Since I mentioned the January 2013 B05 test in this post, I thought I might as well post the press release.

I found that announcement while I was looking for something else. I also came across this press release about the March 2013 test of the underwater version of India’s Brahmos cruise missile – another event which occurred during my blogging hiatus.

A few stats:

The submarine-launched version of BRAHMOS supersonic cruise missile was successfully test-fired at 1410 hrs on Wednesday (20th March 2013) from a submerged platform in Bay of Bengal off the coast of Visakhapatnam. Creating history, the missile took off vertically from the submerged platform for its full range of 290 kms. Following a pre-defined trajectory, the missile emerged from underwater, took a turn towards the designated target meeting all mission objectives.

This likely warrants another post, but here’s Indian PM Singh’s congratulatory message regarding the first time that the reactor on board India’s nuclear-powered submarine achieved criticality.

Here it is. I should have mentioned the report when it came out in June…great stuff for those interested in proliferation networks.

A little while ago, The Hindu had a good interview with Vijay Kumar Saraswat, then-head of India’s DRDO, which contains some informative material on DRDO’s origin and evolution, as well as an explanation of why certain DRDO programs have lagged in the past.

I found this section on the past effects of the MTCR to be telling:

We were to develop Prithvi missile’s one version in seven years but we developed three versions in 15 years – first of 150 km range, second of 250 km and the third naval version of 350 km range when fired from the ship, yes we took 15 years but we developed the complete system. Same thing happened in Agni One, Two Three programme. But still time and cost overruns were there because when IGMDP was planned we had planned to import some material. We had to import some materials for Prithvi which was first fired in 1988 and Agni in 1989 and then MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) which was brewing all this time clamped all restrictions on us. All the contracts which we had signed with all companies were not honoured and these companies took back everything. Everything was denied to us, this denial caused us a lot of delay and whatever we needed had to be designed, developed and produced by us.

From 1989 to 1997 was a harrowing period. There were restrictions imposed on India and for things like getting Magnesium supply and Servo valves for launch vehicles, we had to struggle and later produce our very own. At that time, Tamil Nadu government’s TIDCO helped in making Magnesium slab from ore.

Saraswat went on to say that India solved some problems caused by these restrictions, but others remain:

Though technical problems had been solved by first launches of Prithvi and Agni missiles. Now these problems are not there, Today, India produces its own servo valves not only for missiles but also for launch vehicles and many other industrial purposes. What was a critical technology in 1988 is no more critical, new technologies have come. A lot of liberalisation has taken place but the fact still remains that critical technologies which are required are not available to us. For example, we still do not have access to high end computer processors and we have to make do with Intel core system. I cannot get a high end computer and I have to start building it for my missile right from the chip.

Here’s a video of an Indian SLBM test featuring Dr. Saraswat:

If you’re a complete dork and looking for a compilation of Wassenaar Arrangement documents, here it is. Current as of January 2013.

A while back, a CIA report argued that “it seems unlikely that or any major power can prevent the emergence of more nuclear explosives states because”:

–the requisite materials and technology are already too widely available for technical safeguards and international regulations to be effective.

–competition among the nuclear supplier states guarantees threshold states that diverting and diversifying power programs into explosives programs will not deny them a source of nuclear materials or technology.

–legal restraints on proliferation have lost much of their effectiveness because of the growing political confrontation between industrialized and less developed countries.

–political pressures against proliferation only tend to confirm the view that the nuclear-haves are trying to deny all other countries a valuable prize.

That was written almost 38 years ago in a December 1975 CIA Research Study titled Managing Nuclear Proliferation: The Politics of Limited Choice. The National Security Archives folks published this a while back, but I happened to notice this part of it.

For those who may be interested, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament has annual reports dating back to 1995 available here.

Only in recent years did the reports really start talking about proliferation. The counterproliferation section of the 2012-2013 report is here.

I didn’t notice anything terribly interesting, but take a look.

We’ve all seen claims that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons, but I’m not sure I’ve seen any mentions of last month’s claim from the French Foreign Ministry that government forces sprayed sarin from a helicopter.

Take a look:

Q – Has France ever tried to verify allegations of the use of chemical weapons by rebels?

A – Of course.

Q – Without success?

A – We have no evidence that would allow us to draw the conclusions we’ve drawn about the regime with respect to the opposition. The same holds true for U.S. officials. Not only is there nothing to indicate that the opposition might have used such weapons, everything leads us to think that that isn’t the case.

So let’s allow the commission of inquiry to do its work in Syria to verify, on the ground, the accusations made by the regime against the opposition. And we will then see how true the regime’s accusations are. What we can say today, officially, affirmatively, and proven scientifically, is that the regime has used them against the opposition. To be even more specific, they have sprayed sarin by helicopter.

Seems that knowing the truth behind this claim would tell us something about what the Syrian government is actually thinking regarding chemical weapons.

Not that they’re that hard to find, but if you all of the INFCIRCs on Iran, here they are.

There’s been some discussion about comments by Ali Akbar Velayati (foreign policy adviser to the SL) during a June 7 Presidential election debate about what he described as the Ahmadinejad government’s diplomatic shortcomings, but I haven’t seen any references (not that I looked very hard) to another interview which Velayati which was published the same day. Read the whole thing, but here’s the part about Iran’s relationship with the P5+1:

In negotiating with foreign countries, including the P5+1, it is very important for the negotiating diplomats to enjoy multilateral domestic support. The other issue is to use all the existing capacities in our country at the expert level in the nuclear negotiations. Nuclear negotiation is a very sensitive matter and Iran’s prominent diplomats are well-equipped to deal with this matter. Our negotiating team in talks for Resolution 598 of the United Nations, which consisted of the skillful experts of the Foreign Ministry, succeeded in ending a very complicated negotiation with Iraq and the UN with honor. Nuclear negotiation is not more complicated than the Resolution 598 negotiation. By using all of our expert forces, we will be able to succeed in the nuclear issue as well. We pursue dialogue and are ready to seriously enter quality negotiations without wasting any time. I am sure that if the other party also shows its honesty, we will be able to remove the concerns of both sides through talks.

Even though he didn’t win, it’s reasonable to believe that Velayati’s opinion counts for something.

I said about a month ago that I would say more about the 2004 Rouhani speech. At the time, I point out that the speech was given in the early fall of 2004, not 2005, and claimed that

I’m not (just) being pedantic here; the date of the speech matters from a substantive standpoint. But I’ll address that in a later post.

Well, it matters because the 2004 speech is only part of the story; one needs to examine the manner in which Iran dealt with the E3 after the speech…although Rouhani was obviously no big fan of suspension, he ultimately agreed to the November 2004 Paris agreement, which was considerably more expansive than the October 2003 agreement.