Jeffrey “pointed out a few days ago”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1467/1300-centrifuges-at-the-fep that we did, with respect to Iran’s centrifuges.
Because my ego needs more boosting, I will take this occasion to point out that, a couple of days before the invasion of Iraq, _Defense News_ published a (widely-read and obviously influential) piece in which I argued that it was not time to attack Iraq.
Specifically, I wrote:
Given the obvious risks and costs of military intervention, *it is worth looking for a way to disarm Iraq without going to war.* Any rush to use military force, especially without U.N. Security Council approval, would undermine one of Bush’s most compelling rationales for using military force against Iraq – preserving U.N. credibility.
[snip]
The problem is that, *despite its claims to the contrary, the Bush administration is not giving the inspection process sufficient opportunity to succeed. The inspectors have only recently begun to receive the helicopters, surveillance equipment and intelligence they need to do their job. The Security Council can certainly provide them with whatever additional resources are necessary.*
We must recall that weapon inspectors during the 1990s found and destroyed the vast majority of Baghdad’s weapons of mass destruction in the face of systematic Iraqi obstruction. Additional U.S. intelligence could help inspectors investigate other suspicious sites likely to reveal even more convincing evidence of ongoing activities related to weapons of mass destruction.
I think that people frequently forget the extent to which concerns about the length of time that the United States could keep troops deployed in the region drove the timetable for invasion. At the time, I wrote
bq. the large number of troops deployed to the Arabian Gulf region suggests *short-term military requirements are driving the timetable for action, rather than any threat Iraq poses*. Military experts disagree about how long a large number of troops can be kept in the theater, but it is clear that political and military pressure for action increases with the length of deployment.
Anyway, the rest of the article is at the bottom of the post.
“We were all wrong,” my ass. Let me “reiterate:”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/601/youre-out-of-your-element-tommy
bq. …those who supported the Iraq fiasco really need to STFU, stop lecturing the rest of us about foreign policy, sit in a corner, and think about what they did.
Not that I’m bitter. Happy Friday.
Time To Launch Iraq War Has Not Yet Arrived
Defense News March 17, 2003
By Paul Kerr
A cautionary voice needs to be injected into the chorus calling for war against Iraq. To be sure, the prospect for a peaceful solution to the Iraq crisis seems remote. The United States has provided compelling evidence Baghdad is not complying with its disarmament obligations under U.N. Resolution 1441, and President George W. Bush’s administration has suggested St. Patrick’ s Day as the deadline for compliance.
Given the obvious risks and costs of military intervention, it is worth looking for a way to disarm Iraq without going to war. Any rush to use military force, especially without U.N. Security Council approval, would undermine one of Bush’s most compelling rationales for using military force against Iraq – preserving U.N. credibility.
A genuine commitment to the U.N. process is required if Bush’s diplomatic efforts are to be seen as anything more than tactical maneuvers to facilitate a preconceived decision to go to war.
Fortunately, recent history suggests that such a commitment can compel Iraq to further comply with inspections if the Security Council applies united, unyielding pressure on Baghdad.
Largely ignored in the Iraq debate is that Baghdad significantly changed its position on weapon inspections during the last several months. Starting last spring, Iraq expressed to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan a willingness to discuss resuming weapon inspections, but only if the Security Council agreed to first address issues such as removing the no-fly zones and lifting economic sanctions. Annan and the Security Council correctly insisted that Iraq had to admit inspectors prior to any such discussion.
Iraq then surprised skeptics by deciding to admit inspectors in September. The Security Council then adopted a new resolution to compensate for weaknesses in the inspectors’ previous mandate. In November, Iraq again confounded expectations and accepted Resolution 1441, giving inspectors unprecedented access to suspected weapon sites. So far, Iraq has not impeded this access.
The inspectors’ March 7 report indicates this trend has continued. Although more certainly needs to be done, Iraq has increased its cooperation with inspectors in several respects. Baghdad has begun to destroy its prohibited al Samoud 2 missiles and allowed more unfettered interviews with weapon scientists.
These changes did not happen because Iraq is enthusiastic about disarming, but they did happen. If the Security Council insists that Baghdad comply fully with all its obligations under resolution 1441, including a complete accounting for its past chemical and biological weapon production, it may yet do so.
In this regard, Security Council meetings during the past several weeks have been encouraging, with all Permanent Five members emphasizing the importance of Iraqi cooperation with weapon inspections. They should intensify this pressure and make certain Iraq understands that its past strategies of dividing the Security Council will not succeed and inspections will not continue indefinitely without concrete results.
The problem is that, despite its claims to the contrary, the Bush administration is not giving the inspection process sufficient opportunity to succeed. The inspectors have only recently begun to receive the helicopters, surveillance equipment and intelligence they need to do their job. The Security Council can certainly provide them with whatever additional resources are necessary.
We must recall that weapon inspectors during the 1990s found and destroyed the vast majority of Baghdad’s weapons of mass destruction in the face of systematic Iraqi obstruction. Additional U.S. intelligence could help inspectors investigate other suspicious sites likely to reveal even more convincing evidence of ongoing activities related to weapons of mass destruction.
Inspectors may not be able to find all of Iraq’s prohibited weapons without its cooperation, but more discoveries can put additional pressure on Saddam to comply with Resolution 1441.
However, the large number of troops deployed to the Arabian Gulf region suggests short-term military requirements are driving the timetable for action, rather than any threat Iraq poses. Military experts disagree about how long a large number of troops can be kept in the theater, but it is clear that political and military pressure for action increases with the length of deployment.
There have long been enough troops in the region to make threats of force credible. Continued war preparations may create a self-fulfilling prophecy and undermine Bush’s claims that war can be avoided.
Make no mistake, Iraq must comply with Resolution 1441 and military force may eventually be required. As the administration itself has argued, arms control agreements are some of our most valuable tools for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have an interest in making sure leaders like Saddam Hussein take them seriously.
Fortunately, we can afford to wait at least a few months. Iraq does not present a short-term threat to the United States. The inspectors’ presence can deter weapon production, we control two-thirds of Iraq’s airspace, and Iraq’s military is considerably weaker than in 1991.
The administration says it has not yet decided to use military force and that war is not inevitable. Iraq’s negotiating behavior suggests that a bit of patience on the administration’s part may yield a peaceful solution.
