Category Archives: Iran

2007 Iran NIE Still in Effect

I know that there has been a good deal of speculation regarding the current U.S. assessment of Iran’s nuclear program, “including from yours truly.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1864/dni-blair-on-iran However, it is useful to understand that the analysis in the relevant section of the most recent “Threat Assessment”:http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20090212_testimony.pdf is essentially the same as that contained in the “2007 NIE.”:http://odni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf This,as far as I know, will remain the case until a new one is issued – an event which reportedly “may happen soon.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1888/new-iran-nie And yes, that means that I no longer have the doubts that I expressed in “this post.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1864/dni-blair-on-iran

That’s it.

As an aside, I have never understood some people’s alleged inability to understand the 2007 NIE. Nor have I ever understood why the fact that Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program upsets some people so much.

New Iran NIE?

There’s no sourcing for the claim, as far as I can tell, but “Haaretz reported”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1067901.html a little while back that the Obama administration is planning to publish a new U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran soon.

New Iranian Centrifuges to be Installed

In the “discussions about”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1875/dammit Iran’s centrifuge installation patterns, I haven’t seen much mention of Gholamreza Aqazadeh’s “announcement”:http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=839756 that Iran plans to install a new generation of centrifuges at Natanz:

bq. “*New generation of centrifuges which are technologically more advanced than the previous generation will soon be installed* at Natanz nuclear facility,” Aqazadeh told a joint news conference with Russian nuclear agency chief Sergei Kiriyenko at the site of Bushehr nuclear reactor in southern Iran.

It may be that Iran is content to operate its IR-1 centrifuges until it’s ready to install the new generation. Having said that, lots of Iranian officials’ predictions about the nuclear program have had a troubled relationship with reality, so grain of salt and all that.

Iranian Companies to Approach With Caution

The UK has “a list”:http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/europeandtrade/strategic-export-control/licensing-policy/end-use-control/page29307.html, current as of February.

According to the site,

bq. The entities included on the list are mainly based on the last 3 years’ experience of either invoking the WMD end-use control or refusing licences under it. In addition there are a few other entities for which we have not refused licences or invoked the control, but there is publicly available information indicating their *involvement in WMD programmes of concern.*

One footnote jumped out at me because it states that some of the listed entities “are included solely because they are listed in UN Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747 or 1803 concerning Iran.”

Not sure if this suggests that UK intel doesn’t have anything on those entities, but I thought it worth noting.

Playing the Gargoyle Card

Here’s some more about the “S-300PMU1 (Gargoyle) not going to Iran”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1910/dvorkin-weighs-in-three-things-not-to-do. Or, if you prefer, С-300ПМУ1 not going to Иран.

According to “Interfax”:http://treli.ru/newstext.mhtml?Part=3&PubID=25315, the delivery of advanced air defenses from Russia to Iran may be postponed indefinitely. Whatever that means:

Implementation of the multimillion dollar contract for the delivery of Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile systems to Iran, which was concluded more than three years ago, may be postponed indefinitely. Experts believe that the primary deterring factor here is the emerging opportunity for improving relations between Russia and the US after the arrival of the new administration.

So… indefinitely, maybe, for now. Depending.

Belated addition: a “musical bonus”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kn481KcjvMo.

Dvorkin Weighs In: Three Things Not To Do

Vladimir Dvorkin, former -commander- _Director of the Research Institute_ of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, is “quoted by Interfax”:http://www.militarynews.ru/ cautioning against the following bad things:

* Shooting down a North Korean space launch

“I subscribe to the view that North Korea may try to launch a delivery vehicle to put a satellite in orbit. It [the launch] will also serve as a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching Alaska.”

“As far as we are aware, Japan intends to take measures which will include the use of Standard-3 sea-based interceptor missiles,” he said, warning that such developments could lead to a “serious conflict situation.” Dvorkin said that American and Japanese counteractions could “cause China concern.”

* Underestimating Iran

Discussing Iran’s missile program Dvorkin said: “It has always been clear to me that Iran’s missile program is underestimated. Iran stopped using outdated missile technologies a long time ago.” In his view, “it is quite clear” that Iran is capable of building a missile reaching all of Europe.

Dvorkin suggested that Iran was close to building a nuclear weapon, Interfax-AVN said. He was quoted as saying that he “saw no reason why Iranian scientists should not be able to do it; perhaps they are short of highly-enriched weapons-grade uranium.”

“If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon it may trigger a snowball effect,” with the number of countries seeking a nuclear weapon going up sharply, a “total collapse” of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and “not just a regional but a global catastrophe,” Dvorkin said.

* Selling advanced air defenses to Iran

Asked to comment on media reports about an alleged deal on the supply of Russian S-300 air defense systems to Iran, Dvorkin said he wasn’t aware of “any such contract” but warned that giving Iran S-300 could cause serious tensions in Moscow’s relations with both Israel and the USA, Interfax-AVN said.

He is also quoted as suggesting that U.S.-Russian strategic arms talks will be complicated by the U.S. warhead upload capability.

Related items:

* Ted Postol proposes replacing existing missile defenses with “UAV-based boost-phase systems”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/12/opinion/12postol.html?_r=1&ref=opinion. As I read it, these systems ideally would be based in Russia.

* Richard Weitz reviews the the “S-300 question”:http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3425.

Promissory Note

Back before Paul doubled my salary, he made an “insightful little observation”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1850/iran-thought-not-so-deep about negotiating with Iran without first insisting on suspension of enrichment.

This has got me thinking. Perhaps it’s time to lay out as many pros and cons as can be thought of, and see how they stack up.

It’s not going to happen right away, but stay tuned.

Non-Technological Safeguards

I’ve just stumbled across a “paper”:http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/Friend%20-%20Urenco%27s%20Views%20on%20International%20Safeguards%20Inspection.pdf, almost a year old now, by one Peter Friend, the head of Safeguards and Security at Urenco. It concerns the safeguarding of a centrifuge enrichment facility.

Yes, this again.

It includes a short section on “new inspection techniques.” Here are the highlights:

There are many organisations – particularly in USA – currently aiming to develop new equipment and new techniques for safeguards verification purposes. But many of the developers (who might not have many contacts with IAEA or with operators experienced in safeguards implementation) seem to be too interested in the technology per se, and should give a lot more thought into the practicalities.

[snip]

In Urenco’s view, the presence of a competent inspector on site provides more effective safeguards than the use of complex remote monitoring equipment.

(VERTIC’s Persbo has “mentioned the idea in the past”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2007/11/new-safeguards-approach-for-enrichment.html as well.)

Without regurgitating Friend’s entire list of concerns — see page 7 of “his paper”:http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/Friend%20-%20Urenco%27s%20Views%20on%20International%20Safeguards%20Inspection.pdf if you’re interested — it suffices to say that there are many complexities involved with designing and installing new monitoring technologies in centrifuge plants, especially if the plant is already standing.

One might add to this a certain lack of trust between the monitors and the monitored: just what is that gizmo doing, anyway? And those third parties meant to be assured by the monitoring may have concerns that the gizmos can be gamed, one way or another, if there’s no one around to keep an eye on them. So having a permanent on-site presence does seem preferable in many ways.

(To be sure, sorting out the modalities, including who would make a mutually acceptable on-siter, is not entirely simple. Also, I do think continuous flow monitoring would be an excellent idea. These are not mutually exclusive ideas, or shouldn’t be.)

But there’s another benefit to having a small team of on-site inspectors always present. They can really get to know the people.

It’s the People, Stupid

Without pretending to know more than I do, let’s just say that there can only be so many humans in a given country, such as Iran, with the requisite expertise in working with centrifuge enrichment technology. Getting to know those humans and what they are doing seems like the best possible monitoring technique.

Call it “social verification”:http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/docs/NWC_Becker.pdf, right?

Concerns about breakout potential are “clearly”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1890/more-breakoutology “mounting”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1900/tribute-breakout-blogging — even if one doesn’t indulge in worst-case thinking — and undeclared centrifuge facilities are notoriously difficult to detect. So if you are worried about both a breakout at a declared site _and_ the possibility of an undeclared site somewhere else, how would you guard against them? There’s reason to be doubtful that even the Additional Protocol, by itself, would suffice to detect undeclared plants with confidence.

You’ll sometimes hear this same argument made in favor of a multinational fuel center; personally, I find it pretty compelling, at least compared to alternative strategies. But there’s a long way to go before any such proposal can be realized. The good news is, even if the multinationalization idea can’t be achieved, the idea of a full-time -inspectors- _presence_ can be adapted to safeguarding a national facility.

_Added thought: The difficulty, of course, remains in getting the monitored side to agree._

“Cross-posted to ArmsControlWonk.com”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2215/non-technological-safeguards. See “the comments at ACW”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2215/non-technological-safeguards#comment.

Headline of the Day

“Iran: Hostile drones disrupted our satellite launch”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1069876.html

Hostile unmanned aerial vehicles overflew Iran last month and disrupted the communications systems at the launch site of a missile carrying Iran’s first satellite to space, according to the country’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The Iranian leader was quoted by an Iranian news agency as having said in recent discussions that the disruptions of communications caused a delay of several hours to the launch of the rocket, which had to be operated with the use of a backup system.

Ahmadinejad said drones flew at very high altitude and used sophisticated electronic equipment to jam ground-based systems. He also said that a decision was made to shoot down the drones with fighter planes, but it was decided not to do so for reasons he did not explain.

It goes on from there, but that’s the nut of it, if you’ll pardon the expression.

True? Embellished? Sheer hallucination? You’ll have to decide.

Iran’s president has got “a vivid imagination”:http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063353.html, that much is certain.

Here’s the “musical bonus”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a6Oo79f742Q. You may wish to avert your eyes.

Fun Missile Defense Fact (?)

According to a “newly released study”:http://cboblog.cbo.gov/?p=211 — see the “full report”:http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10013/02-27-MissileDefense.pdf — the -existing- Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, as it will exist in 2012 or so, would not be able to defend itself against attack from Iran. First, there’s the radars:

To intercept U.S.-bound missiles from Iran, the GMD Block 3.0 system will rely on tracking from radars in Fylingdales, England, and Thule, Greenland. However, it will not be capable of defending those radar sites against Iranian missiles, which makes the system vulnerable to attacks in which multiple missiles first target the radars and then target the United States. That vulnerability could be removed by using local defenses to protect the radars — say, Aegis ballistic missile defense ships or terminal-phase systems such as the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense or Medium Extended Air Defense System.

And then there’s the main interceptor base itself at Ft. Greely, Alaska. Unless I misunderstand Fig. 3-1 on page 28, it’s not covered from attack by a hypothetical ICBM coming over the pole.

Not that it has to be; no such threat has yet emerged, and presumably won’t by 2012, either. (Right?) But it’s still a very interesting little quirk.

The assumptions of the study are given in a convenient appendix, for the curious.