Category Archives: Iran

Iran and Bushehr

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Just wanted to add a little to a “good post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1444/policy-changes-podvig-on-russia-and-bushehr from Jane about the Bushehr project. Specifically, I think that discussions of Russian motivations for completing the reactor frequently ignore Russia’s desire to maintain/establish its reputation as a reliable nuclear supplier for -countries other than Russia- potential customers outside of Iran.

As Pavel Podvig says in the “_BAS_ column”:http://www.thebulletin.org/columns/pavel-podvig/20070326.html that Jane cites:

*Rosatom most likely understands that abandoning Bushehr now would deal a serious blow to its reputation as a commercial partner.* In this situation, resorting to delays and hoping that the situation will somehow resolve itself is the only option.

I think there’s a lot to this…I first thought of it when I heard Vladimir Orlov’s “presentation”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/2005conference/2005_conference.htm#Iran at the most recent Carnegie conference. He didn’t make the supply credibility argument but did point out that the project isn’t worth all that much to Russia:

bq. Economically, we are not gaining much from nuclear cooperation with Iran. I’m sorry, but the numbers, the amounts we were discussing about only Bushehr content are much lower than they were publicized. And probably in the mid-90s that was something not of little importance for the Russian impoverished ministry of atomic energy. Currently, the situation in Russia and its economic growth is quite different, so actually what we got from Iran economically from Bushehr is not that much attractive.

I would be remiss if I didn’t point out Jane’s argument that Russia has already done a few things to damage its reputation as an energy supplier:

bq. Russia’s cut off of gas to Ukraine in January 2006 and of oil through Belarus in January 2007 has partners hesitating in relying too much on Russia in the future. Regardless of whose fault these dispute really were, Russia clearly has the capacity and the will to cut off very significant energy flows in times of disagreement.

This is in the context of fuel supply, rather than reactor construction, but it’s a good point.

Orlov, BTW, added this amusing anecdote:

bq. …[a] senior Russian official once asked – I think in the 101st time – but what finally Russia feels about nuclear cooperation with Iran. Are you still partners? He was probably so exhausted with that question, he said, oh yes. We, of course, are partners with Iran. From the times of Mr. Griboyedev, we are partners with Iran. And of course, without the context, it could be difficult to understand what it means. The context was simple. Mr. Griboyedev is a famous Russian poet of the 19th century who was also diplomat decapitated by Mog in Teheran. So we are of course strategic partners, but with some footnotes, right?

Happy Friday.

N Korean Radio and Iranian Enrichment

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I’m not sure this has anything to do with anything, but I just found this bit of a 21 March North Korean radio broadcast:

On 16 March, during an interview with a daily, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki reiterated, once again, his country’s right to peaceful use of nuclear energy.

He said that Iran has the right to use nuclear energy for a peaceful purpose and uranium enrichment activity is a central issue for his country.

Given that, he stressed that his government will continue to promote uranium enrichment activity and Iran will never give up its basic right whatever price it has to pay.

It _is_ an example of the North Koreans watching what the Iranians do…not trivial, given the lack of available public evidence.

Weekly Standard Wankathon II

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Michael Goldfarb, the “_Weekly Standard_ dude” I mentioned “here,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1392/rok-intel-on-yongbyon-reactor “commented”:http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2007/04/absence_of_evidence.asp on my “post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1392/rok-intel-on-yongbyon-reactor about the US IC’s assessment that Iran and North Korea are not collaborating on nuclear weapons.

According to Goldfarb, the US IC and I believe that

bq. an absence of evidence that the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs are collaborating is, in fact, evidence of absence.

I’ve actually emailed with Goldfarb a bit in the past and he seems like a pretty nice guy. But this is really a bit silly. As I “previously wrote”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1337/_weekly-standard_-wankathon about a similar Goldfarb post:

bq. Absence of evidence is absence of evidence. “Some guy wrote it in the paper [or on the internets]” is not evidence.

I find the prevalence of this sort of “we should assume the worst” nonsense in wingnutistan to be an interesting phenomenon. I’d like to find time to write more about it, but I will note two things here.

*First,* Goldfarb’s post contains an example of a weird moral component that is frequently found in his ilk’s evaluations of potential threats from unsavory governments:

bq. I mean, we haven’t actually seen Kim Jong-Il handing plutonium to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, so I’m sure they’ve confined their collaboration to the development of missile systems.

He then implies that I and the US IC are giving “these rogue regimes the benefit of the doubt.”

To me, this sort of sneering rhetoric implies that one is a bad person if one doesn’t believe the worst about bad governments. Remember that Goldfarb doesn’t have an actual argument, just a label for the governments in Tehran and Pyongyang.

*Second,* examining evidence through such a lens conveniently excuses ignorance – why know anything about Iran and North Korea when you think you should believe “even discredited reports”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1375/super-villain-team-up of nuclear collaboration between the two?

*Update:*

Elevated from the comments…

I should have pointed out “this post”:http://roboteconomist.blogspot.com/2007/03/what-nonproliferation-means-to-them.html by the Robot Economist, as well as “this article”:http://www.democracyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6517 by Jofi Joseph.

IC on Iran – NK Nuclear Cooperation

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Greetings from Dallas.

While working on an article for _ACT_, I read a 27 February SASC hearing during which Sen. Collins asked Admiral McConnell and General Maples about reports that Tehran and Pyongyang were cooperating on nuclear weapons research.

Short answer: No.

That’s pretty much the long answer too. Here’s the exchange:

SEN. SUSAN COLLINS (R-ME): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, in your testimony you describe Iran and North Korea as the states of most concern to us. Both are determined, it appears, to pursue nuclear capability. We hope that the recent agreement with North Korea will help in that regard.

You’ve described Iran as, quote, “determined” to develop nuclear weapons.

*Do you have evidence that North Korea is assisting Iran in developing its nuclear capabilities?*

*ADM. MCCONNELL: No, ma’am, I’m not aware of anything.* Let me turn to my colleagues, if they are. I don’t know of anything — any connection between the two.

*SEN. COLLINS: General?*

*GEN. MAPLES: No, ma’am.*

SEN. COLLINS: The reason I ask is there was a CRS report that was issued back in October of last year that says the evidence suggests that North Korea has had extensive dealings with Iran on missiles and other weapons. But General?

GEN. MAPLES: That’s correct, they have had extensive interaction on the development of missile systems. And Iran, in fact, has purchased missiles from North Korea.

SEN. COLLINS: But *there’s no concern that North Korea may be helping Iran develop nuclear capabilities?*

*GEN. MAPLES: There is a concern, but we haven’t seen –*

*SEN. COLLINS: But no evidence to support it?*

*ADM. MCCONNELL: No evidence, that’s correct, Senator.*

Check out posts from “Jeffrey”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1375/super-villain-team-up “and me”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1333/wankery-department-of about the subject. I also “made fun of”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1337/_weekly-standard_-wankathon a _Weekly Standard_ dude for criticizing them.

UNSC Resolution 1747

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The UNSC “adopted it”:http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21997&Cr=Iran&Cr1 today. A joint statement from the P5+1 is “here.”:http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/mar/82160.htm

The full text (with assorted national statements) can be found “here”:http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2007/sc8980.doc.htm and is below (with the exception of Annex II, which is a description of the June 2006 P5 +1 proposal).

Have a good rest-of-weekend.

p=. ***

“The Security Council,

“Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, and its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006, and reaffirming their provisions,

“Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States parties, in conformity with articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

“Recalling its serious concern over the reports of the IAEA Director General as set out in its resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006),

“Recalling the latest report by the IAEA Director General (GOV/2007/8) of 22 February 2007 and deploring that, as indicated therein, Iran has failed to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006),

“Emphasizing the importance of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution guaranteeing that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes, and noting that such a solution would benefit nuclear non-proliferation elsewhere, and welcoming the continuing commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to seek a negotiated solution,

“Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

“Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006) and resolution 1737 (2006) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

“Recalling the requirement on States to join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council,

“Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006) and 1737 (2006), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

“Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

“1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006);

“2. Calls upon all States also to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of that resolution;

“3. Underlines that nothing in the above paragraph requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution and resolution 1737 (2006), including where article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

“4. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annex I to this resolution;

“5. Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel, and that all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;

“6. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms to Iran, and in the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of such items in order to prevent a destabilising accumulation of arms;

“7. Calls upon all States and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes;

“8. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above;

“9. Expresses the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes, underlines the willingness of the international community to work positively for such a solution, encourages Iran, in conforming to the above provisions, to re-engage with the international community and with the IAEA, and stresses that such engagement will be beneficial to Iran;

“10. Welcomes the continuous affirmation of the commitment of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the support of the European Union’s High Representative, to a negotiated solution to this issue and encourages Iran to engage with their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), attached in Annex II to this resolution, which were endorsed by the Security Council in resolution 1696 (2006), and acknowledges with appreciation that this offer to Iran remains on the table, for a long-term comprehensive agreement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme;

“11. Reiterates its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supports the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commends and encourages the Director General of the IAEA and its secretariat for their ongoing professional and impartial efforts to resolve all outstanding issues in Iran within the framework of the IAEA, underlines the necessity of the IAEA, which is internationally recognized as having authority for verifying compliance with safeguards agreements, including the non-diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, in accordance with its Statute, to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme;

“12. Requests within 60 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

“13. Affirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, to be submitted within 60 days, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;

(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 above as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in paragraph 12 above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report in paragraph 12 above shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1737 (2006) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

“14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

Resolution Annex I

Entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities

1. Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group (AMIG) (aka Ammunition Industries Group) (AMIG controls 7th of Tir, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in Iran’s centrifuge programme. AMIG is in turn owned and controlled by the Defence Industries Organisation (DIO), which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006))

2. Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre (NFRPC) and Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (ENTC) (Parts of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran’s (AEOI) Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities. AEOI is designated under resolution 1737 (2006))

3. Kavoshyar Company (Subsidiary company of AEOI, which has sought glass fibres, vacuum chamber furnaces and laboratory equipment for Iran’s nuclear programme)

4. Parchin Chemical Industries (Branch of DIO, which produces ammunition, explosives, as well as solid propellants for rockets and missiles)

5. Karaj Nuclear Research Centre(Part of AEOI’s research division)

6. Novin Energy Company (aka Pars Novin) (Operates within AEOI and has transferred funds on behalf of AEOI to entities associated with Iran’s nuclear programme)

7. Cruise Missile Industry Group (aka Naval Defence Missile Industry Group) (Production and development of cruise missiles. Responsible for naval missiles including cruise missiles)

8. Bank Sepah and Bank Sepah International (Bank Sepah provides support for the Aerospace Industries Organisation (AIO) and subordinates, including Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) and Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG), both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006)

9. Sanam Industrial Group (subordinate to AIO, which has purchased equipment on AIO’s behalf for the missile programme)

10. Ya Mahdi Industries Group (subordinate to AIO, which is involved in international purchases of missile equipment)

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps entities

1. Qods Aeronautics Industries (Produces unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), parachutes, paragliders, paramotors, etc. Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has boasted of using these products as part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)

2. Pars Aviation Services Company (Maintains various aircraft including MI-171, used by IRGC Air Force)

3. Sho’a’ Aviation (Produces micro-lights which IRGC has claimed it is using as part of its asymmetric warfare doctrine)

Persons involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities

1. Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani (Senior Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) scientist with links to the Institute of Applied Physics, working closely with Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, designated below)

2. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi (Senior MODAFL scientist and former head of the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). The IAEA have asked to interview him about the activities of the PHRC over the period he was head but Iran has refused)

3. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)

4. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre, which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)

5. Mohsen Hojati (Head of Fajr Industrial Group, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)

6. Mehrdada Akhlaghi Ketabachi (Head of SBIG, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in the ballistic missile programme)

7. Naser Maleki (Head of SHIG, which is designated under resolution 1737 (2006) for its role in Iran’s ballistic missile programme. Naser Maleki is also a MODAFL official overseeing work on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile programme. The Shahab-3 is Iran’s long range ballistic missile currently in service)

8. Ahmad Derakhshandeh (Chairman and Managing Director of Bank Sepah, which provides support for the AIO and subordinates, including SHIG and SBIG, both of which were designated under resolution 1737 (2006))

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps key persons

1. Brigadier General Morteza Rezaie (Deputy Commander of IRGC)

2. Vice Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian (Chief of IRGC Joint Staff.)

3. Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi (Commander of IRGC Ground Forces)

4. Rear Admiral Morteza Safari (Commander of IRGC Navy)

5. Brigadier General Mohammad Hejazi (Commander of Bassij resistance force)

6. Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani (Commander of Qods force)

7. General Zolqadr (IRGC officer, Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs)

Iran in Iraq in PowerPoint

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The issue of alleged Iranian jackassery in Iraq isn’t something I write much (if anything) about, but those who are interested should check out “this presentation”:http://www.realcities.com/multimedia/nationalchannel/archive/mcw/pdf/Iran_in_Iraq.pdf over at McClatchy’s site. It looks to be the DoD officials’ presentation referenced in press reports over the last couple of days, but that’s not totally clear; it could just be McClatchy’s summary.

*Update:*

It’s from the DoD…should’ve read further down in “this _WP_ article.”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/11/AR2007021100479.html

bq. The officials released a PowerPoint presentation including photographs of the weaponry, but did not allow media representatives to record, photograph or videotape the briefing or the materials on display

Ass-tacular

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I cannot imagine why anyone would think that the U.S. will refuse to take “yes” for an answer from Iran RE: its nuclear program.

From the ” _WP_:”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/10/AR2007021001275_2.html

bq. Later this month, the U.N. Security Council will convene to judge Iranian compliance with a unanimous December resolution giving the nation until Feb. 21 to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities. Anticipating a negative finding, the administration is readying a new resolution to increase Iran’s isolation. Among other measures, officials are considering charging Iran with violating U.N. resolutions that prohibit member countries from harboring or assisting known terrorists. Tehran has refused to hand over a number of senior al-Qaeda operatives it has claimed to be holding under “house arrest” for years.

The article also points out that

bq. Some senior administration officials still relish the notion of a direct confrontation. One ambassador in Washington said he was taken aback when John Hannah, Vice President Cheney’s national security adviser, said during a recent meeting that the administration considers 2007 “the year of Iran” and indicated that a U.S. attack was a real possibility. Hannah declined to be interviewed for this article.

Which makes this paragraph even funnier:

bq. “I don’t know how many times the president, Secretary Rice and I have had to repeat that we have no intention of attacking Iran,” an exasperated Gates told reporters at a NATO meeting in Spain.

Keep at it, Bob. We’ll tell you when to stop.

Rice/Iran Update

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_Newsweek_ ran “this article”:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17050142/site/newsweek/ a few days ago which confirms, and provides additional, details about” Rice’s silliness”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1346/rice-what-iran-proposal RE: Iran’s spring 2003 proposal to the United States.

Hereafter, the relevant portions:

Asked about her comments later by NEWSWEEK, [Flynt] Leverett shot back: “If I had been in such a position I certainly would have done that. The two people who were in that position then were Elliott Abrams and Zal Khalilzad.” A spokeswoman for Abrams, who is currently the deputy national-security adviser for democracy promotion—but was then in charge of Mideast affairs—told NEWSWEEK on Thursday: “He has absolutely no recollection of getting any sort of fax at all.” (Khalilzad, soon to be the next ambassador to the U.N., was traveling abroad as special envoy to Afghanistan at the time, and is unlikely to have been in Washington when the fax came through.)

Such a proposal did find its way to the State Department in 2003, via Swiss ambassador Tim Guldimann. But a lot of questions remain about its origins and importance. Iranian officials insist that the document began as a U.S. trial balloon, possibly developed out of the office of former deputy secretary of State Armitage. But Armitage, in an interview this week, said he had nothing to do with creating the document and saw it for the first time as an Iranian fax. At the time, Armitage said, he thought it might have represented some creative diplomacy by Guldimann (who would not comment on the proposal to NEWSWEEK). “We couldn’t determine what was the Iranians’ and what was the Swiss ambassador’s,” Armitage said. His impression at the time was that the Iranians “were trying to put too much on the table,” Armitage added.

One small gripe I have is with _Newsweek’s_ claim to have “obtained” a copy of Iran’s proposal. To me, that implies (though does not say) that that info is some sort of _Newsweek_ exclusive. The document has been available “on the internets”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1083/irans-march-2003-offer for a while now.

*Update:*

Steve Clemmons has “this”:http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/001935.php to add:

bq. Leverett has reported to this blogger that about 90% of what is available on the internet and in the press about the “content” of the Iran proposal is correct — but there is another 10% that has not been disclosed and that is critical to understanding the seriousness and consequential nature of what Iran put forward.

_Thanks to SLK for the tip._