There’s been some discussion about comments by Ali Akbar Velayati (foreign policy adviser to the SL) during a June 7 Presidential election debate about what he described as the Ahmadinejad government’s diplomatic shortcomings, but I haven’t seen any references (not that I looked very hard) to another interview which Velayati which was published the same day. Read the whole thing, but here’s the part about Iran’s relationship with the P5+1:

In negotiating with foreign countries, including the P5+1, it is very important for the negotiating diplomats to enjoy multilateral domestic support. The other issue is to use all the existing capacities in our country at the expert level in the nuclear negotiations. Nuclear negotiation is a very sensitive matter and Iran’s prominent diplomats are well-equipped to deal with this matter. Our negotiating team in talks for Resolution 598 of the United Nations, which consisted of the skillful experts of the Foreign Ministry, succeeded in ending a very complicated negotiation with Iraq and the UN with honor. Nuclear negotiation is not more complicated than the Resolution 598 negotiation. By using all of our expert forces, we will be able to succeed in the nuclear issue as well. We pursue dialogue and are ready to seriously enter quality negotiations without wasting any time. I am sure that if the other party also shows its honesty, we will be able to remove the concerns of both sides through talks.

Even though he didn’t win, it’s reasonable to believe that Velayati’s opinion counts for something.

I said about a month ago that I would say more about the 2004 Rouhani speech. At the time, I point out that the speech was given in the early fall of 2004, not 2005, and claimed that

I’m not (just) being pedantic here; the date of the speech matters from a substantive standpoint. But I’ll address that in a later post.

Well, it matters because the 2004 speech is only part of the story; one needs to examine the manner in which Iran dealt with the E3 after the speech…although Rouhani was obviously no big fan of suspension, he ultimately agreed to the November 2004 Paris agreement, which was considerably more expansive than the October 2003 agreement.

I neglected to post the most recent IAEA BoG report about Iran. “Here it is.”:http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2013/gov2013-6.pdf

“ISPR”:http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-main_page is a good source for official Pakistani information about its missiles. For example, “this”:http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=2240 February 11 press release (scroll down) describes the most recent test of Pakistan’s Hatf IX (NASR) ballistic missile.

bq. Pakistan today conducted a successful test fire of Short Range Surface to Surface Missile Hatf IX (NASR). The test fire was conducted with successive launches of two missiles from a state of the art multi tube launcher. NASR, with a range of 60 km, and inflight maneuver capability can carry nuclear warheads of appropriate yield, with high accuracy. This quick response system, which can fire a four Missile Salvo ensures deterrence against threats in view of evolving scenarios.

This part struck me as new:

bq. NASR has been specially designed to defeat all known Anti Tactical Missile Defence Systems.

On the “Adventure and Sports” section of the ISPR site, one can also find an “announcement”:http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-article&id=27 for a ski course, complete with an outstanding video.

A friend pointed out “this Sherman Kent piece”:https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/sherman-kent-and-the-board-of-national-estimates-collected-essays/6words.html to me recently.

The whole thing is really worth reading….this is one of my favorite parts:

bq.. How fertile the human mind in devising ways of delaying if not avoiding the moment of decision! How rich the spoken language in its vocabulary of issue-ducking! “I have a sneaker that . . . ,” “I’d drop dead of surprise if . . .”–expressions with sound but upon reflection almost without meaning. How much conviction, for example, do you have to have before you become possessed of a sneaker; *how much of the unexpected does it take to cause your heart to fail?*

p. This passage is perhaps the most relevant to proliferation:

bq.. Some years back we were obliged by force majeur to compose some tables *setting forth how the Blanks might divide up an all-but-undreamed-of stockpile of fissionable material among an as-yet-unborn family of weapons.* There were of course the appropriate passages of verbal warning, and then, on the chance that the numerical tables should become physically separated from the warning, the tables were overprinted in red, “This table is based on assumptions stated in . . . . Moreover, it should not be used for any purpose whatever without inclusion, in full, of the cautionary material in . . . .” More recently we have issued a document which not only began with a fulsome caveat but was set off by a format and color of paper that were new departures.

Apologies for the persistent inconsistency with this blog.

Anyway, I have an article in this month’s “Arms Control Today,”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_01-02/Looking-Back-Iraq-Disarmament-Without-Resolution titled “Iraq: Disarmament Without Resolution.” It’s about the Iraq WMD thing.

While re-reading part of “the 2004 ISG report,”:http://www.foia.cia.gov/duelfer/Iraqs_WMD_Vol1.pdf I found a discussion about the Saddam Hussein regime’s views on Iran. Some of it concerns Iran’s perceived chemical and nuclear weapons capabilities.

bq.. Saddam was very concerned about Iranian military production capabilities, particularly *its nuclear weapons program*, according to former Vice President Ramadan. A Ministry of Defense conference concluded in January 2003 that Iranian WMD posed a looming menace to Iraq and the region, according to a sensitive source. Attended by 200 senior officers, *the conference discussed Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, acquisition of suitable delivery systems, and possession of missiles capable of carrying CW or BW warheads over a range of 1,000 kilometers.* Saddam believed that *Iran had benefitted from the breakup of the former Soviet Union by gaining access to WMD* as well as conventional technologies.

Iraqi military troops trained with the *expectation that Iran would use CW if Iran invaded*. If Iraq came under chemical or biological attack, the army would attempt to survive until the international community intervened. Tariq ‘Aziz also expressed hope that the close UN monitoring of Iraq might force international intervention in this scenario. Saddam felt that the United States would intervene to protect oilfields, according to a former senior Iraqi official.

A former Corps commander stated that Saddam believed the next war would be fought in a chemical environment with heavy reliance upon missiles. *Iraq assumed that Iran could manufacture CW and would use it,* according to a former senior Iraqi intelligence officer. The Iraqis had identified Iranian nuclear and chemical facilities as well as 240 factories in Iran that they assessed produced missile components.

p. The report also contains a few enlightening paragraphs about Iraqi intelligence collection against Iran. An excerpt:

bq. IIS conducted extensive collection operations against Iran, according to a former IIS senior officer and various captured documents. Intelligence collection as a whole *targeted Iran’s weapons programs, its nuclear program,* economic issues, and international relations. Human intelligence sources were the primary means of intelligence collection against Iran, supported by signals intelligence
conducted by the IIS Directorate for Signals Intelligence (M17).

Interestingly, the MEK was a source on Iran’s unconventional weapons programs:

bq. IIS had assigned 150 officers to work the Iranian target, according to a former senior IIS officer. The IIS *relied heavily on the MEK* and independent assets in every province to monitor Iranian military and WMD development.

The report also discusses the regime’s use of open-source information. It didn’t always work very well, especially when it came to Iran’s nuclear program:

bq. Iraqi intelligence collected on the Iranian nuclear program in 2001, but *did not contradict Iranian claims that their reactors [sic] being used for peaceful purposes*, according to the former deputy director of the IIS. Regardless, *Iraq assumed Iran was attempting to develop nuclear weapons.* IIS assets often *passed along open source information as if it were intelligence, allowing disinformation to reach the upper levels* of the former Regime.

Hopefully, you’re doing something other than reading this blog on New Year’s Day.

One last post for 2012. There will be more in 2013.

A reader wanted to know why I hadn’t thought of “this.”:http://www.greenbag.org/v16n1/v16n1_ex_post_kerr.pdf Orin S. Kerr, observing that law review editors frequently demand citations for claims that are “obvious or obscure” or “made up or false,” proposes a solution:

bq. Legal scholars need a source they can cite when confronted with
these challenges. It should be something with an impressive but generic title. I offer “this page,”:http://www.greenbag.org/v16n1/v16n1_ex_post_kerr.pdf with the following conclusion: If you have been directed to this page by a citation elsewhere, it is plainly true that the author’s claim is correct. For further support, consult the extensive scholarship on the point.

Quite a generous offer. I’m annoyed that I didn’t think of it, but at least another Kerr did.