Clif Burns has an “entertaining post”:http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/3645 about export controls over at ExportLawBlog.

I’m serious. He writes that the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls removed certain chemical toilets from the US Munitions List, explaining that “[t]he toilet in question was initially manufactured for the Lockheed C-130 and was subsequently modified for other military aircraft.”

I concur that this line from the DOS notification, which is apparently an explanation of this item’s limited military applications, is just outstanding:

bq. The core functionality of the toilet remains the same as a model used for commercial aircraft.

Nothing to add to that.

I noticed that CEIP’s Pierre Goldschmidt presented an interesting “short paper”:http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Looking_Beyond_Iran_and_North_Korea.pdf on the IAEA safeguards system. I just wanted to add one thought.

The paper correctly argues that, in the case of NNWS, commitments contained in CSAs and APs are “much more limited” than the powers given to the IAEA by its statute. However, I think it’s worth noting that, from what I understand, these limitations exist partly because the IAEA statute isn’t self-executing. Therefore, the IAEA’s legal authority to implement safeguards is grounded in the CSAs and APs.

That is all.

In a shocking turn of events that no one could have anticipated, ISIS “has it.”:http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_8Nov2011.pdf

This thing has been talked to death already, it seems, but I do wish to highlight this paragraph:

bq. The information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a
nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may still be ongoing.

I actually think the description of the suspected nuclear weapons program is one of the most interesting aspects of the report.

Spencer Ackerman was gracious enough to quote me in this “good piece”:http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/11/loose-geek/ about the potential spread of nuclear expertise:

bq. But the fact that no one precisely knows how large the problem is speaks to its danger. [Sharon] Squassoni, like every expert contacted for the story, laments the fact that it’s an under-researched topic. If the U.S. government even knows, it’s not telling. “It’s the kind of thing that when you start asking, you hit the classification wall pretty quickly,” says Paul Kerr, a proliferation expert at the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service, who estimates that the number is in the tens of thousands of scientists.

I do feel the need to clarify one thing…although I told Spencer that the tens of thousands estimate sounded credible to me, it’s not MY estimate; I’ve never researched that particular issue. That’s not to say the number’s wrong – as I said, it sounds credible to me.

Spencer is a great blogger/journalist and I’m certainly not accusing him of making stuff up or misquoting me; there was just a misunderstanding.

I’m planning a series of posts about Libya, on top of “this one”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2114/libya-and-cw I did a little while back.

This first short offering is about “Security Council Resolution 2017,”:http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sc10429.doc.htm adopted last week. Its focus is obviously on MANPADS, but there are some provisions related to WMD:

bq.. 1. Calls upon the Libyan authorities to take all necessary steps to prevent the *proliferation of all arms and related materiel of all types,* in particular man-portable surface-to-air missiles, to ensure their proper custody, *as well as to meet Libya’s arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation obligations under international law, through the full implementation of their plans in this regard;*

“2. Further calls upon the Libyan authorities to continue their *close coordination with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, with the aim of destroying their stockpiles of chemical weapons, in accordance with their international obligations;*

Apologies for the lack of blogging. I’ve been busy because the battle between the mongoose and cobra I recently purchased has been more prolonged than anticipated.

Anyway, Jeffrey recently blogged about two items that Iran’s AEOI had at the September IAEA General Conference: “a laser pointer”:http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4570/iranian-giveaway-at-the-gc shaped like an IR-1 and an “IR-1 on display.”:http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4576/more-on-iran-at-the-gc

Unfortunately, I don’t have any visual aids, but I can add a couple of tidbits: first, the laser pointer has lights in three different colors.

Second, and more interesting, is a flash drive that the AEOI was distributing with information about Iran’s nuclear program. Of course, more than one person has pointed out to me the need for caution when attaching the drive to one’s laptop, however tantalizing the drive’s contents.

Sorry that it has taken longer than expected for blogging to resume; the week’s been busier than expected.

My token offering for today is a “series of papers”:http://www.cmc.sandia.gov/papers-reports.htm from Sandia’s Cooperative Monitoring Center to which a colleague recently drew my attention. I haven’t had a chance to dig through them, but many look interesting.

Well, probably not. I will be on travel. There are other things to read.

Former Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim wrote a “piece”:http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=64 for the Cairo Review of Global Affairs a while back. It covers a range of topics, including the diplomacy which produced the May 2010 “Tehran Declaration.”:http://www.mfa.gov.tr/17_05_2010-joint-declaration-of-the-ministers-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey_-iran-and-brazil_.en.mfa

After citing Brazil’s past work on nuclear issues, Iraq, and the CD, Amorim explains that his government also got involved because of “Brazil was also interested in developing her economic and commercial ties with a country roughly the same size as Turkey and Egypt.”

The article gives a fair amount of background on the negotiations, most/all of which you probably know. But it’s good to get it from another official source.

Perhaps the most interesting addition to the record is Amorim’s assessment of the discussions:

bq. Iran made voluntary concessions regarding three central points that she had been resisting before Brazil and Turkey joined the talks. *It is fair to ask why Brazil and Turkey succeeded where the major powers had consistently failed.* Probably the main reason consists in the fact that *Brazil and Turkey have good relations with Iran.* We talk to her government with respect and understanding. Second, *Brazil and Turkey are non-nuclear states, thus enjoying far greater legitimacy in negotiating issues related to Iran’s nuclear file.* Third, *the two countries did not prejudge that the Iranian nuclear program was necessarily for non-peaceful ends.* Giving the benefit of the doubt is both a powerful encouragement and a valuable bargaining chip in a negotiation. *Finally, Brazil and Turkey have always recognized Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program,* to which every member of the NPT is entitled, so long as the clauses of the treaty and the regulations of the IAEA are respected.

Well. Russia, the UK, and the US, along with UN S-G Ban Ki-moon, “announced”:http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sg2180.doc.htm that Finland will host “the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.” The joint statement says that Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will be the facilitator.