You can find it “here”:http://www.dni.gov/interviews/20080424_interview.pdf or “download”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/file_download/12 it.
ODNI Briefing on Syria
Leave a reply
Author Archives: kerr
IAEA Official Questions Syria Reactor Video
That’s what it looks like in “this AFP”:http://www.spacewar.com/2006/080426131406.jym0g8it.html story.
I had thought of most of the official’s arguments, but this one jumped out at me:
A *nuclear physicist close to the United Nations atomic watchdog* cast doubt Saturday on the veracity of US intelligence which claimed that Syria had been building a secret atomic reactor.
“When you look at the (US intelligence services) pictures, they show only raw construction,” an expert close to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) told AFP on condition on anonymity.
*”It was just the shell of a site, and the walls did not look like the ones needed for a plutonium reactor.”*
*Walls of a plutonium reactor “need a lot of piping, there was nothing like that on the pictures,”* he added.
Still trying to wrap my head around this, in between doing other things.
Deep Thought On The NonPro Community
I think a list of people in the community who have not been associated with ACA, Monterey, or CSIS would be pretty short.
Syria Reactor Video
Well.
The BBC has “posted”:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/7366235.stm what looks to be the CIA video briefing about the Syrian nuclear reactor that, as the briefing puts it (with an artful use of the passive voice), “was destroyed in September 2007.” We would, by the way, have an easier way of confirming the CIA’s information about the structure had the unnamed entity not blown it up.
It looks persuasive, but I need to think about it some more. I will note that the video says nothing about a reprocessing facility, without which the Pu contained in the spent fuel means dick.
For its part, the IAEA is a “bit annoyed”:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7366868.stm. ElBaradei
says the US gave his organisation its evidence about the Syrian reactor only on the same day that it briefed legislators on Capitol Hill.
A statement from the IAEA says that Dr ElBaradei “deplores the fact that this information was not provided to the agency in a timely manner”. It is now going to investigate further.
USG Sochi Non-Paper
I thought I’d mention that “NPEC”:http://www.npec-web.org released full text of a non-paper titled “_International Finance and Investment for Nuclear Power Projects in Developing Countries: Implementation of the U.S.-Russia Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation_,” (“available here”:http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=00000000-NonPaper-IntlFinanceInvestment&PDFFolder=Essays) which was apparently circulated by U.S. officials at the Bush-Putin Sochi meeting in April. The non-paper, which is undated, but seems to have been written between July 2007 and February 2008, makes for quite an interesting read.
Full text of the July 2007 _U.S.-Russia Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation: Joint Actions_ is “available here”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070703.html. Since we are on the subject, I should note that I found the text of the Sochi “Strategic Framework Declaration”:http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/print/20080406-4.html quite positive in the sense that the White House promised to “work to bring into force” the U.S.-Russian bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. We’ll just have to wait and see…
T Friedman Gets Pied
bq. Not everyone agrees with Friedman’s vision that innovation is the path to climate and energy salvation. *Just seconds into his speech, he was interrupted by two environmental activists, who stormed the stage shortly after Friedman stepped up to the microphone, tossing two paper plates loaded with shamrock-colored whipped cream at him.*
[“ProJo”:http://www.projo.com/news/content/friedman_speaks_04-23-08_QN9SH59_v17.373f992.html via “HuffPo”:http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/04/23/thomas-friedman-gets-a-pi_n_98209.html and “Eschaton.”:http://www.eschatonblog.com/2008_04_20_archive.html#2357868869623561126 ]
The students didn’t pie him for the past column on nonproliferation that I mocked “a while back”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/601/youre-out-of-your-element-tommy. So I feel duty-bound to point it out again. I will reiterate that
bq. People who know about proliferation would not write that “the solution [to proliferation] is so ridiculously obvious there isn’t much to say.”
P Scoblic on Able Archer 83
I’m a bit more than half way through Peter Scoblic’s excellent new book, “_U.S. Vs. Them: How A Half Century of Conservatism Has Undermined America’s Security._ “:http://www.powells.com/biblio/1-9780670018826-2 You should read it. Seriously. All of you.
Peter has a way with words. For instance, he describes (accurately, I imagine) the 1983 “NATO Able Archer”:https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/a-cold-war-conundrum/source.htm#HEADING1-13 exercise as “bowel loosening.”
Spencer Ackerman, who, like me, had Peter as an editor, highlights “another metaphor.”:http://thinkprogress.org/attackerman/tag/not-everything-about-tnr-blows/
Happy Tuesday.
Indian Nuclear Test: 1994 Edition
Wow. K Santhanam, the former director of India’s Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses who played what C Ferguson “called”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/Ferguson.asp a “leadership role” during New Delhi’s 1998 nuclear weapons tests, told “Times Now”:http://timesnow.tv/NewsDtls.aspx?NewsID=6911 television that India canceled a 1994 nuclear test at the last minute.
Interesting topics include: New Delhi’s perception of other nuclear threats at the time, steps that India took to conceal test preparations, and domestic political considerations.
The full text of the interview, broadcast April 1, is below, with relevant portions in bold.
Srinjoy: Why compelled India to think of testing a nuclear bomb in 1994?
Santhanam: First of all you had *the clandestine programme of Pakistan; there was an increasing evidence of collaboration, co-operation, collusion between China and Pakistan, in nuclear weaponry. Specifically the trigger development which technology the Chinese had.* Secondly, other international factors came into play. You may remember The Glen and Symington amendments under which economic and military aid to Pakistan was stopped because of Pakistan’s Nuclear programme despite having certified.
For a variety of reasons we have lived with a nuke China, would it be possible for India to live with a nuke Pakistan, with a history of conflicts? So, the matter was analysed by a special group of experts, drawn from various disciplines as to what exactly should be done and the committee submitted its report to the then PM Narsimha Rao. *This was the build up, so obviously the direction was step by step be prepared to consider conducting tests and exercising the nuke option.*
Srinjoy: What went into the preparation for the test?
Santhanam: *There were two shafts in Pokhran dug during 1981-82 and they had been sealed because no further work was likely to occur. These two shafts were reactivated, we had to blow out the concrete lid and then pump out all the water, do all the repair work.* Brilliant job was done by the engineer in adverse circumstances.
Since we had a lull, so to say, *after December 1994 we came across abandoned wells in the area, the villagers had left because there was no water, deep enough wells, we could use them without inviting attention of digging a new one which the satellites would pick up. So these three wells in an area called Navtala, where identified, they were repaired, then made suitable to receive the device.*
Srinjoy: About the 1994 situation *how were they detected by the Americans*, what led to their detection?
Santhanam: *One must be aware that the resolution of the cameras, whether it is the US satellite or the Russian satellites these days is such that they can easily detect, especially in daylight,* night time the resolution is always poor. The phrase is change detection.
Srinjoy: So what happened after the detection what made the government back off?
Santhanam: Let me say the decision to conduct a test is ultimately political. We must acknowledge that fact because the technical factor is only one factor, amongst a host of other elements leading to a decision making at the highest level.
Srinjoy: How did it happen…*did the White house call? How does it actually happen on the ground?*
Santhanam: *It involves the White house; it involves the US embassy in Delhi. It also involves the Indian government and our embassy in Washington. It’s a tight dance.*
Srinjoy: What happened after that?
Santhanam: We were quite clear that *if work is resumed at these sites there is likely to be detection by satellites.* We were clear this would be detected and it was detected by the US satellite and they had conveyed their concerns to New Delhi. This was as you approach the end of 1994. There was another internal development that of parliamentary elections. *The concern was that if you conduct the test in November-December. It could be construed as a way of influencing the results of the elections* by saying that we are a firm government, we know how to attend to our national security needs, but the timing would have invited a lot of criticism. *The consensus was that ‘let’s hold’. After it is over we will revisit the case.*
Interestingly, Bhubnesh Chaturvedi, former Minister of State in the Prime Minister’s Office confirmed that India canceled the tests because of the elections:
bq. We had the capacity to do it, but we did not do it, because the elections were near. We did not want the successive government to bear the brunt. If the government would have continued in power, we could have done it.
A transcript of the interview is “here”:http://timesnow.tv/NewsDtls.aspx?NewsID=6911. You can download a copy “here.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/file_download/11
Wanna Work at Bushehr? Now You Can!
“Atomstroyexport”:http://www.atomstroyexport.com/ has listed *two job vacancies in Iran*, one of them is on site at the Bushehr NPP (the actual listings are in Russian, sorry).
The “first listing”:http://www.atomstroyexport.ru/actual/?id=355 is for an *English-language translator*, apparently to be based in Tehran. In order to be considered, one must be a *male, under 45 years of age*, computer-literate, with advanced translation and interpretation education and experience. For the digs at the Bushehr NPP, Atomstroyexport is “seeking”:http://www.atomstroyexport.ru/actual/?id=285 a *procurement engineer*, who must also be a *male, under 50*, computer-literate, with advanced technical education, and experience of working at an NPP (particularly with cooling and ventilation equipment).
I won’t comment on my personal eligibility aside from admitting that (among other things) my lack of experience with cooling and ventilation equipment disqualifies me from applying. I’ll also note that a Moscow-based translation/interpretation position at Atomstroyexport “calls for”:http://www.atomstroyexport.ru/actual/?id=260 both male and female applicants, sets no age requirements, AND offers medical insurance unlike the position in Tehran. Nevertheless, here is the *contact info* (in English) for “Atomstroyexport’s offices in Iran”:http://www.atomstroyexport.com/about/Countries%20of%20presence/.
*Update:* Maybe Atomstroyexport needs to hire some “export control”:http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKHAF33311920080423 experts too.
New McIntosh and Storey Title Page
The authors of “_Between Acquisition and Use: Examining the Improbability of Nuclear Terrorism_”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/file_download/3 gave me a new title page, complete with their contact info, a while back and I have neglected to post it. “Here it is.”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/file_download/10