Author Archives: kerr

Der Spiegel ElBaradei Interview

The “interview”:http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/spiegel/0,1518,428788,00.html is short, but covers a fair amount of ground.

Here’s what he said about Iran:

SPIEGEL: Iran is Hezbollah’s main source of funding. Many Middle East experts believe that Tehran’s mullah-led regime is behind the current escalation, hoping to use the situation to deflect attention from its nuclear program.

ElBaradei: I don’t know, but one thing is certain: Iran is an important regional power. And like it or not, it will be difficult to find a solution without entering into a dialogue with Tehran.

SPIEGEL: This is precisely what US President Bush wants to avoid.

ElBaradei: That is a problem. One cannot always negotiate through middlemen. This makes it all the more significant that the United States has decided to join in nuclear talks with Tehran. It’s an important breakthrough.

SPIEGEL: Most of the world is dismayed over Iran’s delaying tactics in the dispute over its nuclear program. You also stated, in January, that you were losing patience with Tehran.

ElBaradei: That’s true.

SPIEGEL: It’s now July, and Tehran is still showing no willingness to cooperate. The international community is getting impatient waiting for a response to the offer that was drafted by the five nuclear powers and Germany. It includes both political and economic incentives, such as supplying Tehran with a light-water reactor. In return, Tehran is being asked to stop its uranium enrichment activities, one of the key conditions for building a nuclear bomb.

ElBaradei: It’s a good offer, and I expect an answer soon. The Iranians tell me that they need a few more weeks to take a close look at everything. Last week’s announcement from Tehran — that they are “seriously considering” the package and that they view it as a positive approach to finding a diplomatic solution is encouraging…

SPIEGEL: …or just the usual cat-and-mouse game…

ElBaradei: …but there is mutual mistrust between Iran and the West. It will take time to get past this.

SPIEGEL: But it was the Iranian regime that clearly lied and deceived the West in recent years when it came to its nuclear program. Doesn’t Tehran have to accept the offer without conditions and stop its uranium enrichment activities?

ElBaradei: There is no other choice. To our knowledge, however, the Iranians have not accelerated their nuclear research program, which would be a sign of their developing a nuclear program for military use. There are apparently competing political directions in Tehran. And there are many shades of gray.

SPIEGEL: Is the threat of UN sanctions effective?

ElBaradei: We must be patient. A few weeks won’t make a difference. The issue is not Iran’s nuclear program, but regional security.

SPIEGEL: You sound optimistic. But isn’t it likely that Tehran will insist on uranium enrichment and respond to the offer with an unacceptable counteroffer?

ElBaradei: It would be fatal if the Iranians were to miss this great opportunity. It would lead to a spiral of escalation. Sanctions would be unavoidable but wouldn’t eliminate the problem, and if the situation deteriorates, we risk losing our last inspection opportunities.

SPIEGEL: Tehran recently complained about your chief inspector for Iran, Chris Charlier, a Belgian. Is there anything to reports in the press that you removed him from his position in response to Iranian pressure?

ElBaradei: That isn’t quite the way it was. Our statutes give any state being monitored by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) the right to reject an inspector who is not to their liking. It’s the same thing in diplomacy, where a state can reject a proposed ambassador as a persona non grata.

SPIEGEL: So he was suspended at the request of the mullah regime?

ElBaradei: No, he continues to work in a key position relating to the Iran issue. But he will not be traveling to Tehran until further notice. We have 200 inspectors who can conduct inspections in Iran. Individual employees aren’t the issue.

The issue is getting the job done. I will denounce the policy the minute we are no longer able to do so in Iran.

SPIEGEL: Are you worried that Tehran will terminate the agreements and expel the IAEA?

ElBaradei: This threat has been mentioned.

SPIEGEL: There have not been any UN inspectors in North Korea since the end of 2002. Does Pyongyang pose a more dramatic threat to humanity?

ElBaradei: Most specialists and intelligence experts, including the Americans, believe that Iran is still five to ten years away from building nuclear weapons. In this respect, North Korea is much further along than Iran. Indeed, a nightmare scenario has already developed in North Korea.

Unfortunately, he also called the US-India nuclear goat rodeo a “win-win situation.”

“Here’s an open letter”:http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/20060724_Ltr_ElBaradei_India.pdf to ElBaradei expressing an alternate viewpoint.

Khan Network: Steve Coll in New Yorker

As far as I can tell, the _New Yorker_ hasn’t posted Steve Coll’s piece on the Khan network yet, but they have a Q&A transcript on their website “that’s worth checking out.”:http://www.newyorker.com/online/content/?060807on_onlineonly

This excerpt about the time frame for an Iranian nuclear weapon is interesting:

Q: The question of how fast can’t be answered definitively, but could you give us a sense of the estimates and how reliable you think they are?

A: John Negroponte, the director of National Intelligence, has said, in his most recent public assessment, that the American intelligence community believes that Iran may acquire a nuclear capacity some time in the next decade, meaning from 2010 or 2011 onward. From my reporting, I gather that in private briefings the Bush Administration’s intelligence analysts focus on a five-to-seven-year window, although they emphasize that there’s a fair amount of uncertainty about this estimate. I think the one assertion that the intelligence community seems comfortable with is that it’s not this year or next year and probably not the year after that. However, the more that is discovered about Iran’s research, the more some analysts wonder whether Iran might be able to move faster than the official forecast indicates.

UNSC Iran Resolution

“Here’s a copy”:http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm of UNSC resolution 1696. Qatar didn’t vote for it…everyone else did.

Here are the three most important paragraphs:

“7. Requests by 31 August a report from the Director General of the IAEA primarily on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the above provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration,

“8. Expresses its intention, in the event that Iran has not by that date complied with this resolution, then to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary,

“9. Confirms that such additional measures will not be necessary in the event that Iran complies with this resolution,

A copy of Chapter VII of the UN Charter can be found “here.”:http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm

Here’s what Article 41 says:

bq. The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

WaPo on Secret BW Lab

I love this part of today’s “BW piece by Joby Warrick:”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/29/AR2006072900592_pf.html

Current and former administration officials say that compliance with the treaty hinges on intent, and that making small amounts of biowarfare pathogens for study is permitted under a broad interpretation of the treaty. Some also argue that the need for a strong biodefense in an age of genetic engineering trumps concerns over what they see as legal hair-splitting.

“How can I go to the people of this country and say, ‘I can’t do this important research because some arms-control advocate told me I can’t’?” asked [Penrose “Parney”] Albright, the former Homeland Security assistant secretary.

I guess he could consider that whole “law” thing that such advocates are probably thinking about, but whatever.

FYI, Jonathan Tucker “dropped some relevant knowledge”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Tucker.asp about the lab in question a couple years ago.

Note to CFR.org: BBC China =/= PSI Op

Eben Kaplan wrote “a piece”:http://www.cfr.org/publication/11061/preventing_ballistic_surprises.html a few weeks ago about the PSI. Overall, it’s not bad. But it contains an all-too-frequent error.

He wrote:

bq. Among the PSI’s most notable successes was the 2003 interception of a shipment of nuclear centrifuge parts from the A.Q. Khan network to Libya.

Bzzzt. The BBC China wasn’t a PSI operation. I blogged about this before “here.”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/624/psi-lacks-sweet-libya-skills As an aside, David Sanger recently made the same mistake “in this piece,”:http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0F14FC34540C768DDDAE0894DE404482 calling the interdiction the PSI’s “best-known success.”

Interestingly, Ron Suskind’s “new book”:http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0743271092/sr=8-1/qid=1154120532/ref=pd_bbs_1/104-0701527-6319916?ie=UTF8 contains an account of the CIA’s involvement in the Libyan disarmament effort. Essentially, Suskind reports that the CIA had turned Urs Tinner, who then told the agency about the shipment. Not a PSI operation.

To be fair, the BBC China mistake doesn’t really affect what appears to be Kaplan’s main argument, which is that intelligence-sharing and interdiction are good.

But it does call into question the PSI’s effectiveness for the simple reason that the Bush administration hasn’t been offering any specific evidence that the initiative works. That’s kind of a big deal, especially given that the Bush administration has pushed PSI as a substitute for arms control.

OK, stop being a dork and go do whatever it is you do…

Always Trust Everyone

The President of Pakistan has repeatedly said that Pakistan is not making a bomb and has no intention of making a bomb. We have not only made this commitment solemnly, we are prepared also to accept international safeguards on a non-discriminatory basis.

From “Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme,” published by Pakistan’s Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, 1986

It goes on to explain that Pakistan’s nuclear program is solely for the purpose of heading off an energy crisis.

Department of Wankery

The House “approved this atrocity”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20060727/ap_on_go_co/us_india_nuclear_2;_ylt=Ar7kgf9SNbxPtqc7PKbWBs5A7AkB;_ylu=X3oDMTBiMW04NW9mBHNlYwMlJVRPUCUl yesterday. Great first day back from vacation.

But since the deal will strengthen the nonproliferation regime and definitely has nothing to do with campaign contributions, selling weapons to India, or containing China, I’m not worried.

OTOH, “this”:http://pandagon.net/2006/07/15/oh-no-you-didnt-sully/ is truly frightening.

My utility belt tells me it’s to the bar, Batman…

*Update:*

“The final bill is here.”:http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h5682rh.txt.pdf

Just Saying

I think it’s reasonable to believe that countrires’ adherence to a treaty at least suggests that they agree with its basic tenets.

By that measure, here is the number of countries, apart from India, who believe that New Delhi should be able to do whatever it wants with its nuclear program:

Zero.

How do we know? Well, only three countries are not NPT member-states. And we know Pakistan is decidedly “not a fan”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1031/india-math of India’s nuclear arsenal. I don’t recall seeing any commentary from Israel on the matter, but you get the point.

Of course, we could well be adding the US and A to that number if the administration gets its way…

HIRC Markup, US-India Nuclear Deal

Possible demise of the NPT being “broadcast”:http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/ now…

Just remember that the NPT doesn’t include the phrase “unless the US says so.”

*Update*

I forgot to mention that comments containing the phrases “nuclear apartheid” or “[reference to arms controllers] ayatollahs” will not be approved. If you have to ask why, I doubt you’d understand the answer.

*Late Update*

Today’s “Reuters story”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/29/AR2006062901107.html about the SFRC hearing. Ick.