That ongoing effort is being “broadcast on CSPAN2.”:http://c-span.org/watch/index.asp?Cat=TV&Code=CS3&ShowVidDays=30&ShowVidDesc=&ArchiveDays=30

Will someone please point out that India’s population size, type of government, and economic growth don’t mean that it gets to have nuclear weapons?

Anyway, ACA sponsored a related event on Tuesday. “Check out the transcript”:http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20061114_India_Transcript.asp for more details.

I would point out that Zia Mian discussed “this report”:http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmresearchreport01.pdf which, I think, pretty much demolishes “this one”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18443&prog=zgp&proj=zsa by Ashley Tellis.

Bottom line: India doesn’t have enough uranium for both its nuclear weapons and nuclear power programs. That is why the agreement aids India’s nuclear program.

If you don’t believe me, check out this line from a “previous Tellis report”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_India_strategy_2006.FINAL.pdf:

The energy dialogue represents the best means of reaching a U.S. – Indian modus vivendi on civilian nuclear power. Given its huge energy requirements, the growing pressures to avoid burning dirty coal in order to protect the environment, and the need to reduce carbon emissions that exacerbate global warming, New Delhi has little alternative but to rely increasingly on nuclear power. Unfortunately for India, two major challenges threaten this objective.

One of which is “India has the misfortune to have been poorly endowed with natural uranium.”

Tellis adds:

While the difficulties of mastering the thorium- based fuel cycle will preoccupy India for many years to come, New Delhi is confronted by more pressing threats. The critical problem facing India right now is the severe shortage of natural uranium, which, if unresolved, could bring the operation of many stage 1 PHWRs to a gradual halt. Not only would this worsen India’s electricity production problems—with all the consequent implications for economic growth—but it would also decisively undermine the three-stage program on which the Department of Atomic Energy has staked the nation’s energy independence for the secular future.

Interestingly, check out his description of a series of considerably less-ambitious steps (relative to the nuclear deal) that would aid India’s nuclear program:

If the administration were to settle for even such conservative reforms as these, it would not only send an important signal to India about larger American intentions but would materially contribute to preserving the future balance of power in Asia—a prospect that motivated former U.S. ambassador to India Robert D. Blackwill to ask recently, “Why should the U.S. want to check India’s missile capability in ways that could lead to China’s permanent nuclear dominance over democratic India?”23 Even if the United States cannot actively aid India in developing its strategic capabilities, it ought to *pursue policies having exactly that effect.* Currently, the easiest way for the administration to do this is simply to leave New Delhi—and its international partners—alone.

[Emphasis mine.]

Ick.

*Update*

“Here’s an article”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20061117/ap_on_go_co/us_india_nuclear_6 about the final vote.

ACA just posted “an analysis”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_11/NKTestAnalysis.asp from Richard L. Garwin and Frank N. von Hippel on the DPRK nuclear test.

It contains some evidence that I don’t think has been made public before. Here’s an example:

bq. …it is not surprising that a range of yields has been reported. One authoritative estimate from Terry Wallace, a seismologist at Los Alamos National Laboratory, based on an unclassified analysis of open data, estimates a yield between 0.5 and 2 kilotons, with 90 percent confidence that the yield is less than 1 kiloton.[7] A second authority, Lynn R. Sykes of Columbia University estimates a yield of 0.4 kilotons, with 68 percent confidence that the yield is between 0.2 and 0.7 kilotons and a 95 percent probability that the yield is less than 1 kiloton.[8]

I also liked this observation:

bq. One notable byproduct of the test is that it has demonstrated that university and other independent seismic detection systems, as well as those of governments and the International Monitoring System of the Vienna-based Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization very effectively detect underground explosions in the sub-kiloton range.

But read the whole thing…I can’ t do it justice. And I need time to help Jeffrey pick out a third vacation home, now that our “fear-mongering has pushed revenues through the roof”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1260/shorter-bill-arkin.

_Jeffrey Adds_: “Perhaps North Korea’s weapon designers tried to go directly to a weapon in the 500-1000 kilogram class that could reach South Korea on a Scud missile…” “Sounds familiar, eh?”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1233/so-like-why-didnt-it-work

Arkin takes on a massive straw-figure in “a post”:http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2006/10/ambulance_chasers_of_the_apoca.html which says something about North Korea and nuclear weapons.

Allow me to paraphrase:

bq. Unnamed “Ambulance Chasers of the Apocalypse” point to the dangers of a nuclear-armed North Korea – as well as nuclear proliferation in general – in order to get rich. Not because nuclear weapons can kill people and blow up a lot of shit.

Now I need to tell the servants to wax my Ferrari…

I was re-reading some _ACT_ pieces last night and came across “a gem”:http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/69024.htm from SecState Rice this past July on US North Korea policy.

Here’s the quote in full:

bq. I just want to say to China that the responsibility that has been shown here — and I think the President will say this to President Hu later — really shows that the efforts that we’ve been making over the last couple of years to have six-party talks — not U.S.-North Korea talks, where it was the United States and North Korea — but six-party talks, in which all of North Korea’s neighbors have been working toward a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, *that that’s really paying off,* because we really now have a coalition…That’s why I think ultimately North Korea will have no choice but to return to the talks and pursue denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

[Insert witty comment here…and read about Jane below.]

“NHK”:http://www.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/index.html and “Yonhap”:http://english.yna.co.kr/Engnews/20061012/430100000020061012152554E0.html have both reported on what Japan and South Korea have found in the atmosphere after the DPRK’s Monday test: bagel.

According to NHK:

Japan’s 47 prefectures say no radioactive substances have been detected at any measuring points in a survey conducted one day after North Korea’s claimed nuclear test.

The prefectures took samples of dust and rain from the air on Tuesday as part of an emergency government monitoring program.

They say the survey shows no trace of radioactive substances peculiar to a nuclear explosion, and that air radiation levels are normal.

Other government checks, including an air survey of radioactive substances from a Self-Defense Forces’ training plane, have also shown no unusual data.

Says Yonhap:

No signs of unusual radiation levels have been detected in South Korea after North Korea said it successfully detonated a nuclear device, the government said Thursday.

The Ministry of Science and Technology said none of the government’s 38 manned and unmanned monitoring centers had picked up any spikes in natural radiation from Monday noon to Thursday morning. The usual levels of radiation in South Korea are 10-20 Micro-Roentgen (mR).

I was at an event this morning where Michael Swaine raised the question of identifying North Korean uranium in the event that it were used in an attack by another state or terrorist organization.

This subject has come up a fair amount lately, it seems. Yesterday, both “David Ignatius”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/10/AR2006101001282.html and “William Perry”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/10/AR2006101001285.html mentioned it in the _WP_. Perry wrote:

… the greatest danger to the United States from this program is not that North Korea would be willing to commit suicide by firing a missile at the United States, even if it did develop one of sufficient range. Rather, it is the possibility that the North Koreans will sell one of the bombs or some of their plutonium to a terrorist group…If a warning is to have a chance of influencing North Korea’s behavior it has to be much more specific. It would have to promise retaliation against North Korea if a terrorist detonated a nuclear bomb in one of our cities. It must be backed by a meaningful forensics program that can identify the source of a nuclear bomb.

Personally, I am less worried that North Korea actually will transfer a nuclear weapon or fissile material, though I wouldn’t rule it out entirely.

Anyway, I thought I’d take this opportunity to flog a “new _ACT_ article”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_10/CVRForensics.asp from William Dunlop and Harold Smith called “Who Did It? Using International Forensics to Detect and Deter Nuclear Terrorism.”

The piece includes a useful “sidebar”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_10/CVRForensics.asp#Sidebar1 about nuclear forensics. Here are excerpts:

In the event of a nuclear explosion, radiochemists would seek to obtain minute quantities of debris from the nuclear device near ground zero and/or in the atmosphere. They would first separate the atoms into groups of chemically similar elements and then measure the radioactivity of each group. To do so, scientists often employ gamma-ray spectroscopy to measure the time of emission and the energy of each detectable gamma ray, electromagnetic radiation produced by radioactive decay.

The energy of the detected gamma ray is unique to each isotope of a specific element, thereby indicating its presence in the debris. Furthermore, the rate at which that isotope emits its signature gamma ray decays in time according to its unique half-life, thereby providing a second identifier of the isotope. By knowing the chemistry of elements that have been separated, the energy of the gamma rays of any radioactive atoms in that chemical group, and the rate at which the emission of the gamma rays at each particular energy level decays over time, scientists can obtain an accurate measurement of many of the isotopes of the chemical elements in the debris. Because there is always experimental uncertainty, particularly with small samples, all three processes (separation, energy measurement, and time dependence) may be used.

According to the authors “[t]hree types of atoms are of particular interest in a forensic analysis:”

* Atoms of fissile material that did not undergo fission. Examining them allows scientists to identify the material used to make the device and, when compared to the number of fission fragments, to measure the efficiency or sophistication of the weapon.

* New atoms created by fission and by other nuclear reactions within the fissile material. When scientists compare these, they can obtain considerable insight into the nuclear processes that were involved during the actual explosion.

* Atoms of material near the fissioning core that were subjected to an intense bombardment of neutrons during the explosion and became radioactive as a consequence. These atoms provide insight into the components of the weapon and the energy of the neutrons that activated the components.

Back to work, nerds. My break is over too…