Category Archives: Uncategorized

Down is Up, Black is White

Michelle Goldberg “reports from CPAC”:http://salon.com/news/feature/2005/02/19/cpac/index.html on Rep. Chris Cox’s wisdom:

bq. America’s Operation Iraqi Freedom is still producing shock and awe, this time among the blame-America-first crowd,” he crowed. Then he said, “We continue to discover biological and chemical weapons and facilities to make them inside Iraq.” Apparently, most of the hundreds of people in attendance already knew about these remarkable, hitherto-unreported discoveries, because no one gasped at this startling revelation.

She then offers an unparalled description of conference attendees’ evident willingness to believe this nonsense:

bq. Like comrades celebrating the success of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, attendees at CPAC, the oldest and largest right-wing conference in the country, invest their leaders with the power to defy mere reality through force of insistent rhetoric. The triumphant recent election is all the proof they need that everything George W. Bush says is true….For much of the rank and file, though, the thousands of blue-blazered students and local activists who come to CPAC each year to celebrate the völkisch virtues of nationalism, capitalism and heterosexuality, Bush is truth.

Solid.

More on North Korea, Pakistan, Uranium

Jon Wolfstahl has an “analysis”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16509 of recent reports indicating that North Korea shipped UF6 to Libya. He covers a lot of the same issues that I did “here”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/index.php?id=418, but includes a sentence which speaks to an important question: how can the Bush administration be so confident that it has all the relevant information about Pakistan’s uranium deposits, mines, etc.?

Jon writes:

bq. In addition, technical experts have confirmed that U-234 content can vary greatly even within the same mine or even within the same sample of ore, raising the possibility that the uranium sample does come from a known source.

I was uncertain as to whether and to what degree U-234 content varies within a country. Jon’s assessment suggests that the uranium in question could well have come from an unknown Pakistani mine. Another possibility is that we know about the mine, but lack the necessary uranium samples.

It’s worth noting that Pakistan does not have a comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement. “According to the agency,”:http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2003/table_A24.pdf Pakistan has three facilities under safeguards. None are mines.

Kerry Intel Zinger

Jeffrey can write the substance today. I’ve been busy.

I just noticed this exchange between the SecState and Kerry during Rice’s 18 January confirmation hearing:

Context: Rice and Kerry were discussing the role of “interfaith efforts” in U.S. public diplomacy. Rice expressed doubts about the need for a government role. The rest speaks for itself. I don’t know if Rice was being deliberately obtuse, or just missed the joke entirely.

RICE: … a lot of it is going on in the private sector and I actually am not sure that this is something the U.S. government would do better than letting the private sector…

KERRY: Well, isn’t it really a part of public diplomacy and there’s no way to…[ellipses in original]

RICE: It is certainly part of public diplomacy, Senator, but I often think that we are too narrow in our definition of public diplomacy if we only think it is something the U.S. government is going to do.

*KERRY: Well, this will be the first time this administration left a faith-based analysis lying by the wayside.*

RICE: Well, the faith-based analysis here I would agree with but I think the need for interfaith dialogue is important….

More on North Korea and Libya

The NYT and WP stories are obviously describing two different intelligence methods, but the two don’t seem to exclude one another. Put together, they are perhaps compelling.

Perhaps. Some relevant questions/comments:

1.When was the UF6 produced and shipped to Libya? Where did it come from? Who shipped it?

“I wrote in ACT”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_07-08/IAEAandLibya.asp:

[According to the IAEA,] Libya used Khan’s network to acquire two …shipments of uranium hexafluoride in September 2000 and February 2001.

[snip]

A report earlier this year from Malaysia’s inspector general of police stated that, according to U.S. and British intelligence officials, uranium hexafluoride was shipped from Pakistan to Libya in 2001. Additionally, [an IAEA official told ACT that] the IAEA has “uncorroborated information,” but no “proof,” that North Korea may have supplied Libya with nuclear material.

The _Post_ says that the UF6 containers had traces of North Korean plutonium. That may prove the containers were in North Korea, but it doesn’t prove that the UF6 came from there. The UF6 may have been produced in another country, even if the natural uranium came from North Korea.

The IAEA’s Iran investigation illustrates the difficulty of unraveling networks like A.Q. Khan’s. We now know that centrifuge components Tehran obtained through the Khan network changed hands more than once before arriving in Iran. This is relevant because the IAEA initially had a hard time determining the source of enriched uranium particles found on those components. (The investigation is still incomplete- details “here”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_12/IAEA_Iran.asp).

Now, the _Times_ story _does_ trace the UF6 back to North Korea, but how reliable is the intelligence method the article describes (e.g. process of elimination, tracking U-234, etc.)? What kind of samples do you need from a country in order to make an identification? Is natural uranium enough, or do the samples need to come from uranium compounds (e.g. UF6?).

[_Note_: Tonight’s Nelson Report has some devastating quotes concerning this accuracy of this method.]

2. It is true that a North Korean UF6 production capability would tell us something about Pyongyang’s ability to produce feedstock for a uranium enrichment program. But we knew that North Korea’s fuel fabrication facility could produce UF4 and former Clinton administration official Gary Samore was confident enough to tell Nuclear Fuel in September 2003 that “”North Korea could probably start making hex [UF6] fairly quickly.”

And remember that the intelligence about the centrifuge program “remains sketchy”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_01-02/Deconstructed.asp.

3.The DoD official who told the _Times_ that this intelligence finding “changes the whole equation with the North” and “we don’t have time to sit around and wait for the outcome of negotiations” is wrong. These findings point to _past_ North Korean behavior, not present. And Libyan receipt of this material is hardly a crisis, since Tripoli’s nuclear weapons program has been shut down. We already knew to be wary of North Korean nuclear exports

4. *Big Picture:* Details aside, this episode points to the danger of letting the North Korean nuclear crisis persist. Negotiations remain Washington’s best option.

More Egypt Nonsense

Well now that Michael Roston’s called me out, I feel the need to say something about “this”:http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20050123-100613-7697r.htm _Washington Times_ editorial about Egypt.

In short, it’s bad for many of the same reasons as “this other right-wing article”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/index.php?id=365 about Egypt’s alleged nuclear weapons program.

The _Washington Times_ does acknowledge that the “IAEA is investigating the matter”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_01-02/Egypt_Taiwan.asp. But rather than, you know, waiting for the results, the _Times_ carries on with a bunch of alarmist silliness. For example, it talks about a bunch of Egyptian weapons activities that don’t exactly point to a bomb-in-a-basement program (e.g. their ballistic missile programs).

Additionally, the piece mentions that:

bq. Egypt has been quite open in defending the right of Arab nations to develop weapons of mass destruction in order to counteract Israel’s presumed nuclear deterrent (an odd formulation indeed, given the fact that the Arabs have been the ones starting the wars). At a 1989 Chemical Weapons Conference in Paris, for example, Egypt said these weapons were necessary to counterbalance Israeli nukes. In October 1998, President Hosni Mubarak said that Egypt reserved the right to acquire nuclear weapons.

This, of course, ignores several pesky facts:

1. Chemical weapons are not nuclear weapons.

2. Israel “likely has a chemical weapons program”:http://www.puaf.umd.edu/CISSM/Scholars/Cohen.pdf, in addition to its nuclear weapons.

3. The Mubarak quote, though not sourced, is likely taken out of context from an interview the president did with Al-Hayat. I don’t have the full interview, but a 5 October 1998 AFP article quotes Mubarak saying:

bq. Currently we are not thinking of entering the nuclear club because we don’t want war … When the time comes and we need nuclear weapons, we will not hesitate. But I say if we need it because it is the last thing on our mind.

[_Late Update_: Here is the “full text of the interview”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/Mubarak.pdf, becuase I do have such sweet skills. _ACW_]

The _Times_ also ignores the fact that Mubarak made several “anti-nuclear weapons statements”:http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/egypt/index98.html just in that very same year.

Obviously, Egypt’s nuclear activities should be investigated. But right wing opinion writers need to get sweeter skills.

Egyptian Nuclear Experiments: The Peter Principle

In an effort to placate Dr. Lewis, I am back to blog†at least until I go to Utah this weekend. Recalling that it’s easier to tear down something than to build it, I then had only to find a target … fortunately, the Heritage Foundation is the gift that keeps on giving when it comes to nuttery. Today’s case in point is Peter Brookes’ “latest screed from today’s _New York Post_”:http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/38184.htm about a possible Egyptian nuclear weapons program.

In a nutshell, Brookes asserts†on the basis of almost no evidence†that Egypt could be pursuing a nuclear weapons program. He then says that Egyptian nucler weapons would have bad consequences.

I will concentrate on the first part, which, needless to say, is really, really, really weak. (Shameless plug … the upcoming issue of _Arms Control Today_ has an article I wrote about this.) My reaction to the second, which takes up about 2/3 of the piece, can be summarized as: “no shit.”

Brookes blows it right from the get-go. He says:

bq. As if North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons programs weren’t enough, now it seems Egypt may be pursuing the bomb as well.

bq. The evidence isn’t conclusive yet. But according to an initial International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) statement last week, several Egyptian scientists conducted unreported nuclear experiments over the past 30 years.

bq. [snip]

bq. Well, it turns out that Egypt forgot to mention some nuclear activities in its 1982 declaration. And it failed to inform the IAEA about some new work since then, too. Egypt denies violating the treaty, but the IAEA is analyzing environmental samplings from nuclear facilities near Cairo, looking for evidence of uranium enrichment or plutonium extraction.

A few relevant facts:

1. The public evidence shows that Cairo isn’t even close to being in the same league as Tehran and Pyongyang, despite what Brookes’ first sentence implies.

Details about the ongoing IAEA investigation in Egypt are from anonymous officials in press reports (AP broke the story in early November). As far as I know, the “IAEA statement” Brookes mentions does not exist. My interviews for _ACT_ generally support the press reports, but the IAEA has not made an authoritative statement.

The press reports and my sources in both Washington and Vienna say most, if not all, of Egypt’s nuclear experiments took place in the 1980s or 1990s. Obviously, any IAEA safeguards violations should be dealt with accordingly, but it’s not like anyone has found anything like a large-scale nuclear programs.

2. Egypt did have a nuclear weapons program in the past, which peaked in the 1960s. But by all accounts, it never advanced very far. Cairo’s efforts amounted to very little and the country never got anything approaching the ability to produce fissile material. NO ONE I spoke with seemed to think that there is any sort of serious nuclear weapons program.

3. IAEA DG Mohammed ElBaradei obliquely referred to the Egypt in his November 25 statement to the Board of Governors. He “wasn’t exactly sweating when he said”:http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n016.html that:

bq. … cases are surfacing, and will likely continue to surface, in which the Agency finds that States have not in the past fulfilled all of their reporting obligations. Most of these cases are failures that can normally be dealt with in the Agency´s annual Safeguards Implementation Report.

p=. ***

p{float: right; margin-left: 10px}. !/images/161.jpg!
_Is being this dumb like a sharp_
_shooting pain or just a dull ache_?

Then Brookes goes off the deep end:

bq. Nonproliferation: While some pooh-pooh the idea of an Egyptian nuclear program, it really isn’t that far-fetched. Pakistan’s rogue nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, is said to have been in contact with Egypt, and Cairo has had a long-standing ballistic missile relationship with nuclear-capable North Korea.

bq. Also, during a Sino-Egyptian summit two years ago, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak signed a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with China. That same year, press reports indicated that China (also nuclear-capable) was helping Egypt mine uranium in the Sinai desert.

OK, I won’t insult your intelligence. Obviously any contacts with A.Q. Khan should be investigated along with any other procurement activities. However, “reports” — which ones? — of peaceful nuclear cooperation between China and Egypt prove precisely nothing, nor does the implied connection between missiles and nuclear weapons.

[Brookes probably means: Jacques Schuster, “Cairo Wants to Build Nuclear Bomb,” _Die Welt_, June 22 2002 (EUP-2002-06-21-000487). He should have checked out Mark Hibbs, “Claim Egypt Has Secret Program Unfounded, U.S. Tells Germany,” “_Nucleonics Week_ 43:28, July 11, 2002”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/CLAIM_EGYPT_HAS_SECRET_PROGRAM_UNFOUNDED.pdf. The official U.S. response was that the allegation “doesn’t make any sense.” This may explain why Babbling Brookes is no longer employed in the Pentagon. — _Jeffrey_]

Brookes then adds some policy prescriptions:

bq. Whatever the case, Washington must deal with Cairo carefully. Remember, Pakistan’s pursuit of nukes †and its subsequent isolation †ruined our post-Cold War relationship with the South Asian Muslim giant for years.

bq. And what was the result of our 1990s policies of isolating Pakistan?

bq. The first Muslim nuclear weapons state, and A.Q. Khan’s proliferation of nuclear knowledge to North Korea, Iran, Libya †and maybe even Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In addition, Pakistan’s pariah status brought Islamabad’s support for the Taliban’s rise in Afghanistan, and the festering of international terrorism, culminating in the horrors of 9/11. Preventing nuclear proliferation is tough business. Let’s hope we do better with Egypt.

Brookes never explains why isolation was responsible for Khan selling nuclear technology to other countries. My own feeling is that Khan was keen to do that regardless of our “isolation” of Islamabad. Also, Pakistan’s alliance with Islamic extremists in Afghanistan has a lot more to do with the U.S. – sponsored proxy war during the 1980s and Washington’s subsequent neglect of Afghanistan.

But his point is that the US is better off engaging with problem countries in order to further our national security interests. Does that mean he’s willing to support direct negotiations with North Korea and greater engagement with Iran? Somehow, I doubt it.

_Update_: “Michael Roston tooled on Brookes earlier today”:http://lookingforsomeonetolietome.blogspot.com/2005/01/two-minutes-hate-january-10-2005.html, but I didn’t see it until now.

_Editor’s Note_: A decent sumary of Egypt’s nuclear programs, past and present is Barbara M. Gregory, “Egypt’s Nuclear Program: Assessing Supplier-Based And Other Developmental Constraints,” “_Nonproliferation Review_ 3:1, Fall 1995, pp.20-27”:http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol03/31/gregor31.pdf.

_Note from Paul_: A better one is found in Robert Einhorn’s chapter in “_The Nuclear Tipping Point_”:http://www.brookings.edu/press/books/nucleartippingpoint.htm.

North Korea: So Don’t Talk…See if We Care

I was catching up on reading State Department transcripts and ran across “this”:http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/39717.htm response from spokesperson Richard Boucher to a question regarding the stalled six-party talks.

Given that North Korea is free to continue working on its nuclear weapons programs, it is troubling that there’s not even another round of talks scheduled. Even if this state of affairs is more North Korea’s fault than anyone else’s (as is probably the case), you’d think this would be kind of a problem.

Boucher agrees, but not necessarily for the reason you’d think:

bq. North Korea keeps finding reasons to delay. They keep missing out on the opportunity of solving this and the other opportunities that would arise by solving this.

That is certainly one way of looking at it. But when I said “problem” I meant “For the United States.” I think we might be “missing out” on a few things as well.

Another North Korea Intelligence Summary

I always appreciate it when Jeffrey plugs my scribbling, but I will add something further. “This”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_01-02/Deconstructed.asp is a more recent article about North Korea’s nuclear programs.

The section on the enrichment program reads:

North Korea denies U.S. charges that it has a gas centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment program. Little is known about this program, including the location of its related facilities. Clandestine centrifuge facilities are widely believed to be more difficult to detect than plutonium-based nuclear programs.

According to U.S. estimates, North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program appears to be significantly less advanced than its plutonium-based program. North Korea is believed to have procured components for a gas-centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment facility, but there is no publicly available evidence that it has integrated these components into a functioning system capable of producing uranium.

Public CIA assessments about the program have changed significantly during the past year. The CIA said in November 2002 that North Korea was “constructing a centrifuge facility” capable of producing “two or more nuclear weapons per year,” perhaps as soon as “mid-decade.” Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly told Congress in March 2003 that the facility could start producing fissile material in “months and not years.”

Subsequent CIA reports have been increasingly vague. For example, a “November report covering the last half of 2002″:http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2002.htm#5 says only that North Korea “had begun acquiring material and equipment for a centrifuge facility,” with the apparent “goal” of building a plant. Another “November report covering the first half of 2003”:http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm#5 says nothing about the program.