You’re reading this blog. Or writing for it.
Author Archives: kerr
Khan Network: Steve Coll in New Yorker
As far as I can tell, the _New Yorker_ hasn’t posted Steve Coll’s piece on the Khan network yet, but they have a Q&A transcript on their website “that’s worth checking out.”:http://www.newyorker.com/online/content/?060807on_onlineonly
This excerpt about the time frame for an Iranian nuclear weapon is interesting:
Q: The question of how fast can’t be answered definitively, but could you give us a sense of the estimates and how reliable you think they are?
A: John Negroponte, the director of National Intelligence, has said, in his most recent public assessment, that the American intelligence community believes that Iran may acquire a nuclear capacity some time in the next decade, meaning from 2010 or 2011 onward. From my reporting, I gather that in private briefings the Bush Administration’s intelligence analysts focus on a five-to-seven-year window, although they emphasize that there’s a fair amount of uncertainty about this estimate. I think the one assertion that the intelligence community seems comfortable with is that it’s not this year or next year and probably not the year after that. However, the more that is discovered about Iran’s research, the more some analysts wonder whether Iran might be able to move faster than the official forecast indicates.
UNSC Iran Resolution
“Here’s a copy”:http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm of UNSC resolution 1696. Qatar didn’t vote for it…everyone else did.
Here are the three most important paragraphs:
“7. Requests by 31 August a report from the Director General of the IAEA primarily on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the above provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration,
“8. Expresses its intention, in the event that Iran has not by that date complied with this resolution, then to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary,
“9. Confirms that such additional measures will not be necessary in the event that Iran complies with this resolution,
A copy of Chapter VII of the UN Charter can be found “here.”:http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm
Here’s what Article 41 says:
bq. The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
WaPo on Secret BW Lab
I love this part of today’s “BW piece by Joby Warrick:”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/29/AR2006072900592_pf.html
Current and former administration officials say that compliance with the treaty hinges on intent, and that making small amounts of biowarfare pathogens for study is permitted under a broad interpretation of the treaty. Some also argue that the need for a strong biodefense in an age of genetic engineering trumps concerns over what they see as legal hair-splitting.
“How can I go to the people of this country and say, ‘I can’t do this important research because some arms-control advocate told me I can’t’?” asked [Penrose “Parney”] Albright, the former Homeland Security assistant secretary.
I guess he could consider that whole “law” thing that such advocates are probably thinking about, but whatever.
FYI, Jonathan Tucker “dropped some relevant knowledge”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Tucker.asp about the lab in question a couple years ago.
Note to CFR.org: BBC China =/= PSI Op
Eben Kaplan wrote “a piece”:http://www.cfr.org/publication/11061/preventing_ballistic_surprises.html a few weeks ago about the PSI. Overall, it’s not bad. But it contains an all-too-frequent error.
He wrote:
bq. Among the PSI’s most notable successes was the 2003 interception of a shipment of nuclear centrifuge parts from the A.Q. Khan network to Libya.
Bzzzt. The BBC China wasn’t a PSI operation. I blogged about this before “here.”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/624/psi-lacks-sweet-libya-skills As an aside, David Sanger recently made the same mistake “in this piece,”:http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0F14FC34540C768DDDAE0894DE404482 calling the interdiction the PSI’s “best-known success.”
Interestingly, Ron Suskind’s “new book”:http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0743271092/sr=8-1/qid=1154120532/ref=pd_bbs_1/104-0701527-6319916?ie=UTF8 contains an account of the CIA’s involvement in the Libyan disarmament effort. Essentially, Suskind reports that the CIA had turned Urs Tinner, who then told the agency about the shipment. Not a PSI operation.
To be fair, the BBC China mistake doesn’t really affect what appears to be Kaplan’s main argument, which is that intelligence-sharing and interdiction are good.
But it does call into question the PSI’s effectiveness for the simple reason that the Bush administration hasn’t been offering any specific evidence that the initiative works. That’s kind of a big deal, especially given that the Bush administration has pushed PSI as a substitute for arms control.
OK, stop being a dork and go do whatever it is you do…
Always Trust Everyone
The President of Pakistan has repeatedly said that Pakistan is not making a bomb and has no intention of making a bomb. We have not only made this commitment solemnly, we are prepared also to accept international safeguards on a non-discriminatory basis.
From “Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme,” published by Pakistan’s Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 1986
It goes on to explain that Pakistan’s nuclear program is solely for the purpose of heading off an energy crisis.
Department of Wankery
The House “approved this atrocity”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060727/ap_on_go_co/us_india_nuclear_2;_ylt=Ar7kgf9SNbxPtqc7PKbWBs5A7AkB;_ylu=X3oDMTBiMW04NW9mBHNlYwMlJVRPUCUl yesterday. Great first day back from vacation.
But since the deal will strengthen the nonproliferation regime and definitely has nothing to do with campaign contributions, selling weapons to India, or containing China, I’m not worried.
OTOH, “this”:http://pandagon.net/2006/07/15/oh-no-you-didnt-sully/ is truly frightening.
My utility belt tells me it’s to the bar, Batman…
*Update:*
“The final bill is here.”:http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h5682rh.txt.pdf
Just Saying
I think it’s reasonable to believe that countrires’ adherence to a treaty at least suggests that they agree with its basic tenets.
By that measure, here is the number of countries, apart from India, who believe that New Delhi should be able to do whatever it wants with its nuclear program:
Zero.
How do we know? Well, only three countries are not NPT member-states. And we know Pakistan is decidedly “not a fan”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1031/india-math of India’s nuclear arsenal. I don’t recall seeing any commentary from Israel on the matter, but you get the point.
Of course, we could well be adding the US and A to that number if the administration gets its way…
HIRC Markup, US-India Nuclear Deal
Possible demise of the NPT being “broadcast”:http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/ now…
Just remember that the NPT doesn’t include the phrase “unless the US says so.”
*Update*
I forgot to mention that comments containing the phrases “nuclear apartheid” or “[reference to arms controllers] ayatollahs” will not be approved. If you have to ask why, I doubt you’d understand the answer.
*Late Update*
Today’s “Reuters story”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/29/AR2006062901107.html about the SFRC hearing. Ick.
Snakes on the Six Party Talks
While the usual suspects fantasize in their collective right-wing whack-shack about a North Korean ballistic missile test, a working GMD, etc., it would be useful to take a look at what North Korea’s MFA said 1 June.
The fact that North Korea invited Chris Hill for a visit was widely reported at the time. But I don’t remember anyone noting that the statement also said that Pyongyang has made a “strategic decision” to give up its nuclear weapons program.
Here’s the relevant part of the “statement”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2006/200606/news06/02.htm#1:
Of late officials of the U.S. administration never open their mouths without crying out for the “resumption of the six-party talks.” They bluster that Pyongyang needs to make a strategic decision and Washington is seeking a new approach toward the DPRK in a bid to build up public opinion.
This, however, is bringing into bolder relief the U.S. true intention to torpedo the six-party talks, not pleased with their process.
[snip]
We will not need even a single nuclear weapon once we get convinced that the U.S. does not antagonize us and confidence is built between the DPRK and the U.S. and, accordingly, we are no longer exposed to the U.S. threat. This is what we have already clarified more than once.
The DPRK has already made a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear program and this was reflected in the above-said joint statement.
We are fully ready to discuss the issues of bilateral relations, peaceful coexistence, the conclusion of a peace agreement, the provision of light water reactors and other points mentioned in the statement along with the issue of abandoning the nuclear program on the principle of “simultaneous action”.
What remains to be done is for the U.S. to create conditions and climate whereby the DPRK may return to the talks and fulfill its commitment, free from any pressure.
I can’t say that I’ve done the lexis search, but I’m pretty sure this is the first time that North Korea has actually used the phrase “strategic decision.” Anyway, the whole thing is pretty interesting – go “read it”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2006/200606/news06/02.htm#1.
Here’s “your reward”:http://www.snakesonablog.com/2006/06/22/snakes-on-the-colbert-report-ii/ for educating yourself.
*Update:*
From the comments section… a reader points out that North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gae Gwan “used the phase”:http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/08/14/gwan.transcript/index.html last summer.
I actually reported his comment in “this piece”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_09/NKoreaTalks9-05.asp on the 6PT. Guess the memory’s not what it used to be….wish I had an excuse other than old age.
I still think the latest comment is important, given the timing and source – a written FM statement is, I think, considered more authoritative.
Well-spotted, though.