Author Archives: kerr

Dead-Horse Flogging, Department of

US Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation Chris Ford:

bq. There have been more PSI successes than one can discuss publicly, but we should remember that *it was a PSI interdiction, of a shipment of illicit centrifuge equipment bound for Libya in October 2003 that began the unraveling of the dangerous and infamous A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network and helped catalyze Libya’s decision two months later to renounce the pursuit of WMD* and dismantle its WMD programs.

“Bzzzt:”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_07-08/Interdiction_Misrepresented.asp

John Wolf, who served as assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation from 2001 to 2004, told _Arms Control Today_ May 25 that the BBC China operation was “separate” from PSI. He said the incident stemmed from previous efforts to track and uncover the Khan network.

A foreign official familiar with the operation corroborated Wolf’s version of the event. “The BBC China operation was carried out in the spirit of PSI, but it was not a PSI operation,” the official informed _Arms Control Today_ May 31.

Previous dead-horse abuse “here.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1385/nyt-on-bob-j

Insert dolphin-flogging joke here.

North Korean HEU: Bad Decisions

I was re-reading a Nelson Report from a few weeks back and noticed a interesting tale related to US intelligence RE: North Korea’s HEU program. Chris gave me permission to print the following paragraphs:

… directly involved players in 2002 have told us that despite the strong public face presented to both N. Korea and the Congress, there was a bitter inter-agency fight over how to interpret the intelligence on all DPRK nuclear activity, but especially over the HEU situation. And we quoted one of these sources as saying he personally witnessed the intervention of then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to produce a formal assessment on the hard-line extreme of the interpretive spectrum.

Yes, you would be correct to recall a similar phenomenon, and player, in the Iraq WMD fiasco.

Commenting privately today, a concerned observer, then and now, said “the [HEU] evidence was very ambiguous. Wolfowitz took it and ran with it as hard as he could, and the upshot was that we shut down everything we planned to do with the DPRK. It was after that [Jan., 2003] they threw out the IAEA and began [what became] the run-up to the bomb test [last fall].”

This story struck me because I recently “wrote about”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_04/NewsAnalysis.asp decisions that stemmed from worst-casing the HEU intelligence:

Even as U.S. confidence about the suspected [HEU] program has decreased, policy decisions based on those judgments have continued to reverberate.

*[snip]*

The belief that North Korea may have constructed an enrichment plant also apparently influenced at least some Bush administration policy decisions. A former State Department official said in a March 21 interview that some U.S. officials were “intent on making policy” based on the worst-case assumption that Pyongyang had an enrichment facility. For example, some State Department officials forcefully advocated an extremely intrusive verification scheme that would allow the United States to search for a possible North Korean enrichment facility. Several former U.S. officials have told Arms Control Today that such a plan would have been unacceptable to Pyongyang.

Former State Department Korea director David Straub, however, argued in a March 25 interview that some Bush administration officials were “intent on making policy toward North Korea based on worst-case scenarios about everything,” regardless of the enrichment issue. The entire department supported a “very intrusive inspection system, although some even more so,” he added.

The _ACT_ article also has some relevant information about the HEU program, if anyone’s interested. My last post on the subject can be found “here.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1368/cia-and-heu-nork-edition

Happy Friday.

Nuclear Terrorism and Probability

Jeffrey has a good “post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1464/more-nuclear-terrorism about the “Allison/Levi exchange on CFR.org”:http://www.cfr.org/publication/13097/ abut nuclear terrorism. He correctly points out that the debate should be “about a particular policy that might be controversial—say, domestic nuclear detection efforts.”

I’ve always thought that, from a policy perspective, the risk of nuclear terrorism does not make much difference – we should do things like fissile material control, threat reduction, and counter-terrorism anyway. The exception may be for things like nuclear detection programs.

Jeffrey (and Matt Bunn) point out that

probabilistic models [of a nuclear terrorist attack] are only useful to identify the optimal allocation of resources in deterring, preventing and responding to nuclear terrorist attacks. As Matt Bunn said in the comments on an earlier post:

… a systematic approach helps in focusing the discussion, identifying areas of disagreement, identifying areas where additional information would reduce the range of uncertainty, and, yes, offering an at least somewhat more focused approach to assessing which policy options might be most important.

My point is that the universe of policy options to which the actual probability of a terrorist attack is relevant seems to me to be pretty small.

Iran Has More Centrifuges

According to “this _AP_ story,”:http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-Nuclear-Iran.html

bq. Iran has started enriching small amounts of uranium gas at its underground nuclear plant and is running *more than 1,300 of the centrifuges* used in the process.

The report cites an 18 April letter to Iranian officials from IAEA DDG Olli Heinonen which says that “Iran has provided information to the agency that it has put into operation *1,312 centrifuges.”*

I can’t provide details, but the 1312 number is consistent with some information that I received a couple of weeks ago.

In addition,

bq. the letter also cites Iranian information to the agency that *”some UF6 is being fed’*’ into the centrifuges at the underground Natanz facility, referring to the uranium gas that can be enriched to levels potent enough to be used for nuclear arms.

I must point out that the story wrongly says that “Last week, Iran said it had begun operating 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz.”

“Bzzzzt.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1403/iran-still-does-not-have-3000-centrifuges

*Update:*

“Reuters”:http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL1870149120070418?feedType=RSS and “AFP”:http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070418/wl_mideast_afp/irannuclearpolitics_070418182439;_ylt=AinlHTfubaXBPE5tcrqcLfZSw60A have the story too. According to Heinonen’s letter, IAEA inspectors found that Iran has 8 cascades running.

*Later Update:*

ISIS has a “copy”:http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEAreport18April2007.pdf of the letter.

Papal Proliferation

I know at least one other person will be amused by this. A former co-worker of mine at CSIS (no, not Jeffrey) used to warn us about “Papal Prolif” as a potential nuclear threat.

Anyway, according to “this letter”:http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc187m1.pdf, the Holy See has amended its IAEA small quantities protocol.

Read more about the SQP “here”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-IAEALoophole.asp and “here.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_07-08/IAEASafeguards.asp

BDA Documents

McClatchey has a “bunch of them”:http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/17090786.htm for you BDA junkies.

The “article”:http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/17090786.htm also notes something that I don’t recall hearing before….that the US may have cracked down on the bank because it was helping North Korea sell gold.

*Update:*

Jane “has more.”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1466/show-me-the-money

Iran’s Centrifuge Work

Some people are not going to be happy about this.

In the interview I cited in “this post,”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1403/iran-still-does-not-have-3000-centrifuges Gholamreza Aqazadeh indicated that Iran is still working on new types of centrifuges and intends to build new uranium conversion facilities.

Iran has made similar centrifuge comments “in the past,”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_05/iransecuritycouncil.asp but I think this interview [full text in comments] provides a glance at Iran’s current R&D efforts.

Here’s the relevant portion:

[Anchorman] Mr Aqazadeh, how many thousand centrifuges is needed to produce the fuel for a 1,000 megawatts power plant? Does it need to be four thousand centrifuges or three thousand is enough?

[Aqazadeh] It depends on the type of the machine. I mean there are some old generation machines which require more. Because the amount of fuel it produces is low. Imagine if we inject 80 grams of UF6 in a chain to achieve five per cent enrichment we would get one eighth or one tenth of this amount. And in order to get the required fuel we would have to increase the number of chains. *If the new generation machines, especially those which are Kevlar [as heard] and are of synthetic material and the world are relying on them, suddenly you see that the same machines can provide fuel for three or four power plants instead of one. It means that both their intake and output are great. Therefore this is an industry that we need to keep ourselves upgraded through research. We should work on new generations, technologies. I can tell our people that we have passed the stage of complete mastery over designing the machines.*

*[snip]*

[Aqazadeh] As I already said this depends on the type of machines we use. *With the present generation of machines we can produce one-fifth of the needed fuel.* I cannot exactly give you the answer, but if we know what type of machines we are talking about, then I can give you an answer.

*There are machines on which we are working. If we develop the appropriate machines, because of their great capabilities, we will quickly be in need of far less number of machines. We are considering a 20 year perspective. In view of the rapid development of new generation of machines in Iran, we may be able to say in the near future that we have achieved the capability to produce a generation of equipment that need far less number of machines.* Based on our developed capabilities, we would then be able to speak more seriously about the 1,200 tons of fuel and that how much of it can be produced within the country.

Presumably, the “synthetic material” refers to the P-2 centrifuge (or something similar), “the rotor of which is made of carbon fiber.”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1386/pimp-my-cascade

The increased SWU capacity of the new centrifuges that Aqazadeh hints at also suggests that he’s talking about P-2’s (and probably more-advanced centrifuges as well).

Mark Fitzpatrick drew a similar conclusion “in _Survival_”:http://www.world-nuclear.org/reference/pdf/fitzpatrick.pdf from President Ahmadinejad’s April 2006 claim that Iran was working on improved centrifuges ” ‘that would quadruple Iran’s enrichment power.’ ” Fitzpatrick noted that the “German-origin P-2 centrifuges…are rated at 5 SWU,” which is considerably “more than”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1032/collected-thoughts-on-iranian-leu Iran’s P-1.

Anyhow, stop reading blogs and watch “this instead.”:http://www.kickedinthenuts.com/index.asp

Industrial Music, Iran Style

It’s probably not in the same league as anything on ” _Mind: The Perpetual Intercourse_”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind:_The_Perpetual_Intercourse, but the other day Iranian Esfahan provincial television broadcast “Nuclear Know-How,” which it described as Iran’s “nuclear song.” The song celebrates “Tehran’s purported ability”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1403/iran-still-does-not-have-3000-centrifuges to enrich uranium on an industrial scale.

p{float: right; margin-left: 10px}. !/images/11.jpg!

Here’s the description of the song (and accompanying video) from the broadcast:

A caption was shown at the beginning of the song…saying that the song was presented to “young scientists” working on the country’s nuclear technology.

The song is cut to pictures showing Iranian nuclear scientists at work. Video shows inside shots of a nuclear facility, scientists dressed in white working with various types of equipment, looking at video screens, large demonstrations in streets of the capital Tehran, demonstrators waving pictures of the spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, more inside and outside shots of nuclear facilities and a group of demonstrators pulling an American and an Israeli flag tied together on the ground.

*Some of the words of the song are: “O Iran, O proud Iran, the most capable Iran, your name at the peak of glory. Your scientists have reached new horizons, nuclear know-how, nuclear know-how.”*

At the end of the song a caption shows the following words attributed to Ayatollah Khamene’i: “Nuclear technology and nuclear fuel cycle are the inalienable right of the Iranian nation”.

I’m disappointed that “Nuclear Assault”:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Handle_with_Care_(Nuclear_Assault_album didn’t do this song back in the day. In any case, download it to your iPod, along with “this track”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1331/greatest-song-title-ever from the North Koreans.

Iran Still Does Not Have 3,000 Centrifuges

Shocking, I know.

Asked about “Iran’s annoucement”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1400/more-on-iran-and-centrifuges that it was beginning “industrial-scale” production of enriched uranium, IAEA DG Mohamed ElBaradei, according “to Reuters,”:http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL1238351120070412 told reporters that

bq. There are various definitions of industrial scale production. Iran is still at the starting stage of creating a uranium enrichment plant.

More precisely, he said that Iran still only has “hundreds” of centrifuges.

If you don’t wanna take ElBaradei’s word for it, check out what AEOI head Gholamreza Aqazadeh said a few days ago. Asked during an Iranian TV broadcast whether Iran has actually installed 3,000 centrifuges in the Natanz facility, he seemed to say “no.”

Here’s the relevant portion of the interview:

During my comments [earlier in the day about Iran’s centrifuge advances] *I didn’t give a number on purpose and for a number of reasons. The most important reason is that I was worried that if mention was made of the number of centrifuges, some ambiguities would arise regarding whether we planned to only install 3000 centrifuges or more.* This is whilst we have invested and made plans to install 50,000 centrifuges in Natanz. The infrastructure which has been built and all the equipment such as the ventilation, electricity and air conditioning systems, and all the logistical equipment which is needed for this industry, have been built to cover 50000 centrifuges.

He also elaborated on what Iran means by “industrial-stage.” As far as I can tell, the term means that Iran is proceeding with plans to install 50K+ centrifuges. That was, of course, already Tehran’s declared policy.

Aqazadeh said:

*When we announce that we have entered the industrial stage, there are no limitations. I didn’t want this fact to be used as a pretext to say that Iran has now installed 3000 centrifuges and that’s it. No, it’s the opposite. When we enter the industrial stage the installation of equipment continues permanently until the stage where all the 50000 centrifuges are installed.* As a result, I thought that this issue may be misused especially by foreign media and make them think that with the installation of these 3000 centrifuges, Iran’s nuclear case will be closed. This was the main reason why I didn’t mention a number in my speech and talked about entering the industrial stage. The reality is that we have all the necessary infrastructure for the development and completion of the whole programme and God willing, we will continue it.

This “pretext” argument makes no sense to me. I think another quote confirms that Tehran’s announcement was more diplomatic than technical:

[The West] can see that Iran is following this path in a fast pace and with steadfastness. Time is not against us and they can see that clearly. This is why they are issuing resolutions one after another and putting us under pressure to halt this trend and dissuade us. I think stopping this move is a very difficult task.

What happened today in Natanz is an undeniable reality. One cannot deny all these facilities, equipment, installations and production machines; therefore this is a reality. I think *the world should change its literature. After all, it is in their own interest to deal with Iran through interaction, dialogue and confidence-building rather than exerting pressure.*

Get back to work.

T Blankley Kan’t Reed

Or maybe he just gets paid to write crap. Evidence “here.”:http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/04/irans_nuke_program_advances.html

I commend “this post”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1457/iran-enriching-on-industrial-scale and “this post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1400/more-on-iran-and-centrifuges to him.

[Apologies “to Atrios.”:http://atrios.blogspot.com/2006_05_07_atrios_archive.html#114705830668276581 ]