Author Archives: kerr

Remember Russia?

A conversation I had yesterday with an esteemed arms control expert, as well as “this article by my colleague Wade Boese”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_01-02/NA_US_Russia.asp, reminded me to write about a subject I’ve been thinking about recently.

While it is good to continually point out that the Bush administration screwed the pooch on Iraq and neglected more serious threats from North Korea and Iran in the process, it is worthwhile to point out that there is precisely ONE entity that presents an existential threat to the United States: Russia.

The solution for dealing with this existential threat? The Bush administration’s circus act/foreign policy team decided to write some talking points, call them the “U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_06/factfilejune02.asp, and declare the problem solved.

Now, the problems with SORT have been obvious for a while (“no verification in the treaty, expires in 2012, is only in effect for one day, etc.”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/index.php?id=332). And Wade’s article points out that the negotiations for implementing the treaty aren’t going so well.

I know that few, if any, Russia experts think that the Russians will be able to deploy a bunch of nuclear weapons anytime soon. But I still don’t think that we ought to bank totally on these intelligence projections, especially since “the lack of verification measures”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/index.php?id=337 will leave the IC with considerably less capability to monitor WTF is gong on with the Russian strategic arsenal.

Now don’t misunderstand me – I don’t think Russia is going to up and attack us anytime soon. But the fact remains that these weapons *are* there and intentions change faster than capabilities. And then there’s always the risk of accidents, etc.

It is also worth noting that US/Russian/Soviet nuclear negotiations have never been easy. But if US/Russian relations are so damn good right now, it might have been a good time to try a little more arms control.

If you want some perspective on why we didn’t, check out “this interview with outgoing Undersecretary of State John Bolton”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_03/boltonmarch02.asp. In essence, he says treaties are useless.

Clowns on Parade

Reading Kevin Drum’s recent “take”:http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2005_01/005419.php on DepSecDef Wolfowitz’s “laughable prewar testimony”:http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/consequences/2003/0228pentagoncontra.htm inspired two not-terribly-original thoughts.

1. Everyone who supported the Iraq invasion should be embarrassed. They should really rethink their qualifications to speak about any foreign policy issue, or at least learn from their mistakes. They should also start apologizing profusely to war opponents. The latter is especially true for people who “made their living during the 1990s by trash-talking arms control”:http://www.twq.com/spring00/232cambone.pdf, as well as for liberals (like the New Republic’s Peter Beinart) who still feel entitled to “slander those who disagreed with him about the war”:http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?pt=whKP5U%2BbbaxbirV9FQhQuh%3D%3D.

2. Watching the administration and its minions pontificate about foreign policy is like watching David Brent opine about management — only it’s tragic rather than funny.

One nice example is contained in a slide that was part of a briefing about Iraq and terrorism that some folks in OSD Policy (wearing floppy shoes) shopped around to the SecDef, the NSC, the CIA, and the Office of the Vice President. (Senator Levin’s staff issued a “report”:http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2004/102104inquiryreport.pdf this past October that nicely summarizes the issue.)

This particular slide is special because it was left out of the briefing shown to the CIA. Entitled *Fundamental Problems with How Intelligence Community is Assessing Information,* it includes this highlighted gem.

And so the circle is closed: evidence of a partnership, as well as the lack of such evidence, proves that Iraq and al-Qaeda were buddies.

Note to OSD: absence of evidence is still absence of evidence.

Only in this administration could you present something like this to senior policymakers and not be a laughing stock.

Egyptian Nuclear Experiments: The Peter Principle

In an effort to placate Dr. Lewis, I am back to blog†at least until I go to Utah this weekend. Recalling that it’s easier to tear down something than to build it, I then had only to find a target … fortunately, the Heritage Foundation is the gift that keeps on giving when it comes to nuttery. Today’s case in point is Peter Brookes’ “latest screed from today’s _New York Post_”:http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/38184.htm about a possible Egyptian nuclear weapons program.

In a nutshell, Brookes asserts†on the basis of almost no evidence†that Egypt could be pursuing a nuclear weapons program. He then says that Egyptian nucler weapons would have bad consequences.

I will concentrate on the first part, which, needless to say, is really, really, really weak. (Shameless plug … the upcoming issue of _Arms Control Today_ has an article I wrote about this.) My reaction to the second, which takes up about 2/3 of the piece, can be summarized as: “no shit.”

Brookes blows it right from the get-go. He says:

bq. As if North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons programs weren’t enough, now it seems Egypt may be pursuing the bomb as well.

bq. The evidence isn’t conclusive yet. But according to an initial International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) statement last week, several Egyptian scientists conducted unreported nuclear experiments over the past 30 years.

bq. [snip]

bq. Well, it turns out that Egypt forgot to mention some nuclear activities in its 1982 declaration. And it failed to inform the IAEA about some new work since then, too. Egypt denies violating the treaty, but the IAEA is analyzing environmental samplings from nuclear facilities near Cairo, looking for evidence of uranium enrichment or plutonium extraction.

A few relevant facts:

1. The public evidence shows that Cairo isn’t even close to being in the same league as Tehran and Pyongyang, despite what Brookes’ first sentence implies.

Details about the ongoing IAEA investigation in Egypt are from anonymous officials in press reports (AP broke the story in early November). As far as I know, the “IAEA statement” Brookes mentions does not exist. My interviews for _ACT_ generally support the press reports, but the IAEA has not made an authoritative statement.

The press reports and my sources in both Washington and Vienna say most, if not all, of Egypt’s nuclear experiments took place in the 1980s or 1990s. Obviously, any IAEA safeguards violations should be dealt with accordingly, but it’s not like anyone has found anything like a large-scale nuclear programs.

2. Egypt did have a nuclear weapons program in the past, which peaked in the 1960s. But by all accounts, it never advanced very far. Cairo’s efforts amounted to very little and the country never got anything approaching the ability to produce fissile material. NO ONE I spoke with seemed to think that there is any sort of serious nuclear weapons program.

3. IAEA DG Mohammed ElBaradei obliquely referred to the Egypt in his November 25 statement to the Board of Governors. He “wasn’t exactly sweating when he said”:http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n016.html that:

bq. … cases are surfacing, and will likely continue to surface, in which the Agency finds that States have not in the past fulfilled all of their reporting obligations. Most of these cases are failures that can normally be dealt with in the Agency´s annual Safeguards Implementation Report.

p=. ***

p{float: right; margin-left: 10px}. !/images/161.jpg!
_Is being this dumb like a sharp_
_shooting pain or just a dull ache_?

Then Brookes goes off the deep end:

bq. Nonproliferation: While some pooh-pooh the idea of an Egyptian nuclear program, it really isn’t that far-fetched. Pakistan’s rogue nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, is said to have been in contact with Egypt, and Cairo has had a long-standing ballistic missile relationship with nuclear-capable North Korea.

bq. Also, during a Sino-Egyptian summit two years ago, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak signed a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with China. That same year, press reports indicated that China (also nuclear-capable) was helping Egypt mine uranium in the Sinai desert.

OK, I won’t insult your intelligence. Obviously any contacts with A.Q. Khan should be investigated along with any other procurement activities. However, “reports” — which ones? — of peaceful nuclear cooperation between China and Egypt prove precisely nothing, nor does the implied connection between missiles and nuclear weapons.

[Brookes probably means: Jacques Schuster, “Cairo Wants to Build Nuclear Bomb,” _Die Welt_, June 22 2002 (EUP-2002-06-21-000487). He should have checked out Mark Hibbs, “Claim Egypt Has Secret Program Unfounded, U.S. Tells Germany,” “_Nucleonics Week_ 43:28, July 11, 2002”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/CLAIM_EGYPT_HAS_SECRET_PROGRAM_UNFOUNDED.pdf. The official U.S. response was that the allegation “doesn’t make any sense.” This may explain why Babbling Brookes is no longer employed in the Pentagon. — _Jeffrey_]

Brookes then adds some policy prescriptions:

bq. Whatever the case, Washington must deal with Cairo carefully. Remember, Pakistan’s pursuit of nukes †and its subsequent isolation †ruined our post-Cold War relationship with the South Asian Muslim giant for years.

bq. And what was the result of our 1990s policies of isolating Pakistan?

bq. The first Muslim nuclear weapons state, and A.Q. Khan’s proliferation of nuclear knowledge to North Korea, Iran, Libya †and maybe even Syria, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In addition, Pakistan’s pariah status brought Islamabad’s support for the Taliban’s rise in Afghanistan, and the festering of international terrorism, culminating in the horrors of 9/11. Preventing nuclear proliferation is tough business. Let’s hope we do better with Egypt.

Brookes never explains why isolation was responsible for Khan selling nuclear technology to other countries. My own feeling is that Khan was keen to do that regardless of our “isolation” of Islamabad. Also, Pakistan’s alliance with Islamic extremists in Afghanistan has a lot more to do with the U.S. – sponsored proxy war during the 1980s and Washington’s subsequent neglect of Afghanistan.

But his point is that the US is better off engaging with problem countries in order to further our national security interests. Does that mean he’s willing to support direct negotiations with North Korea and greater engagement with Iran? Somehow, I doubt it.

_Update_: “Michael Roston tooled on Brookes earlier today”:http://lookingforsomeonetolietome.blogspot.com/2005/01/two-minutes-hate-january-10-2005.html, but I didn’t see it until now.

_Editor’s Note_: A decent sumary of Egypt’s nuclear programs, past and present is Barbara M. Gregory, “Egypt’s Nuclear Program: Assessing Supplier-Based And Other Developmental Constraints,” “_Nonproliferation Review_ 3:1, Fall 1995, pp.20-27”:http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol03/31/gregor31.pdf.

_Note from Paul_: A better one is found in Robert Einhorn’s chapter in “_The Nuclear Tipping Point_”:http://www.brookings.edu/press/books/nucleartippingpoint.htm.

North Korea: So Don’t Talk…See if We Care

I was catching up on reading State Department transcripts and ran across “this”:http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2004/39717.htm response from spokesperson Richard Boucher to a question regarding the stalled six-party talks.

Given that North Korea is free to continue working on its nuclear weapons programs, it is troubling that there’s not even another round of talks scheduled. Even if this state of affairs is more North Korea’s fault than anyone else’s (as is probably the case), you’d think this would be kind of a problem.

Boucher agrees, but not necessarily for the reason you’d think:

bq. North Korea keeps finding reasons to delay. They keep missing out on the opportunity of solving this and the other opportunities that would arise by solving this.

That is certainly one way of looking at it. But when I said “problem” I meant “For the United States.” I think we might be “missing out” on a few things as well.

Another North Korea Intelligence Summary

I always appreciate it when Jeffrey plugs my scribbling, but I will add something further. “This”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_01-02/Deconstructed.asp is a more recent article about North Korea’s nuclear programs.

The section on the enrichment program reads:

North Korea denies U.S. charges that it has a gas centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment program. Little is known about this program, including the location of its related facilities. Clandestine centrifuge facilities are widely believed to be more difficult to detect than plutonium-based nuclear programs.

According to U.S. estimates, North Korea’s uranium-enrichment program appears to be significantly less advanced than its plutonium-based program. North Korea is believed to have procured components for a gas-centrifuge-based uranium-enrichment facility, but there is no publicly available evidence that it has integrated these components into a functioning system capable of producing uranium.

Public CIA assessments about the program have changed significantly during the past year. The CIA said in November 2002 that North Korea was “constructing a centrifuge facility” capable of producing “two or more nuclear weapons per year,” perhaps as soon as “mid-decade.” Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly told Congress in March 2003 that the facility could start producing fissile material in “months and not years.”

Subsequent CIA reports have been increasingly vague. For example, a “November report covering the last half of 2002″:http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2002.htm#5 says only that North Korea “had begun acquiring material and equipment for a centrifuge facility,” with the apparent “goal” of building a plant. Another “November report covering the first half of 2003”:http://www.odci.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/jan_jun2003.htm#5 says nothing about the program.

Iran: The Verification Trap

The Bush administration may be laying the ground work to sabotage any deal that the EU-3 conclude with Iran regarding the suspension of Tehran’s uranium enrichment program.

The grounds? The deal is unverifiable.

Obviously, we would all like to see as strong a deal as possible and it’s hard to be against verification. But what the administration is now saying regarding verification could form the basis for either

bq. 1. Arguing that no suspension of Iran’s enrichment program is verifiable, or
2. Pushing for a verification regime that is so intrusive that Iran won’t agree to it.

Bush spoke to this more than once before the IAEA Board of Governors adopted its latest Iran resolution.

For instance, “he said November 26”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/11/20041126.html that “the only good deal is one that’s verifiable. And I look forward to talking to the leaders of those countries, if they can get Iran to agree to a deal, to make sure that it’s verifiable.”

Well, there’s a bit of a problem. Besides the obvious fact that there’s no such thing as a 100% verifiable agreement, the administration has been saying that it is impossible to verify any agreement with Iran.

Take, for example, this idea that the administration was kicking around prior to the IAEA board’s June meeting. A State Department official “told _Arms Control Today_”:”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_05/IranIAEA.asp in June that the United States was thinking about encouraging the board to say it “cannot verify” Iran’s suspension of its centrifuge program because of Tehran’s demonstrated ability to manufacture relevant components at various locations throughout the country.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei alluded to the verification issue in his June report to the board, “noting”:http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-34.pdf that “some of the activities subject to suspension, such as component production, are inherently difficult to verify.” ElBaradei added that the IAEA “cannot provide any assurance” that components are not being produced at undeclared Iranian sites.

(_Right, You can hide an enrichment facility just about anywhere_.)

Detecting small, concealed centrifuge facilities is very difficult. And the Bush Administration is “convinced”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_12/Iran.asp that Iran has more concealed nuclear facilities. Can you think of a verification scheme that Iran would sign up to and also satisfy the Bush administration?

It is tempting to argue that the UN Security Council should give the IAEA Iraq-style inspection powers, but those wide-ranging powers did “precisely nothing”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020826.html to satisfy this administration.

Getting the most verifiable deal possible obviously ought to be a priority for the EU-3, but watch for the administration to say “Hey, we supported the deal, but the Iranians just wouldn’t agree to verification.”

Ick.

Answering Paine on Ledeen

I am just responding to an “insightful comment”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/?parentid=285 by Chris Paine at the Natural Resources Defense Council.

I agree that my uses of the phrase “give up” was probably a bit off. What I should have said was “agree to not use” or “dismantle” or something like that. I didn’t say that Iran will give up its “right” to the fuel cycle — I agree that they probably won’t.

However, I am a little more optimistic than Chris. Iran’s public statements suggest Tehran *may* accept some agreement that allows the Iranian government to say “we stopped enriching because we wanted to, not because we had to.” Tehran seems to be fixated on not being *required* by the IAEA to do something that it is not legally required to do. Iran wants its “rights” recognized, but that doesn’t necessarily mean they’ll exercise them.

I think Chris’ ideas are good (especially the establishment of some universal rule that would deal with the fuel cycle problem), but unlikely in the short term. We may have to settle for some arrangement that leaves some ambiguity about Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Given the alternatives — and the likely inability of this administration to get its act together on this issue — I could well support such an arrangement (not that anyone’s asking me.)

I’ve sent Chris a recent ACT “article”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Iran_EU.asp I wrote; I thought I’d also post it here.

Ledeen’s Iran Falsehoods

Michael Ledeen’s November 29 “screed”:http://www.nationalreview.com/ledeen/ledeen200411290913.asp in the National Review Online about the recent EU3 deal with Iran proves that it’s easy to make arguments when you can just invent facts.

Some background: Iran agreed in October 2003 to stop its uranium enrichment activities, but there has been an ongoing dispute about the scope of that agreement and Iran has continued work on portions of its gas centrifuge enrichment program. The new agreement is more specific and explicitly requires Iran not to do things like build centrifuges or convert yellow cake into uranium hexafluoride, which is the gas used as feedstock for centrifuges.

Anyway, here are some facts Ledeen gets wrong.

First, Ledeen says:

bq. The latest Iranian shenanigan may have set a record for speed. On Monday they announced they had stopped the centrifuges that were enriching uranium. On Tuesday they asked for permission to run the centrifuges again. The Europeans sternly said no.

Not exactly. Iran hasn’t used any nuclear material in its centrifuges since it agreed to stop doing so in October 2003. This is the part of its original deal with the EU that it has abided by. What Iran wanted this time was to exempt 20 sets of centrifuge components from its suspension deal. The EU3 said they couldn’t do that and reached a compromise where the centrifuges are under IAEA surveillance, but not IAEA seal (which is where the rest of the centrifuge components are.)

Ledeen also argues:

bq. No serious person can believe that the negotiations are going to block, or even seriously delay, the Iranian race to acquire atomic bombs.

Actually, they can and do. IAEA inspectors have pretty extensive powers to access Iranian facilities suspected of being involved in a nuclear program. While they’re not foolproof (Iran might possess concealed facilities that the agency doesn’t know about), these inspection powers have produced a wealth of information about Iran’s nuclear programs in the 2+ years that this investigation has been going on.

Even the CIA agrees in its most recent “report”:http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2003.htm#iran that Iran can’t do much with the facilities under IAEA safeguards:

bq. International scrutiny and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and safeguards will most likely prevent Tehran from using facilities declared to the IAEA directly for its weapons program as long as Tehran remains a party to the NPT.

Ledeen then accuses the Europeans of “appeasement” and acting in bad faith, claiming (without evidence) that they “surely know” that their agreement is “a ritual dance designed to put a flimsy veil over the nakedness of the real activities.”

Apart from the obvious weakness of this ad-hom attack, Ledeen also ignores the fact that, since the original October 2003 agreement, Iran:

* has not enriched uranium
* has increased its cooperation with the IAEA’s investigation
* is doing several things that it’s not legally required to do, like act as if the additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement is in force (even though it isn’t). In fact, there’s not really a legal requirement for Iran to suspend its enrichment program.

Now it is true that Iran has, among other things, also gone back on a February 2004 agreement to refrain from building centrifuges and manufacturing components for them. And they previously lied to the IAEA and still need to resolve several other outstanding issues. And all of their claims should be scrutinized very, very, closely. But it’s tough to argue that there’s not at least some basis for believing that Iran may want to deal with the EU3 and eventually give up its fuel cycle facilities.

After asserting (again, without evidence) that the EU3 want a nuclear-armed Iran and want to keep the US from acting to stop Iranian nukes (No, I’m not going to waste keystrokes answering this nonsense), Ledeen claims that

bq. There is certainly no risk that the United Nations will do anything serious, which is why the Europeans keep insisting that it is the only “legitimate” forum for any discussion of the Iranian nuclear menace.

This is really where up becomes down for Ledeen and (apparently) NRO editors. In point of fact, the US has been insisting on going to the UN Security Council. The EU3 have threatened to support this US effort as a way to get Iran to cooperate. The reason they’re skeptical of the US idea is because they don’t think the US knows what to do if the issue does go to the Security Council. It’s worth noting that the IAEA referred North Korea to the Security Council more than 18 months ago and nothing has happened.

Anyway, the rest of the article is about why we should push for regime change in Iran. There’s no evidence to support any of his claims here either, and most knowledgeable people seem to agree that regime change is a) unlikely to work, especially in the short term and b) no guarantee of a regime that won’t want nuclear weapons. (see, for example, “this”:http://www.cfr.org/pub7194/zbigniew_brzezinski_robert_m_gates_suzanne_maloney/iran_time_for_a_new_approach.php CFR task force report.)

Whatever.

Pakistan Aided Iran With Centrifuge Technology – Revisited

After a bit of reading, I have a couple of things to add to “Jeffrey’s post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/index.php?id=272 on Doug Jehl’s Nov.24 NYT “article”:http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/24/politics/24weapons.html.

The first two items are previous public statements from some pretty high-ranking US officials on Pakistan’s assistance to Iran.

First, in a speech to a G-Town audience last February, then-DCI George Tenet “implied”:http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/tenet_georgetownspeech_02052004.html that the Khan network had supplied Iran with centrifuge technology:

bq. [W]e discovered the extent of Khan’s hidden network. We tagged the proliferators. We detected the network, stretching across four continents, offering its wares to countries like North Korea and Iran…

bq. ***

bq. Through this unrelenting effort we confirm the network was delivering such things as illicit uranium-enrichment centrifuges.

Second, President Bush “said”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html later that month:

bq. Khan and his associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan’s older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models. The network also provided these countries with components, and in some cases, with complete centrifuges.

Third, Jehl is a bit misleading when he writes that the CIA report says that the Khan network supplied Iran with nuclear “weapons components.”

The report, however, is actually referring to gas centrifuge components, not weapons components. Needless to say, centrifuges are not weapons.

To be fair, Jehl does say that the report “does not say explicitly whether Mr. Khan’s network sold Iran complete plans for building a warhead.” But I think that sentence implies that the report says Iran acquired parts for a nuclear weapon. He should have been more careful.