Category Archives: DPRK

Japan Shakes Its Fist At North Korea’s Rocket

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So far, it’s just a “battle of words”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/14/world/asia/14korea.html:

“Under our law, we can intercept any object if it is falling towards Japan, including any attacks on Japan, for our safety,” said the Japanese government’s top spokesman, Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura.

If North Korea’s rocket launching is successful, it will not fall toward Japan but rather fly over it. North Korea has said that it will consider any attempt to intercept its rocket “an act of war” and that it will attack the interceptors.

For anyone who can’t wait for the first week of April to see how this turns out, here are the “results of a sophisticated simulation”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F7FZsvImbBY:

Shooting At Kwangmyongsong-2

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It’s a very bad idea. Here is why.

Today, North Korea released information to international agencies showing where it expects the first and second stages of “Unha-2”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1877/kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong to fall. “Geoff Forden”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2220/dprks-stay-clear-zones has a picture. The “International Civil Aviation Organization”:http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/2009/pio200902_e.pdf has a more elaborate version that includes civil air routes and other details. (See the second page of the PDF.)

What this shows us is a planned launch due east over Japan, dropping the first stage in the Sea of Japan, the second stage in the Pacific.

Currently, neither Japan or the United States has any known ability to shoot down a launch vehicle as it is boosting. There are plans, but the reality is still a way off, according to “MDA”:http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/mdalink.html. So if an intercept is attempted, it won’t be an intercept of Unha-2 (the rocket). It will be an intercept of Kwangmyongsong-2 (the satellite), once it has already passed over Japan, perhaps when it’s already in orbit.

In the past, the United States has maintained that its own satellites are equivalent to its sovereign territory. That’s a stance that’s difficult to maintain if one doesn’t honor it oneself. So entirely apart from the “legal issues”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2214/shooting-down-dprks-satellite-launch-its-legal surrounding North Korean missile activities — and setting aside “how the NKs might react”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1897/shooting-down-north-koreas-launch — it would simply be making a very bad precedent for the U.S. to make an unprovoked attack on a foreign satellite, one that would undercut the security of the most space-dependent nation on Earth.

Let’s think about this a little before doing anything rash, OK, folks?

Shooting Down North Korea’s Launch?

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Will either the U.S. or Japan attempt to shoot down a North Korean satellite launch? It’s not impossible, but don’t bet on anybody doing anything quite that provocative.

The “last time such threats emanated from the U.S.”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/21/AR2006062101518.html, lo and behold, North Korea’s (failed) long-range missile launch was accompanied by a barrage of short-range and medium-range missiles, which performed just fine. Point made.

Plus, “we have enough space debris already”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1847/iridium-cosmos, don’t we?

Oddly, the following item sourced to the “KCNA website”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/ is not yet there, [Update: “here it is”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200903/news09/20090309-02ee.html] but it’s popped up “elsewhere online”:http://www.individual.com/story.php?story=97486636 and is worth careful study, as it does not read quite like the usual KCNA drivel:

In view of the prevailing grave situation the General Staff of the KPA solemnly declares as follows in order to protect the supreme interests of the country and the nation from the war maniacs’ reckless moves for aggression against the DPRK:

1. Our revolutionary armed forces will counter the enemies’ any slight hostile acts of violating the sovereignty of the country and intruding into its inviolable territory, territorial waters and territorial air with prompt merciless military actions.

It is the invariable stand of our revolutionary armed forces fully ready for all-out confrontation not to allow any enemies to intrude into our territory, territorial waters and territorial air even 0.001 mm.

2. We will retaliate any act of intercepting our satellite for peaceful purposes with prompt counter strikes by the most powerful military means.

If the enemies recklessly opt for intercepting our satellite, our revolutionary armed forces will launch without hesitation a just retaliatory strike operation not only against all the interceptor means involved but against the strongholds of the US and Japanese aggressors and the South Korean puppets who hatched plots to intercept it.

Shooting our satellite for peaceful purposes will precisely mean a war.

3. As an immediate measure we will enforce a more strict military control and cut off the North-South military communications in order to guarantee the security in the opened Eastern and Western coastal areas under the control of the North and the South while the DPRK-targeted war exercises are under way.

It is nonsensical to maintain normal communications channel at a time when the South Korean puppets are getting frantic with the above-said war exercises, levelling guns at fellow countrymen in league with foreign forces.

Accordingly, our army will cut off the military communications, the last channel which has existed between the North and the South, from March 9.

Even if you think there’s no more than a 10% chance of retaliation, would you risk it? it just doesn’t seem remotely worth making whatever point would be made by destroying a primitive satellite.

Instead of a musical bonus, here’s an apt (if dated) comment on the “infamous op-ed”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/21/AR2006062101518.html linked above.

Enjoy.

!/images/70.gif!

DPRK Deterrence Bonus

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I didn’t want to make “the previous item”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1892/how-much-respect-does-a-nuclear-arsenal-get too, too long. Here’s something snipped out that you might appreciate anyhow.

According to a “seemingly authentic transcript”:http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/IG13Dg01.html of a speech by a North Korean Central Committee member, the United States trembles at the thought of the impoverished state’s mighty weapons:

Nobody can intercept our missiles now. All the people in the US are aware of this.

This is why all the people in the United States are completely allergic to missiles of our republic. Once they learn that we test-fired missiles, they become so worried about the rockets changing their directions and exploding over them and killing them, so they develop nervous diseases and nettle rash breaks out all over their bodies. This is what is happening in the United States.

According to the speaker, it was necessary to invest in long-range ballistic missiles even during the devastating famine years of the 1990s. Any money available

had to be spent on developing missiles, even though the generals knew that factories did not work and people were starving. This is why we have survived, and were not eaten up by those bastards. Had it not been like this, the bastards would have eaten us a long time ago.

Pity the poor, hungry bastards with their nervous diseases and nettle rash all over their bodies.

How Much Respect Does A Nuclear Arsenal Get?

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On August 31, 1998, North Korea conducted its first launch of a multi-stage ballistic missile, which flew over Japan. It failed to deliver a satellite into orbit, notwithstanding the boasts of state broadcasters.

On January 10, 2003, in the course of a dispute with the United States, North Korea declared that it was no longer bound by the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and kicked IAEA inspectors out of the country.

On July 5, 2006, North Korea’s second test of a long-range ballistic missile test ended in catastrophic failure, just seconds into flight.

On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted its first (and so far only) test of a nuclear explosive device. (It fizzled.) Within days, the UN Security Council had outlawed all exports of nuclear or ballistic missile technology to North Korea.

Despite the technical hiccups, the government of North Korea (or DPRK) seems proud of its accomplishments in the field of strategic weaponry. One “statement from 2008”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2008/200804/news04/01.htm#1 reads:

The DPRK is not such state which will meekly yield to the pressure of someone to unilaterally dismantle the nuclear deterrent, a product of great Songun [i.e., military-first politics] and a shield for justice and peace.

Just recently, in January 2009, North Korean officials told a visiting American scholar that they had “weaponized”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/18/world/asia/18korea.html their stock of plutonium:

“They’ve raised the bar and said, ‘We are a nuclear weapons state, and deal with us on that basis,'” Mr. Harrison said at a news conference in the St. Regis Hotel.

So how it is, then, despite all these fearsome bombs and missiles, that North Korea has become “the Rodney Dangerfield of rogue states”:http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/151_gusterson.pdf?

Seriously, have you seen “the t-shirt”:http://store.theonion.com/get-il-p-139.html?

Compare and Contrast

p{float: right; margin-left:10px;}. !/images/69.jpg!

To see just how little respect the DPRK gets, consider how North Korea is treated compared to its fellow surviving member of the Axis of Evil, the Islamic Republic of Iran.

(Remember, despite the amply justified suspicions of the outside world, and a chain of deceptions, violations, failed negotiations, and Security Council resolutions, Iran remains within the NPT. The Iranian authorities insist on the purely civilian nature of their nuclear facilities, “point to continuing IAEA safeguards”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/opinion/l03iran.html, and say they are opposed to nuclear weapons.)

So when Iran launched its first multi-stage missile last month, putting a first-generation satellite into orbit, the American response was one of modulated concern.

And when North Korea announced that it was about to launch a satellite, the “Japanese”:http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090303_7935.php and “American”:http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20090304_8706.php response was to threaten to shoot it down.

Let’s see how the _Washington Post_ “explained”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/03/AR2009020300285.html Iran’s space launch:

TEHRAN, Feb. 3 — Iran said Tuesday it had successfully sent its first domestically produced satellite into orbit using an Iranian-made long-distance missile, joining an exclusive club of fewer than a dozen nations with such capabilities.

–compared with how the same publication “framed”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/24/AR2009022400324.html North Korea’s plans to do the _exact same thing_:

TOKYO, Feb. 24 — By announcing that it is preparing to launch a “communications satellite,” North Korea on Tuesday dressed up its planned test of a long-range ballistic missile — which may be able to reach Alaska — as a benign research project.

Honest, it’s not just the “elevator shoes”:http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk02300&num=157 and the bouffant hairdo. The anticipation turns out to be a bigger deal than the reality. When it comes to staring down the Western imperialists, actually having the bomb ain’t everything it’s cracked up to be.

“Cross-posted to ArmsControlWonk.Com”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2210/how-much-respect-does-a-nuclear-arsenal-get. See “the comments at ACW”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2210/how-much-respect-does-a-nuclear-arsenal-get#comment.

IRBM****

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Earlier, I quoted a 2006 article by Daniel Sneider on the “origins of North Korea’s SS-N-6 clone”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1851/pointing-fingers-at-russia, the so-called “Musudan missile”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1500/nork-irbm-musudan-1.

Like “Nodong” and “Taepodong,” “Musudan” is the name of a village close to the “Musudan-ri launch site”:http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nodong.htm, lately also known as the “Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1877/kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong. The U.S. intelligence community seems to issue these geographic names after the first sighting of each missile in question.

Over at ACW, the knowledgeable Allen Thomson sounds “a skeptical note”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2203/unhataepodong-test-imminent#c010602:

I agree about the Nodong and Taepodong, but it’s not clear to me that the “Musudan” missile designation came out of the usual USIC naming process. Mostly because I’m still not convinced that the Musudan/BM-25/SS-N-6/R27 story isn’t a fable. Maybe the thing is real and maybe it, or its engine, were tested at Musudan-ri. But I’m not betting money on it.

I know what he means. There’s still no strong evidence to support the stories in the “NY Times”:http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/02/international/middleeast/02iran.html or the German tabloid _Bild_ (headline: _Irans Raketen reichen bald bis Berlin!_) that placed 18 Russian-designed IRBMs from North Korea in Iran. (If the number 18 sounds familiar, that’s also how many KH-55 cruise missiles were reported smuggled from Ukraine to China and Iran.)

_Update: I’ve just remembered an “article from mid-2006”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115212320912498575-search.html in the_ Wall Street Journal _claiming that Musudan missiles reached Iran by sea in late 2005. Judge for yourself._

But the intelligence community clearly believes that the missile exists in North Korea. See page 10 of this “2006 NASIC report”:http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/NASIC2006.pdf, titled “MRBM and IRBM Characteristics.” It includes the following info, listed right after the No Dong and the Taepo Dong I:

Missile: IRBM****
Country: North Korea
Number of Stages: 1
Propellant: Liquid
Deployment Mode: Mobile
Maximum Range (miles): 2,000+
Number of Launchers: Not yet deployed

****Missile has not yet been flight-tested.

That’s our Musudan.

Why the missile was still nameless in 2006 is anybody’s guess. In September 2003, Lee Chul-hee of _Joongang Ilbo_, a Seoul newspaper, reported a sighting _en plein air_:

North Korea has deployed new intermediate range ballistic missiles capable of reaching key U.S. military posts, South Korean intelligence sources said yesterday.

The sources said the new missiles appeared recently at an air force base near the capital of Pyeongyang.

North Korea is expected to unveil the weapons publicly at its 55th founding anniversary parade today.

The missiles are believed to be modified from Soviet-era weapons.

“The missiles were deployed at the Mirim Airdrome, probably to display them at the military parade,” said a South Korean military intelligence official on condition of anonymity. Five launch pads and about 10 missiles were detected at the air base, he said.

Intelligence officials in Japan, South Korea and the United States have inferred from the unique shape of the missile’s warhead – which resembles the top of a baby bottle – that the North’s version was developed based on the Soviet-designed, submarine-launched SS-N-6.

In the end, the missiles did not join the parade. But a nameless “U.S. official” told Sonni Efron of the _LA Times_:

“We’ve had hints of this for several years, but it’s only within the last year that we’ve been able to confirm that this did exist and it’s derived from Russian technology,” the official said, adding that the development “makes you wonder what else they might have been able to access” during that period.

Some guy named “Paul Kerr”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_09/NK_Missile also wrote about this.

Since NASIC’s 2006 report said it was not “flight-tested,” and it’s not called “Mirim” or “Pyongyang” in the open-source reporting, I’m guessing that Allen’s speculation about an engine test at Musudan-ri is about right.

Northeast is Red

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The South Korean press, reading the tea leaves, suggests that “reports of KJI’s presence in North Hamgyong Province”:http://uk.reuters.com/article/usTopNews/idUKTRE51O1BH20090225?sp=true mean a space launch is nigh.

That sound you hear is two or three dozen wonks sacrificing chickens to whichever deity promises to ensure the release of good footage.

If the title of this post puzzles you, “clarification is here”:http://english.cri.cn/4406/2008/09/25/1141s409110.htm.

“Kwangmyongsong”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1877/kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong-kwangmyongsong, or so I’ve read somewhere or other, means “bright star.”

Kwangmyongsong. Kwangmyongsong? Kwangmyongsong!

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According to “KCNA”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200902/news24/20090224-06ee.html:

The preparations for launching experimental communications satellite Kwangmyongsong-2 by means of delivery rocket Unha-2 are now making brisk headway at Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground in Hwadae County, North Hamgyong Province.

“FCNL”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2190/fun-with-fcnl, call your office.

More About the Bosworth Appointment

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The Secretary of State “announced”:http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/02/119421.htm the appointment of “part-time North Korea envoy Stephen Bosworth”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1861/part-time-envoy on Friday.

Acting Deputy Department Spokesman Gordon Duguid had some “excellent adventures”:http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2009/02/119416.htm trying to explain what the job is.

Any other questions? Yes, please.

QUESTION: Secretary Clinton in Seoul announced that Steve Bosworth would be the new Special Representative to North Korea.

MR. DUGUID: Yes.

QUESTION: I’m wondering if you could explain a little bit the difference between Special Representative and Mr. Sung Kim’s position as Special Envoy to the Six-Party Talks.

MR. DUGUID: Okay. We did this a couple of weeks ago. A special envoy, in diplomatic parlance, has the authority to negotiate. A special representative, in this particular case, as well as in Ambassador Holbrooke’s case, is an authority who coordinates across the board for the United States. So Sung Kim will remain our Special Envoy and he will handle the day-to-day contact and discussions with our Six-Party colleagues. And Ambassador Bosworth will be the special representative coordinating the overall U.S. Government effort.

QUESTION: Will that be a full-time position or a part-time position?

MR. DUGUID: It will be a position that will take up a lot of his time. The question is leading to – will he be based in this building the entire time? Sorry. Of course, it’s a full-time position, but I mean, I don’t understand the question properly.

QUESTION: Okay. Yeah, he’s – it’s been reported that he’ll remain the dean of the Fletcher School?

MR. DUGUID: That is correct, he will.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. DUGUID: Yes.

QUESTION: So it’s more like a part-time position?

MR. DUGUID: I won’t – I wouldn’t characterize it that way. He will be fully engaged in the – in the effort to try and denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. That is work enough for anyone, but he will also retain his current position.

QUESTION: So he will be based in this building?

MR. DUGUID: He will have an office here.

QUESTION: So it’s almost as if he were the U.S. ambassador to North Korea if U.S. had relation with North Korea?

MR. DUGUID: No, that’s not correct. The – Ambassador Bosworth will be our senior official handling North Korea issues and reporting to the Secretary of State as well as the President. The Secretary has asked Ambassador Bosworth to oversee U.S. efforts in the Six-Party Talks to achieve verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. He will serve as our senior emissary for U.S. engagement with North Korea in close consultation with allies and partners. With regard to the Six-Party Talks, his involvement will facilitate high-level engagement with the North Koreans and other members of the Six-Party Talks. He will work closely with Sung Kim on this.

QUESTION: Will he travel to Pyongyang?

MR. DUGUID: I don’t have any plans – travel plans for him at the moment.

QUESTION: You seem to be suggesting that Bosworth will have a role and a dialogue with the North Koreans outside of the Six-Party.

MR. DUGUID: I am not. He is our senior–excuse me–Special Representative for the Six-Party Talks.

QUESTION: But he is going to be above the Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks? Or who is going to decide? Who’s going to be the boss relative to —

MR. DUGUID: Secretary Clinton is the boss.

QUESTION: And so the two of them are equal?

MR. DUGUID: The two of them are working on the Six-Party Talks. Sung Kim does the day-to-day negotiating, and Ambassador Bosworth will work across the process in – for the U.S. Government. Therefore, Sung Kim is doing the State Department part on a day-to-day basis, and Ambassador Bosworth will work across the process coordinating all the U.S. Government efforts. They will work in close consultation.

QUESTION: How is Ambassador Bosworth’s job not a part-time job if he’s maintaining his other position? I mean, can you defend that in any way?

MR. DUGUID: I refer you to – well, I refer you to his – you know, Ambassador Bosworth himself on what he will be doing with his current position. He will not be leaving. But the work that he will do will fully engage his talents as we need them.

QUESTION: Right, but I mean, he’s not going to – if it’s not his only job, how is that not a diminished role than it was under the Bush Administration?

MR. DUGUID: The role that the Ambassador will play will be significant. He will lead our efforts and it will be – not be any diminution of the responsibilities that previous special representatives have had.

QUESTION: Not in terms of responsibilities, but in terms of effort.

MR. DUGUID: I think that he will engage 100 percent of his effort when the Secretary calls upon him to engage in these matters.

Yes. In the back, please.

QUESTION: Just wanted to clarify. Is Ambassador Bosworth – is he going to be attending head of delegation meetings when they have Six-Party meetings, or will that Sung Kim who will attend those meetings?

MR. DUGUID: I don’t think we’ve got that down for you yet. We’ll make the announcement of our delegation when we have those meetings, and it will be based on the conditions at the time.

You can “watch the video”:http://www.state.gov/video/?videoid=13775861001, too. The fun and games start at 1:54.

Just A Little Bit More Information

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So what’s the status of the fresh fuel stored at Yongbyon, and the “process lines”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1865/more-than-you-wanted-to-know-about-magnox to make more? For that, we have SIGINT.

From “Dr. Sigfried (Sig) Hecker’s account of a February 2008 visit”:http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008_rpt/dprk.pdf:

They have in storage less than a quarter of a reactor load of clad fuel rods. They also have in storage a full load of bare uranium fuel rods (our best estimate is 12,000) for the 50 MWe reactor. It appears that these can be used for the 5 MWe reactor, but may require some machining, and would have to be clad with magnesium alloy cladding. These operations would require the reconstitution of parts of the fuel fabrication facility, including the machine shop. Such actions would most likely take close to 1 year.

[snip]

Fuel Fabrication Facility. The front end of fuel fabrication (Building 1) had been operating making uranium dioxide (UO2) from uranium ore concentrate right up to the time the facility was shut down on July 15, 2007. The back end was operational with seven conversion furnaces, two casting furnaces, and eight machining lathes. However, the middle part, the fluorination facility, had deteriorated so badly during the freeze (1994 to 2003) that the building has been abandoned (as we were shown in August 2007). However, the DPRK had recently completed alternate fluorination equipment (using dry rather than wet techniques) in one of the ancillary buildings. However, this was a makeshift operation that has limited throughput potential. It was not put into full operation by the time of the shutdown on July 15.

The disablement steps taken at the fuel fabrication facility focused on those buildings and equipment that were in reasonable working order. The removal of the three uranium dissolver tanks and the disassembly of the seven conversion furnaces (with thousands of refractory bricks) are serious disablement steps. The removal of the casting furnaces and the machining lathes also constitute significant steps. The DPRK has not been willing to take steps to render the fresh fuel in storage not usable for a reactor restart. These fuel rods could be bent, making it necessary to recast and remanufacture the rods to precise tolerances. Or, since the uranium metal content is substantial (close to 100 metric tons of natural uranium metal), the fresh fuel rods could be sold to one of the five parties, which could use the uranium as feed material for light-water reactor fuel. DPRK officials say that they await additional corresponding measures by the United States before they are willing to take actions on the fresh fuel rods. If the fresh fuel rods are bent, the DPRK would have to recast and remachine, which would add several months to a restart time. If the fresh fuel were sold, then the DPRK would have to restart the entire fuel fabrication facility and produce new uranium metal, which would add approximately a year to a restart time.

There are some “pictures”:http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/5220/gallery/, too.

It’s been reported that “Hecker and colleagues may visit Yongbyon again soon”:http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090209_4835.php.

Oh yeah. I almost forgot about the “musical bonus”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmwlzwGMMwc. Silly me.