An anonymous FoKerr sent this to me a little while back. S/he is, I hope, forgiving.

A handful of reactions.

The overall conclusions are plausible in light of the public record of events.

Unfortunately, the conclusions are confusingly stated at some points, and seem bound to mislead the casual reader. It is not as apparent as it ought to be that the major elements of Iran’s clandestine military nuclear program are identical to those of its overt civilian nuclear program. Nor were they willingly surfaced; they were “taken public” as a way of sustaining them only after others had made them public.

Skeptics can be forgiven for observing that the IC has just moved from one “high confidence” conclusion to another “high confidence”
conclusion opposed to the first, without explaining clearly what went amiss the first time, or why we readers should now have high
confidence ourselves. Despite some clear efforts at change in recent years, the IC appears (to this outsider, at least) to face cultural and methodological problems in the handling of confidence and uncertainty that threaten both the clarity and credibility of
important products. But, with the caveats given above, that does not necessarily make the broad conclusions of the document wrong.

The conclusions of the NIE have been embraced by many whom you’d think wouldn’t be so eager to credit the administration with a success (albeit one recognized only belatedly), let alone with having read Iranian intentions correctly at the time of the “Axis of Evil” speech. This reaction appears motivated by excessive fears of imminent armed conflict, influenced by an Iraq analogy. In practice, the main lines of U.S. policy on Iran actually have been to pursue a combination of broadly multilateral, unilateral, and “coalition” sanctions, while making an occasional show of force to reassure skittish allies.

It is very difficult for the IC to reverse itself on such sensitive
issues, so respect is due to those who did so regardless.

Nevertheless, by virtue of its subject matter, the NIE is a policy
statement as much as anything else. Its conclusions were such that it would have leaked had it not first been released. And its release has thrown a spanner into the works of the diplomatic process. By intention or by accident, the IC has asserted itself as an autonomous actor in the U.S. policy community, akin to the Federal Reserve Bank.

This NIE was ordered up by Congress in the last defense budget bill. The 2005 version — apparently a “memo to holders” (i.e., a partial update, not a full-blown NIE) — appears to have been initiated by the IC leadership itself. The administration seems never to have regarded the IC as a useful tool, and has effectively conceded its management to others. That may explain, in part, how we have come to the present circumstances.

A few days ago, James Schlesinger had a “piece”:http://opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110011011 in the _WSJ_ about the Iran NIE. I particularly liked this part:

Exclusive reliance on hard evidence not infrequently results in deliberately blinding oneself to the most obvious explanation of what has occurred. The classic example of this failing occurred during the Vietnam War, when intelligence analysts stubbornly refused to accept that enemy supplies were pouring through Sihanoukville ostensibly on the grounds that there was no hard evidence. (Actually, there was an agent’s report that revealed the activity, but it was dismissed as insufficient.) Intelligence based on hard evidence requires supplementation by other forms of intelligence.

“Failures of imagination,” to which the 9-11 Commission referred, can come in a variety of modes.

Personally, I can’t think of anything bad that could happen from the IC engaging in speculation about another country’s nuclear program.

My babbling aside, _ACT_ editor Miles Pomper composed a more thoughtful response, which you can read below. I plan to feature more of Miles’ work in the near future.

I agree with much of the thrust of what James Schlesinger wrote in his column (“Stupid Intelligence on Iran,” Dec. 19). The recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear programs—and even more so the press coverage of that assessment— did not give sufficient weight to the danger posed by Iran’s uranium enrichment program (nor its missile programs I would add) in its narrow emphasis on an apparent 2003 halt in Iran’s weaponization activities.

However, Secretary Schlesinger is inaccurate and misleading in his analysis of the factors that may have led to Iran’s 2003 decision.

First of all, it is highly unlikely that Col. Moammar Gadhafi’s decision to abandon Libya’s nuclear program would have affected a 2003 Iranian decision to halt weaponization activities. The Libyan decision was not announced until late December 2003. Even less credible is the possibility that Iran’s decision could have been affected by the exposure of A.Q. Khan’s nuclear technology network and his subsequent confession. After all, Khan’s confession occurred in February 2004.

At the same time, Schlesinger ignores a crucial factor that likely proved more important to the 2003 Iranian decision—international inspections of Iran’s previously secret enrichment facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had been informed of Iran’s fuel cycle intentions in September 2002 and their existence was first publicly disclosed by a U.S. non-governmental organization in December 2002. IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaredei first toured those facilities in February 2003 and the subsequent agency inspections led to a torrent of damaging disclosures about Iran’s program and to Iran’s reluctant agreement to grant the agency the power to conduct broader inspections beyond declared nuclear facilities.

Under these circumstances, it would have been surprising if Iran had not taken steps to hide its nuclear weapons activities most uniquely suited to weapons production. After all, discovering such activities—unlike the continuation of the dual-use enrichment program—would have represented a clear and unambiguous violation of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and required a swift referral to the UN Security Council.

Therefore, rather than attributing the Iranian decision solely to “the successes of American policy and arms” during that period, Schlesinger might have considered giving at least some credit to the international agency that may, in fact, have been more influential.

At first glance, it looks as if the time frame for Iran to build a nuclear weapon in the new NIE is the same as the one in the 2005 NIE. But I think the new estimate might actually suggest that the time frame is slightly longer.

One the last page of the “current NIE,”:http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf there’s a chart comparing the two estimates. The last row discusses the date by when Tehran could produce enough HEU for a nuke. On this point, the two estimates are essentially the same. The 2005 NIE says that Iran could do it “by the end of this decade”; the 2007 NIE says that “the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon is late 2009.”

But the row above that is more interesting. It shows that, according to the 2005 NIE, the IC judged it “unlikely” that Iran would “make a *nuclear weapon*… before early-to-mid next decade.” The corresponding box for the 2007 NIE, however, says that “the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of *producing enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a weapon* is late 2009…”.

After noting that this date is “very unlikely,” the chart explains that

bq. We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon
*sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame. (INR judges that Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.)*

That row is the only one that talks about weaponization. And only for the 2005 NIE. As we all know, there’s a distinction between these two things.

It’s a bit hard to compare these two estimates, but it _looks like_ the new one is positing a slightly longer time frame to a weapon than the previous estimate – it’s now early-to-mid next decade for Iran to acquire enough HEU for a weapon, as opposed to developing the actual weapon.

In addition to the lack of a weaponization date in the 2007 NIE, it’s hard to compare the two estimates because the 2005 NIE doesn’t compare the likelihood of different timeframes for weapons development. It’s possible that the 2005 estimate was a worst-case scenario and the time by which Tehran was _likely_ to have a nuke was later.

p=. *Covert Enrichment*

In any case, we should pay attention to the fact that the 2007 NIE is assessing the dates by which Iran could be capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon. However, the NIE says that

bq. We assess with moderate confidence that *Iran probably would use covert facilities*— rather than its declared nuclear sites—*for the production of highly enriched uranium for a weapon.*

I agree with this assessment…I find the notion that Iran would pull out of the NPT to be very unlikely, though I wouldn’t rule it out. If Tehran were to go this route, it would (for obvious reasons) take considerably more time to produce the relevant fissile material.

In other news, I was remiss before in failing to point out that Carah Ong has several good posts on the issue at “her place.”:http://irannuclearwatch.blogspot.com/

It’s never the evidence, is it?

bq. Bolton: Well, I think it’s potentially wrong, but I would also say, *many of the people who wrote this are former State Dept employees who during their career at the State Dept never gave much attention to the threat of the Iranian program. Now they are writing as (fingers quote) ‘members of the intelligence community’ the same opinions that they’ve had four and five years ago.*

Five years ago was 2002. But, you know, details…

[via “C&L”:http://www.crooksandliars.com/2007/12/04/bolton-not-swayed-in-the-slightest-by-the-nie-on-iran/ ]

As you all know, the “public version of the Iran NIE”:http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf came out yesterday. PDDNI Kerr’s statement is “here.”:http://dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_statement.pdf You can read S Hadley’s statement “here”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071203-5.html and a transcript of his press briefing yesterday “here.”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071203-10.html

Kerr explained that the NIE was made public because

bq. The Intelligence Community is on the record publicly with numerous statements based on our 2005 assessment on Iran. Since our understanding of Iran’s capabilities has changed, we felt it was important to release this information to ensure that an accurate presentation is available.

I wish they’d now declassify the 2005 NIE. And more than 4 pages of this one, for that matter. Especially because it covers a bunch of topics in which I am interested:

This Estimate focuses on the following key questions:

• What are Iran’s intentions toward developing nuclear weapons?

• What domestic factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?

• What external factors affect Iran’s decisionmaking on whether to develop nuclear weapons?

• What is the range of potential Iranian actions concerning the development of nuclear weapons, and the decisive factors that would lead Iran to choose one course of action over
another?

• What is Iran’s current and projected capability to develop nuclear weapons? What are our key assumptions, and Iran’s key chokepoints/vulnerabilities?

Anyway, the below part of the NIE has received the most attention:

bq. *We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program;* we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that *the halt,* and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, *was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.*

I actually made this same argument about a year ago in a “BAS article.”:http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/747720r27638k367/fulltext.pdf I also argued that

bq. …the very fact that Iran has previously offered several concessions, as well as curtailed some nuclear activities, should signal to the international community that Tehran has not necessarily committed itself to building nuclear weapons — and that there are those within the regime who are reluctant to risk political and economic isolation.

Nyah-nyah.

But it wasn’t just me…people like the “_ACW_”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1722/ic-iran-stopped-nuke-program-in-fall-2003 and “G Perkovich”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19747&prog=zgp&proj=zme,znpp also told you so.

I’ll have a bit more to say about the NIE, but I wanted to get this info up and be obnoxious.

Lastly, I apologize to my 5 or so readers for how ass-tacular this blog has been in recent months. I assure you that my time has been -utterly wasted- well-spent on other stuff.