UNMOVIC released “a report”:http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/compendium_summary/s-2006-420-English.pdf a while back describing the commission’s lessons-learned from its work in Iraq.
The whole thing is pretty interesting…I would just highlight its explanation for Iraq’s slack cooperation with the inspectors:
It would appear that the following factors contributed to Iraqâ€™s decision not to reveal such information to the United Nations:
(a) Preservation of valuable resources by minimizing the extent of
destruction, removal and rendering harmless of items, materials and facilities involved in proscribed programmes (particularly while it remained under comprehensive United Nations sanctions);
(b) Preservation of the ability to conduct clandestine work on some
proscribed missile projects and, possibly, intent to resume other proscribed programmes after the departure of the United Nations inspectors from Iraq;
(c) National security concerns led Iraq to prevent inspection teams from entering sensitive areas of governmental infrastructure, such as institutions of political leadership, military command and control facilities, special security apparatus and intelligence;
(d) Protection of the identity of senior members of the former regime who were involved in the decision-making process, supervision, control and implementation of proscribed weapons programmes;
(e) Safeguarding information relating to rationale and military doctrines for the deployment of proscribed weapons, including possible targets and chain of command, as well as political sensitivity concerning any evidence of the past use of chemical weapons by Iraq;
(f) Protection of information on the procurement network and foreign contacts in support of proscribed weapons programmes in order to shield providers of technology, items and materials, and also on what was specifically acquired by Iraq for these programmes;
(g) Concerns that other States could attempt to collect intelligence
information on Iraq within the framework of United Nations inspections.
58. It is not clear which of these factors dominated Iraqâ€™s concealment policies. However, all of these, separately or in combination, predetermined the extent of Iraqâ€™s declarations prior to 1995.
In other news, I am amazed to learn that the SSCI “lacks sweet Iraq reporting skills”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/06/AR2006090601920.html.