Defense News had a “good interview”:http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120220/DEFREG03/302200008/Interview-Adm-Asif-Sandila-Chief-Naval-Staff-Pakistan-Navy a little while back with Adm. Asif Sandila, Pakistan’s Chief of Naval Staff.

There are several useful items, but this is the paragraph that would likely most interest nuclear geeks:

bq.. Q. Later this decade, you will face an Indian nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed ballistic submarine that threatens the current strategic balance in South Asia. How do you intend to respond?

A. The strategic dimension of India’s naval buildup is a cause of concern not only for us but for the entire Indian Ocean region. I feel nuclearization of the Indian Ocean does not augur well for peace and stability in the region. We are mindful of this development and taking necessary measures to restore the strategic balance.

I am not sure when it was posted, but “here it is”:http://odni.gov/reports/2011_report_to_congress_wmd.pdf.

A few days late on this, but….ISIS “has it”:http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_Report_24February2012.pdf, of course.

Thinking about “this post,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/2173/non-pro-sanctions-just-saying I realized that I should have mentioned “UNSCR 1874”:http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9679.doc.htm and its predecessor. Although the NK nuclear situation is obviously unresolved, it’s still too soon to make the sort of judgements about UNSCR 1874 that we can reasonably make about UNSCRs 1172 and 1441.

“These”:http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5015/atoms-for-peace-baby fail as satire because the basic premise is nonsensical. The IAEA does not claim to possess anything like “super-inspectors;” in fact, Agency officials are generally careful to point out the IAEA’s limitations. So, although the vids raise some legitimate points, they’re lampooning something that doesn’t really exist.

I do like the medium as a communications tool, though.

Reuters has a “report”:http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/12/02/IranSmuggling.pdf about sanctions on Iran’s shipping company IRISL.

Says Reuters:

bq.. …many in the West hold up IRISL as exhibit A for Iran’s ability to evade sanctions because the shipping line regularly reflags its ships and changes their official owners.

An analysis of shipping data sheds new light on that deception.

p. The report claims that

bq. The data shows that in the 48 months before U.S. sanctions began in September 2008, IRISL made 345 changes to its fleet including names, the flags ships sailed under, operators, managers and registered owners. In the 40 months since sanctions began there have been at least 878 changes, including 157 name changes, 94 changes of flag, 122 changes of operator, and 127 changes of registered ownership.

p. In other news, I had no idea that Singapore had a High Court Sheriff. You can discover that and more if you read the rest of the report.

Late to the party on this, I’m sure, but “NUKEMAP”:http://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/ by Alex Wellerstein is really awesome. It allows one to detonate nuclear weapons of various yields over the locations of your choice. It is truly great.

I chose to detonate a 20 kt bomb over Boston, MA (I figure I can drop a U.S. nuke on my hometown w/o causing a stir). The link is “here”:http://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/?lat=42.360432834559596&lng=-71.05902675567626&zm=13&kt=20.

There will be little to no blogging while I’m out of town for the next week or so, but you now have this toy with which to play.

IR Diplomacy has “an interview”:http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/en/news/71/bodyView/1897871/Sanctions.Could.Not.Force.Iran.to.Negotiate.html with Peter Jenkins, who was UK Permanent Representative in Vienna from 2001 to 2006.

Without getting into his policy recommendations, he makes an interesting argument:

bq.. IRD: In June 2005, Bruno Pellaud, former IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards, said that if Iran had a military program, it would not have accepted the Additional Protocol. Is this a sound analysis?

PJ: Essentially, yes. *Iran would have been taking a big risk in December 2003, when it provisionally applied the Additional Protocol, if it had possessed nuclear material or facilities that it had no intention of declaring to the IAEA,* since the Additional Protocols grants the IAEA intrusive inspection rights.

p. Given that Iran apparently shelved its nuclear weapons program in late 2003 and Tehran agreed in October 2003 to accept the Additional Protocol, it might be more accurate to say that Iran decided to halt the program _because_ Tehran was going to be implementing the AP. But Jenkins makes an interesting point, nevertheless.

Well, sort of. I was looking for information on another subject in the “September 2009”:http://www.iranwatch.org/government/documents/us-wh-qomqandas-0909.pdf talking points/Q&A about the Fordow enrichment facility, when I noticed a (forgotten, at least to me) estimate of the amount of time Iran would need to produce an SQ of weapons-grade HEU at that facility.

In response to “How many weapons can [the facility] make?,” the portion called “IC-DRAFTED Q/As” states that

bq. The answer depend on the type and performance of the centrifuges installed at the facility, but we asses it would be capable of producing *approximately one weapons worth of highly enriched uranium per year,* if they chose to do so.

Based on the rest of the document, I think this estimate assumes 3,000 centrifuges, probably IR-1s. It also appears to assume unenriched or ~5% UF6 feedstock (since Iran hadn’t yet begun producing ~19.75% UF6), though I don’t know that for a fact.

So there you go.

The recent history of UNSC-imposed sanctions to end nuclear weapons programs is, well, um….just read.

“UNSCR 1441:”:http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/976316.779851913.html Iraq mostly complied and was increasing its compliance when the US-led invasion happened in early-2003. And Iraq had no WMD.

“UNSCR 1172:”:http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/158/60/PDF/N9815860.pdf?OpenElement It’s pretty hard to say that either India or Pakistan has complied. Pakistan is a major non-NATO ally and the United States has obviously been improving its relations with India (as have a lot of other governments).

Yes, that’s condensing some complex history, but I think you get the point about compliance/response.