Monthly Archives: March 2009

A Swing of the Pendulum

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates on “the risks of precipitous action”:http://www.pbs.org/kcet/tavissmiley/archive/200903/20090311_gates.html:

I think one of the biggest lessons learned in this is that if you are going to contemplate preempting an attack you had better be very, very confident of the intelligence that you have. And I think that the lessons learned with the failure to find the weapons of mass destruction and some of the other things that happened will make any future president very, very cautious about launching that kind of conflict or relying on intelligence.

He’s going to ask a lot of very hard questions, and I think that hurdle is much higher today than it was six or seven years ago. And my personal view is that any future president, this current president or any future president, while they have to retain [the option], if they have very solid evidence that we are about to be attacked that we be in a position to take action to prevent that.

I think, though, that the area first of all will be are we going to be attacked here at home as one of the thresholds, and then the quality of the intelligence would be another.

Call it the Gates Doctrine.

Japan Shakes Its Fist At North Korea’s Rocket

So far, it’s just a “battle of words”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/world/asia/14korea.html:

“Under our law, we can intercept any object if it is falling towards Japan, including any attacks on Japan, for our safety,” said the Japanese government’s top spokesman, Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura.

If North Korea’s rocket launching is successful, it will not fall toward Japan but rather fly over it. North Korea has said that it will consider any attempt to intercept its rocket “an act of war” and that it will attack the interceptors.

For anyone who can’t wait for the first week of April to see how this turns out, here are the “results of a sophisticated simulation”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F7FZsvImbBY:

New Iran NIE?

There’s no sourcing for the claim, as far as I can tell, but “Haaretz reported”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1067901.html a little while back that the Obama administration is planning to publish a new U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran soon.

New Iranian Centrifuges to be Installed

In the “discussions about”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1875/dammit Iran’s centrifuge installation patterns, I haven’t seen much mention of Gholamreza Aqazadeh’s “announcement”:http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=839756 that Iran plans to install a new generation of centrifuges at Natanz:

bq. “*New generation of centrifuges which are technologically more advanced than the previous generation will soon be installed* at Natanz nuclear facility,” Aqazadeh told a joint news conference with Russian nuclear agency chief Sergei Kiriyenko at the site of Bushehr nuclear reactor in southern Iran.

It may be that Iran is content to operate its IR-1 centrifuges until it’s ready to install the new generation. Having said that, lots of Iranian officials’ predictions about the nuclear program have had a troubled relationship with reality, so grain of salt and all that.

Iranian Companies to Approach With Caution

The UK has “a list”:http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/licensing-policy/end-use-control/page29307.html, current as of February.

According to the site,

bq. The entities included on the list are mainly based on the last 3 years’ experience of either invoking the WMD end-use control or refusing licences under it. In addition there are a few other entities for which we have not refused licences or invoked the control, but there is publicly available information indicating their *involvement in WMD programmes of concern.*

One footnote jumped out at me because it states that some of the listed entities “are included solely because they are listed in UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747 or 1803 concerning Iran.”

Not sure if this suggests that UK intel doesn’t have anything on those entities, but I thought it worth noting.

Shooting At Kwangmyongsong-2

It’s a very bad idea. Here is why.

Today, North Korea released information to international agencies showing where it expects the first and second stages of “Unha-2”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1877/kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong to fall. “Geoff Forden”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2220/dprks-stay-clear-zones has a picture. The “International Civil Aviation Organization”:http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/2009/pio200902_e.pdf has a more elaborate version that includes civil air routes and other details. (See the second page of the PDF.)

What this shows us is a planned launch due east over Japan, dropping the first stage in the Sea of Japan, the second stage in the Pacific.

Currently, neither Japan or the United States has any known ability to shoot down a launch vehicle as it is boosting. There are plans, but the reality is still a way off, according to “MDA”:http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/mdalink.html. So if an intercept is attempted, it won’t be an intercept of Unha-2 (the rocket). It will be an intercept of Kwangmyongsong-2 (the satellite), once it has already passed over Japan, perhaps when it’s already in orbit.

In the past, the United States has maintained that its own satellites are equivalent to its sovereign territory. That’s a stance that’s difficult to maintain if one doesn’t honor it oneself. So entirely apart from the “legal issues”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2214/shooting-down-dprks-satellite-launch-its-legal surrounding North Korean missile activities — and setting aside “how the NKs might react”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1897/shooting-down-north-koreas-launch — it would simply be making a very bad precedent for the U.S. to make an unprovoked attack on a foreign satellite, one that would undercut the security of the most space-dependent nation on Earth.

Let’s think about this a little before doing anything rash, OK, folks?

Playing the Gargoyle Card

Here’s some more about the “S-300PMU1 (Gargoyle) not going to Iran”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1910/dvorkin-weighs-in-three-things-not-to-do. Or, if you prefer, С-300ПМУ1 not going to Иран.

According to “Interfax”:http://treli.ru/newstext.mhtml?Part=3&PubID=25315, the delivery of advanced air defenses from Russia to Iran may be postponed indefinitely. Whatever that means:

Implementation of the multimillion dollar contract for the delivery of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to Iran, which was concluded more than three years ago, may be postponed indefinitely. Experts believe that the primary deterring factor here is the emerging opportunity for improving relations between Russia and the US after the arrival of the new administration.

So… indefinitely, maybe, for now. Depending.

Belated addition: a “musical bonus”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kn481KcjvMo.

Dvorkin Weighs In: Three Things Not To Do

Vladimir Dvorkin, former -commander- _Director of the Research Institute_ of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, is “quoted by Interfax”:http://www.militarynews.ru/ cautioning against the following bad things:

* Shooting down a North Korean space launch

“I subscribe to the view that North Korea may try to launch a delivery vehicle to put a satellite in orbit. It [the launch] will also serve as a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska.”

“As far as we are aware, Japan intends to take measures which will include the use of Standard-3 sea-based interceptor missiles,” he said, warning that such developments could lead to a “serious conflict situation.” Dvorkin said that American and Japanese counteractions could “cause China concern.”

* Underestimating Iran

Discussing Iran’s missile program Dvorkin said: “It has always been clear to me that Iran’s missile program is underestimated. Iran stopped using outdated missile technologies a long time ago.” In his view, “it is quite clear” that Iran is capable of building a missile reaching all of Europe.

Dvorkin suggested that Iran was close to building a nuclear weapon, Interfax-AVN said. He was quoted as saying that he “saw no reason why Iranian scientists should not be able to do it; perhaps they are short of highly-enriched weapons-grade uranium.”

“If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon it may trigger a snowball effect,” with the number of countries seeking a nuclear weapon going up sharply, a “total collapse” of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and “not just a regional but a global catastrophe,” Dvorkin said.

* Selling advanced air defenses to Iran

Asked to comment on media reports about an alleged deal on the supply of Russian S-300 air defense systems to Iran, Dvorkin said he wasn’t aware of “any such contract” but warned that giving Iran S-300 could cause serious tensions in Moscow’s relations with both Israel and the USA, Interfax-AVN said.

He is also quoted as suggesting that U.S.-Russian strategic arms talks will be complicated by the U.S. warhead upload capability.

Related items:

* Ted Postol proposes replacing existing missile defenses with “UAV-based boost-phase systems”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/opinion/12postol.html?_r=1&ref=opinion. As I read it, these systems ideally would be based in Russia.

* Richard Weitz reviews the the “S-300 question”:http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3425.

Sarkozy on NATO

Video of the French president’s address to the “Foundation for Strategic Research”:http://www.frstrategie.org/ is “here”:http://www.elysee.fr/webtv/allocution-lors-du-colloque-de-la-fondation-pour-la-recherche-strategique-la-france-la-defense-europeenne-et-l-otan-au-xxieme–video-3-1044.html.

If there are any good bits for nuclear wonks, I’ll try to post the English text when I see it.

In the meantime, dig those hand gestures.

Update: Reader Ferdinand, with sharper eyes than mine, has spotted the “document complet”:http://www.elysee.fr/download/?mode=press&filename=11.03__Conclusion_colloque_Defense_Otan.pdf. Thanks, Ferdinand!

Everyone With Nukes, Except…

There is a school of thought in the nonproliferation/arms control/U.S. strategic policy debate that I think can be summed up this way:

In the future, the following international actors will pose credible nuclear threats: terrorists, poor countries, the other nuclear-weapon states, and at least some U.S. allies.

The United States, however, will not.