The Deccan Herald recently published an excerpt from Anil Kakodar’s book Fire and Fury: Transforming India’s Strategic Identity. Part of the excerpt briefly discusses the considerable effort just before a 2006 U.S. Presidential visit to finalize the separation plan related to the 123 agreement:

Two days before Bush’s arrival, the US team was in New Delhi to finalise the text of the Separation Plan and both the sides were negotiating in South Block till 2 AM on the night before the US President was reaching.

Glenn Kessler’s book The Confidante: Condoleezza Rice and the Creation of the Bush Legacy includes a somewhat-similar vignette:

From Never Trust a Hippie:The Representation of ‘Extreme’ Politics in Punk Music Graphics and the Influences of Protest and Propaganda Traditions:

Nuclear solution – End the war at once/Deadly missiles dropped – Burning human flesh/Buildings turn to ash – Life does not exist/Sadists have their victory – Drop the iron fist

I mentioned the relationship between Crass and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Symbol. Here’s a bit more on the band and the campaign.

From The Story of Crass:

I’m sure that I’m late to the party here, but this 1978 publication by the U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical has some methods for minimizing collateral damage from the use of nuclear weapons. One of these is a handy Collateral Damage Avoidance Table (.pdf p. 12).

The publication also has this graphic:

A little while back, I wrote about a November report from State’s AVC Bureau concerning a suspected chemical weapons program in Myanmar. Recently, Greg Koblentz and Madeline Roty wrote a piece in BAS about the same program. There’s a good history of the program and news about a more recent action:

In January, Myanmar accepted a standing US offer to send a delegation of experts for consultations, marking the first time the country has been willing to discuss concerns about violations of the treaty. It’s likely that Myanmar’s military, given its continued role in government, approved of the invitation, an important indication that the civilian government may be able to not only declare the past program, but also offer the level of transparency and cooperation necessary for the Organization for the Prohibition on Chemical Weapons to verify any future declaration.

I mentioned the 1988 Iraqi chemical weapons attack in Halabja. Here’s what the Iraq Survey Group said about the CW attack “on rebel groups as a part of its strategy to end the revolt in the South.”

ACT had a good piece on this topic back when. (Although I am not averse to self-promotion, I am not the author). The article notes that UNMOVIC “had not uncovered this incident during its investigation.”

The OPCW DG released a statement titled “Commemoration of the March 1988 Halabja Chemical Weapons Attack.” The statement noted that the attack “spurred international efforts to conclude” the CWC.

FWIW, here’s what the CIA said in March 1988:

The 2004 ISG report has a partial list of incidents in which Iraq used chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war:

While looking for something else, I ran across this old post.

Key takeaway: according to p.14 of this 1985 CIA document, the agency assessed that Iraq would be “restrained…in using chemical weapons outside its borders, particularly against states such as Israel or Syria, which have chemical weapons stockpiles.”