Monthly Archives: April 2009

Old News

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Awhile back, I was just so pleased with myself for making the connection between “cars and centrifuges”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1923/rimz-of-mass-destruction — for example, how automakers are used as a false end-users for dual-use machine tools, hard-to-get materials, and the like.

It turns out this has been going on for decades. Take the case of “Van Doornes Transmissie”:http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=770085, which _Nucleonics Week_ flagged waaaaay back in 1981:

bq. THE DUTCH JUSTICE MINISTRY TURNED DOWN A REQUEST FOR A REPORT on the so-called Khan affair from the special parliamentary committee that intends to conduct its own probe into the matter. The Justice Ministry probe is known to concern two companies — Van Doornes Transmissie and Fysisch Dynamisch Onderzoekslaboratorium (FDO), a subsidiary of VMF Stork Nv. A. Q. Khan, a Pakistani scientist, is alleged to have obtained uranium enrichment knowhow while working for Ultracentrifuge Nederland and FDO in the 1970s. The two companies named in the government probe are believed to be involved in the export of strategic goods to Pakistan. The Justice Ministry said it doesn’t know when its probe will be complete, though a member of Parliament concerned with nuclear affairs said he hopes the ministry’s work will be completed in two or three months.

VDT reportedly shipped thousands of maraging steel rotor tubes to Pakistan in the 1970s.

So, like it says up at the top, old news.

P is for Persian

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That’s what Iran’s IAEA rep Ali Asgar Soltanieh says, “according to Fars News”:http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8801291027:

bq. About Iran’s new centrifuges, Soltanieh said, “Previous centrifuges are not centrifuges of Pakistan class – they are “Persian” class (P-1, P-2 or IR-1, IR-2).

Yep. And in Libya, the P-1 was called the L-1.

Now, as Iranian nuclear-program howlers go, that doesn’t crack the top ten. But let’s recall all that LEU and HEU cross-contamination found on Iran’s first set of P-1s, some of Khan Research Labs’ castoffs. Would Mr. Soltanieh care to take credit for those traces, after all?

Once upon a time, of course, some devices not unlike the P-1 were called “SNOR and CNOR”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1401/when-did-pakistan-stop-stealing-urenco-designs. But now I’m rehashing ancient history.

Hibbs on Syria U Traces

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So it turns out that we’re just living in James Acton’s shadow over here.

Mark Hibbs has details on the “uranium oxide traces”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1881/update-from-the-pencil-factory that the IAEA found in Syria. It’s in the the April 6 issue of “NuclearFuel”:http://www.platts.com/Nuclear/Newsletters%20&%20Reports/Nuclear%20Fuel/.

First, it appears that “James’s view”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2106/new-evidence-of-nork-syria-link of the 80+ particles of anthropogenic U found in Syria is shared within the IAEA:

bq. Early this year, a senior UN safeguards official said the IAEA believed that the particles appeared to be NATU that had oxidized (NF, 23 Feb., 5). According to the official, the finding was consistent with the hypothesis the uranium was metallic fuel material for a DPRK-type production reactor.

Second, Hibbs goes on to relate that there’s not a great deal of research on the behavior of U particles under various conditions, but it’s generally accepted that if they are divided finely enough, they’ll oxidize all the way through.

Reading between the lines, it seems that the number of particles found in the swipe samples — now described by Hibbs as numbering close to 100 — is simply too many to be accounted for by cross-contamination. So much for “my pet theory”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1865/more-than-you-wanted-to-know-about-magnox. As long as we’re not talking about something off-the-wall, like HWR fuel — this was said to be a “Magnox”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1865/more-than-you-wanted-to-know-about-magnox reactor, remember? — then in the absence of additional information, it’s only reasonable to believe that there was a lot of uranium metal onsite, which was blasted into itty-bitty bits. (That’s a technical term.)

Hibbs also offers a great deal of insight into the state of attribution technology for particles of this type. The U.S. has traces of U from North Korea; is it sharing the “fingerprints” with the IAEA for purposes of comparison? We don’t know. But that Acton fellow has “written about the North Korea traces”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2163/yet-more-on-nork-heu.

Lastly, it seems that the Syrian government has refused requests to return to the scene of the swipes to take more samples. Once stung, twice shy. This once again raises the question of when the IAEA will be willing to use its power of “special inspections”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1886/syria-ups-and-downs-of-special-inspections. Any day now, folks!

If the subject interests you, Pierre Goldschmidt makes special inspections Topic A in a recent paper on “strengthening the nonproliferation regime”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=22943&prog=zgp&proj=znpp. Some guy named James Acton also “spoke about this recently”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1300&prog=zgp&proj=zted.

I think I’ll go find something else to blog about now.

M Rubin And Iran Hackery

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Whatever one thinks about the Iran nuclear situation, “this WSJ piece”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123958201328712205.html from Michael Rubin is pure hackery.

There are too many errors to bother with, but here are a few fun facts:

First, Tehran did fulfill many, though certainly not all, of its pledges in its 2003 and 2004 agreements with the E3. For example, Iran did cooperate with many aspects of the IAEA’s investigation and signed and implemented an additional protocol to its CSA.

Second, Iran did make several proposals to the E3 in 2005. I know it might be hassle to ferret them out, so “here they are.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals Oh, and there’s “this one”:http://www.armscontrol.org/pdf/2003_Spring_Iran_Proposal.pdf from 2003 that I think 1 or 2 people may have mentioned before.

Farideh Farhi has “more.”:http://icga.blogspot.com/2009/04/on-irans-sincerity-in-nuclear-talks.html I’ve read an English translation of the Aftab News interview with Rowhani that Rubin quotes from (I am not at liberty to post it, unfortunately). Dr. Farhi is correct that it doesn’t come close to supporting Rubin’s claim that “Rowhani, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator at the time, acknowledged his government’s insincerity.”

Rubin is also the primary drafter of “this,”:http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/8448 in case anyone needs a reminder.

*Update:*

I realized that I was not clear about one issue: Iran’s well-known lack of enthusiasm for suspending its enrichment program does not equate to insincerity or an unwillingness to compromise. Whether talks are worth pursuing is a different issue.

Everything You Always Wanted To Know About SBX

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Just one passing thought.

I’ll bet you didn’t know that Allen Thomson maintains “voluminous”:http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/sbx.pdf “sourcebooks”:http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/sbx-v2.pdf on “SBX”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1986/all-teed-up-and-nowhere-to-go.

Some people scrapbook. Some blog. Others, it seems, research!

Moussavi on the Nuclear Issue

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FT “interviews”:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a2466224-2824-11de-8dbf-00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=be75219e-940a-11da-82ea-0000779e2340.html leading Iranian presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Moussavi:

You recently said you would pursue détente with the west if you were elected. How are you going to have that approach with the US while not compromising on the nuclear programme?

I consider détente the principle to build confidence between Iran and other countries. I think the recent discourse, which differentiates between nuclear technology and nuclear weapons is a good one. The more this differentiation is emphasised, the greater the possibility of détente.

Would Iran agree to suspend uranium enrichment if you were president?

No one in Iran would accept suspension.

And you would not accept it, either?

No. The problem is that we had a bad experience with suspension. It was first done [2003-2005] to discuss issues and remove suspicion but it turned into a tool to deprive Iran of having access to nuclear technology. There is a bad memory in this regard.

How would you remove tensions then?

Progress in nuclear technology and its peaceful use is the right of all countries and nations. This is what we have painfully achieved with our own efforts. No one will retreat. But we have to see what solutions or in other words what guarantees can be found to verify the non-diversion of the programme into nuclear weapons.

What kind of solutions?

They can be reached in technical negotiations.

How influential can the president be in nuclear decisions while the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has the last say in this issue?

Decisions on nuclear technology definitely need to be based on a thorough consensus at the national level. Obviously, the role of the supreme leader is very determining.

So far, however, no solution has been found. How would your presidency help?

The issue doesn’t only depend on us. It will also depend on the discourse the Americans use and the issues they pursue. The more realistic they become and recognise Iran in this issue, naturally the better the ground will be prepared to find solutions.

Still working on that longer post.

North Korea’s Reprocessing Option

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“Mark Landler in the NYT”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/15/world/asia/15korea.html asked Sig Hecker for his view:

Siegfried S. Hecker, a professor at Stanford University who has extensively toured the plant, said it would take six months to rebuild the cooling tower that North Korea blew up in June 2008 as part of an earlier agreement.

But Dr. Hecker said the North Koreans could begin reprocessing plutonium from an existing cache in a couple of weeks. That would allow them to make at least one additional bomb, he said, which might embolden them to conduct another test and refine their bomb-making expertise.

“With Yongbyon disabled, it meant no more bombs and no better bombs,” Dr. Hecker said.

The North had earlier agreed in principle to give up its nuclear material and any weapons, but talks on how to reach that goal stalled. During the Bush administration, North Korea is believed to have produced enough bomb-grade plutonium for six or more nuclear weapons.

Dr. Hecker said that throwing out inspectors also raised the risk that North Korea could sell nuclear material to other countries.

The possibility of a second nuclear test -was mooted at least as early as last month- has been mooted “recently”:http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2009/03/26/62/0401000000AEN20090326007400315F.HTML.

Would it get the North Koreans anything? As mentioned above, it could help them to validate a bomb design. But would it soften up the U.S. or the neighbors? I doubt it.

Iran Talks: Definition of Terms

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I’ve “put this off”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1906/promissory-note for awhile, but it’s time: time to weigh the pros and cons of negotiation with Iran without preconditions. But before tackling this hefty matter, a clarification.

David Sanger’s “story in -Monday’s- Tuesday’s NYT”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/middleeast/14diplo.html floats a trial balloon, indicating that the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany – the hard core of the 5+1 group – are poised to shift ground on Iran strategy:

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration and its European allies are preparing proposals that would shift strategy toward Iran by dropping a longstanding American insistence that Tehran rapidly shut down nuclear facilities during the early phases of negotiations over its atomic program, according to officials involved in the discussions.

The proposals, exchanged in confidential strategy sessions with European allies, would press Tehran to open up its nuclear program gradually to wide-ranging inspection. But the proposals would also allow Iran to continue enriching uranium for some period during the talks. That would be a sharp break from the approach taken by the Bush administration, which had demanded that Iran halt its enrichment activities, at least briefly to initiate negotiations.

This overview subtly mischaracterizes the record. Suspension as a precondition for talks was a European policy before it was American. The Iran-E3 talks of 2003-2005 took place under conditions of “voluntary suspension.” What Iran’s “National”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1976/the-festival-of-unenriched-fuel “Nuclear”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1981/inside-irans-fmp “Technology”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1982/more-about-irans-fmp “Day”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1984/the-black-bellows commemorates, in fact, is the reversal of suspension.

The distinctly American position on Iran was something else: a refusal to engage in direct negotiations on the nuclear issues. But this difference between the U.S. and the E-3 was dissolved in May 2006 when Secretary of State Rice announced that “the U.S. would participate”:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5034920.stm in direct talks with Iran, once suspension is resumed. In other words, on the same terms as the Europeans. (In practice, this has meant “more than preliminary talks.” But that’s another story.)

What’s more, the UN Security Council has demanded that Iran suspend enrichment or reprocessing-related activities in five separate Resolutions. That’s apart from the question of negotiations, but the point is, we’re not talking about America Alone.

The Obama administration, it seems, has now led the E-3 away from this unified position, in favor of talks without preconditions. But this process — which started during the “Presidential campaign”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/27/AR2008062703099.html — hasn’t happened overnight or without difficulty, as indicated by the “occasional”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/21/AR2008062101658.html “report”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1064158.html.

OK, enough throat-clearing. Substance to follow.

Update: I should have mentioned that the “State Department”:http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/04/121682.htm and the “White House”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Briefing-by-White-House-Press-Secretary-Robert-Gibbs-4-14-09/ say that the position on Iran hasn’t changed… yet.

A Moment of Gloom

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This evening’s _Nelson Report_ has much discussion of today’s North Korea developments.

N.KOREA…you remember the song, “Oh, what a difference a day makes, 24 little hours…”

The N. Korean government today took steps which, taken literally, may be irrevocable…announcing, twice, it would “never” return to the 6 Party Talks.

That was followed with the official expulsion of IAEA inspectors from the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

“And furthermore” steps included repeating recent threats to fully re-start the Yongbyon fissile material production process…something the Bush folks hoped had been “disabled”, perhaps to the point of “dismantlement”.

Bear in mind the DPRK last month kicked out all international NGO’s, a move it presumably could more or less afford, most of the food needed for getting to the spring harvest having already been delivered.

And in a step not publicized, the N. Korean UN reps privately told US groups planing private trips North that everything’s on hold until further notice.

Add it all up and you can see a self-imposed isolation by the NK leadership.

And whatever ALL of this may reflect in terms of the “succession question”…one can speculate that Kim and his advisors assume the US reaction will be what it has been since the Bush Administration concluded IT’S “freeze option” was a dismal failure.

That is, the US will try to come up with sufficient “inducements”…a word which the Obama folks would like to ban from the lexicon…to bring Pyongyang back to the table.

As you will read, below, serious, pro-engagement adult supervisors like Amb. Jack Pritchard warn that now is NOT the time to jump at that option.

Which brings us back to “never”…

Obviously, NO ONE today has any kind of solid intel, much less solid analysis on the real situation in Pyongyang, and what the leadership there now intends.

But we have to tell you that just about ALL our Korea policy e-mail salon has concluded, collectively and separately, that today’s “never” may have fundamentally altered the equation, and that from today, it’s a new game, with rules we now must work with China, Japan and South Korea to figure out.

That’s just a sample. If you want more, you gotta subscribe.