing it on their own One of the subjects that they were very helpful in resolving was the sale proposed by Russia to India of a third-stage space maneuvering engine for a satellite program but which would have given India the capacity to develop multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles That was resolved in part because Vice President Gore and his very distinguished assistant Leon Fuerth immediately realized that the Russians were also asking for an increased number of American space launches that we could not provide out of our own system And so we agreed to contract for those on the basis that the contract with India would not go ahead