A little while ago, I mentioned that Iran has some options for decreasing implementation of its JCPOA commitments:

Tehran’s been re-visiting its playbook from 2005 and 2006 when, shortly after the election of President Ahmadinejad, the government gradually resumed nuclear activities that it had suspended pursuant to Iran’s 2003 and 2004 agreements with the E3. During that time, Iran also stopped implementing its additional protocol and other transparency measures contained in the aforementioned agreements with the E3. The point is that, although Iran has been complying with all of its JCPOA-related monitoring and inspection requirements, there is precedent for Tehran to decrease such compliance.

Remember, Iran’s 5 January announcement described its latest JCPOA decision as “the final step to reduce [the government’s] commitments” to the agreement. I thought that the adjective “final” might mean that Iran would leave IAEA monitoring and inspection provisions in place while perhaps taking actions like producing LEU containing ever-increasing amounts of U-235. The tolerance of Iran’s political system for such monitoring/inspections may be greater than in the past. For one thing, the AEOI, which runs the nuclear program and is Tehran’s interlocutor with the IAEA, has had several years to become accustomed to the most recent monitoring/inspections. Also, if Iran doesn’t have a nuclear weapons program, or aspirations for such a program, then the political system may well not much care about the above-mentioned provisions.

But a pair of statements from Foreign Minister Zarif, at least for me, confused the matter somewhat. According to one from IRNA, the minister stated that Tehran would take no more steps to decrease its observation of JCPOA-mandated limits on its nuclear program:

the country’s five steps in compliance reduction would have no similar follow-ups, but Europeans’ measure to refer the case to the United Nations Security Council may be followed by Tehran’s decision to leave NPT as stated in President Hassan Rouhani’s May 2018 letter to other parties to the deal.

But I think one can reasonably interpret this Fars News statement as an indication that Iran may well be planning for a such a follow-up step:

“Iran is designing a new and more effective step that will be taken before leaving NPT in case the Europeans do not fulfill their responsibilities to the deal and continue their claims,” he [Zarif] highlighted.

This IRNA article dated January 22 seems to describe Zarif’s position similarly:

If the case is referred to the UN Security Council, the idea of withdrawing from the NPT would be brought up, but before that, other plans could be placed on the agenda, Zarif said earlier on Monday after attending a parliamentary hearing.

Regardless, cages are surely rattling and I want a transcript of what Zarif said.

I should have done this earlier, but I am highlighting a comment from Mark Hibbs in response to this post:

Mark HIbbsJanuary 16, 2020 at 10:16 am

According to people talking yesterday in Brussels, it would appear that in EU circles it is being taken for granted that the timelines for the DRM are going to be extended.

If so, that’s apparently because there is 1.) no confidence that the issues dividing Iran , the EU3, plus Russia plus China (both opposed invoking the DRM) can be resolved a month’s time, and/or 2.) that all parties will reach the conclusion that it would be constructive to extend the timeline in the interest of creating a forum for longer-term discussion of the kinds of political issues ultimately at stake in Iran’s violations of its commitments as distinct from the technical/procedural/legal issues that the DRM was intended to address. 

What would any party to the agreement stand to gain in blocking a consensus to extend the DRM timeline? Perhaps Russia and/or China might consider doing that, if either wished to snuff out the DRM proceeding without it having reached a conclusion of Iranian non-performance after a month. China and/or Russia could in this way perhaps challenge the EU3 to force a decision over non-performance by Iran–a decision that the EU states may be loathe to make. Would the EU states seek a non-performance verdict if they are confident that Russia and or China would stand in the way of that consensus result? Optics would matter. China and Russia would have to decide whether their interests would be advanced or set back by objecting to a non-performance determination by the EU states. In any event, at this point it can be assumed that neither China nor Russia would step forth to trigger snap-back sanctions, and the EU3 themselves may also not want to walk that plank after a month should the DRM timeline run out without a consensus agreement to extend it.

No explanation needed.

Late to the party on this one, but a November report from State’s AVC Bureau asserts that

… Burma is in non-compliance with the CWC due to its failure to declare its past chemical weapons (CW) program and destroy its CW production facility (CWPF).  The United States has serious concerns that a CW stockpile may remain at Burma’s historical CW facility.

Moreover, the USG “assesses Burma had a CW program in the 1980s that included a sulfur mustard development program and a CWPF near Tonbo.”  Also, “CW agent and production equipment may remain at Tonbo,” the report says, adding that Myanmar has not declared this facility (among others) to the OPCW.

Here’s more:

…infrastructure has remained at several buildings at the Tonbo site.  Burma has failed to declare four dual-use facilities:  three urea fertilizer plants and a methanol production plant under the Burmese Ministry of Energy which probably have annual production capacities that meet declaration requirements.  The United States is also concerned that Burma did not declare two other locations that may have been involved in Burma’s military-run CW program.  However, most of the original buildings associated with Burma’s legacy research, production, weaponization, and storage of sulfur mustard munitions remain at the historic CWPF near Tonbo, which was Burma’s primary CW research, production, weaponization, and storage center during the 1980s.  The physical integrity of the buildings at Tonbo remain intact.

The report also has a section titled “Efforts to Resolve Compliance Concerns;” I think this is the key takeaway:

Although the civilian government has actively engaged in discussions and indicated its commitment to fulfill its CWC obligations, Burma’s military has not admitted to its past CW program.

The USG reiterated these concerns in November during the most recent conference of CWC States Parties. Here’s Myanmar’s reply:

In its statement, the delegation of the United States of America made reference to my country. In this regard, I would like to make following points: First, Myanmar as a responsible State Party is committed to the earnest implementation of the Convention and strictly adheres to the provisions of the Convention. Second, Myanmar never has an ambition to be a possessor of chemical weapons. Third, Myanmar always puts its utmost efforts for taking measures to be in compliance with the Convention. Fourth, Myanmar is always willing and ready to address any concern raised in this regard in a constructive manner and in accordance with the Convention. Fifth, the Myanmar Government makes sure that coordination among the relevant agencies is led by the National Authority put in place for taking necessary measures accordingly.

The OPCW Implementation report says nothing about the matter.

I’ve written about this 2014 interview before. But I thought I’d highlight what he said about the origins of IAEA safeguards:

And when the nuclear started, then the—to enforce or demand inspection by international inspectors in big industrial installations was not anything popular in the countries of those days. Germany, Belgium, were traditionally very negative to having inspectors milling around, especially as the nuclear weapons states did not have to do it.Now, they consented to do it on a voluntary basis, which was some little consolation, but anyway, the attitude traditionally in the world is not to accept international inspection. So it was something novel and I think very important. And I think fact-finding and partial fact-finding is a very valuable feature in the world, just as we have our criminal investigations, we want to have—also professional and capable organizations that do it objectively. We are not there as an enemy, but we are there as a trustee in the world.Now, there was this attitude that meant that the whole system of safeguards inspection by the IAEA did not—were not given much teeth. They were to check—focus—upon the nuclear fissionable material and they were in practice confined to going to sites that were declared.

Ok, the only relevant lyric is “Potential H-bomb ,” but still.

Well, here it is. The important part:

We have therefore been left with no choice, given Iran’s actions, but to register today our concerns that Iran is not meeting its commitments under the JCPoA and to refer this matter to the Joint Commission under the Dispute Resolution Mechanism, as set out in paragraph 36 of the JCPoA.

We do this in good faith with the overarching objective of preserving the JCPoA and in the sincere hope of finding a way forward to resolve the impasse through constructive diplomatic dialogue, while preserving the agreement and remaining within its framework. In doing so, our 3 countries are not joining a campaign to implement maximum pressure against Iran. Our hope is to bring Iran back into full compliance with its commitments under the JCPoA.

And here’s JCPOA paragraph 36.

If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration – in parallel with (or in lieu of) review at the Ministerial level – either the complaining participant or the participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be considered by an Advisory Board, which would consist of three members (one each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non- performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.

A colleague helpfully pointed out the number of areas for wiggle room in terms of timelines and responses. The relevant portions are in bold.

I think this post became a bit more relevant today.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Celso Amorim recently wrote in the Guardian about the 2010 Tehran Declaration – an event that’s resided in the memory hole for some time:

As president and foreign minister of Brazil, in the first decade of this century, we held talks with US presidents and senior Iranian officials in an attempt to build peace, which we believed to be what mattered most to the peoples of Iran and the United States.

Together with Turkey, we negotiated with Iran the Tehran declaration, following a request by Barack Obama himself, made at the margins of an expanded G8 summit in 2009, in Italy.

This agreement, celebrated in 2010, hailed by disarmament experts from around the world, including former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Nobel laureate Mohamed ElBaradei, had the potential to bring a peaceful solution to the complex issue of the Iranian nuclear program.

Beyond making the world a safer place, we were helping the two countries, staunch enemies since the 1979 Islamic revolution, to develop a peaceful and mutually respectful coexistence, as expressed by President Obama.

Unfortunately, domestic and foreign policy factors in the United States prevented its adoption at that time. A few years later, however, Obama signed a similar agreement with the Iranian government, later abandoned by Trump.

In his book Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence James Clapper provides an excellent succinct rebuttal to the prevalent – and absurd – claim that Saddam Hussein pretended to have WMD programs when he really didn’t:

In the years that followed, I’ve heard many, including some in the Intelligence Community, theorize that Saddam Hussein had bluffed his way into a US invasion, that he feared Iran more than the United States, and that he wanted Iran and other neighbors to think he had chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, to intimidate them and to prove to his own government and people that he was firmly in control, defiant to the world, and a force in the region. This theory holds that he purposely built facilities to look like WMD sites, and that he deliberately moved trucks on and off those sites prior to UN weapons inspections to create the illusion that he was hiding a covert weapons program. This was not, however, the case. The theory accords far too much credit to Hussein and doesn’t attribute the failure where it belongs—squarely on the shoulders of the administration members who were pushing a narrative of a rogue WMD program in Iraq and on the intelligence officers, including me, who were so eager to help that we found what wasn’t really there.

As you can see, this blog has returned, only with a new URL. Thanks to Leif Hunneman for helping to re-animate this thing, both a few years ago and more recently. The long delay between his work and this post is partly my fault and partly due to circumstances beyond my control. Jeffrey Lewis and Greg Broquard also deserve credit for the blog’s past origin and maintenance. In Jeffery’s case, he deserves credit and/or blame for the blog’s name (I agreed to use it after it got a laugh from everyone). Thanks to both of them.

I think the content is self-explanatory. I’ll see how long this thing lasts.