Yesterday, the Department of State and the Russian MID released a statement titled “*One Year of _Progress_ Following the Joint Declaration on Nuclear Energy and Nonproliferation*.” (“MID text”:http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/8bcdc2f2210a1b74c325747c00325247?OpenDocument)
See link to the 2007 joint declaration in an “earlier post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1614/usg-sochi-non-paper.

Progress indeed. Timing to release the statement before the long holiday weekend seems to speak volumes. (Ok, I know, it’s G8 time.) But this is still nice:

bq. “U.S. Special Envoy for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Ambassador “Jackie Wolcott”:http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/27684.htm, and Russian Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov are working in tandem, and in partnership with others, to advance the objectives of the Joint Declaration.”

Oh yeah, I should also note that the “State version”:http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/07/106502.htm has the phrase *”peaceful uses”* underlined in this sentence:

bq. “…U.S. and Russia are prepared to cooperate, together with others, in making the benefits of *peaceful uses* of nuclear energy available to a wide range of interested states, and developing countries in particular.”

_I wonder what “interested states” they have in mind._

Just in time for the long weekend, here is the “*2007 Euratom Supply Agency Annual Report*”:http://ec.europa.eu/euratom/ar/last.pdf. I won’t pretend that I am very knowledgeable about the EU, but here are some points that caught my eye:

1. For the first time in many years, *Canada’s leading position in 2007 as a supplier of natural uranium to EU utilities was overtaken by Russia*, according to the declarations received from utilities.

2. *Natural uranium of Russian origin amounted to almost 5 144 tU*. Like explained in the previous reports, this last figure can be unreliable and would need more detailed analysis, as it would represent much more than Russia’s total production of natural uranium (3 381 tU according to the “Red Book”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1631/geek-check-part-deux).

3. *In the market for VVER fuel, the Russian supplier TVEL has now re-established a dominant position, which means in fact nearly 100 % market share.* (_The report later notes that “there is concern about the possible lack of alternative suppliers for VVER reactors in the future.”_)

4. *Deliveries of Russian separative work to EU utilities under purchasing contracts amounted to some 4528 tSWU which means a significant increase of some 1 500 tSWU (50% over 2006) and represents thus almost 31 % of the total enrichment services* supplied to EU utilities.

5. *Direct purchases from Kazakhstan have remained relatively low considering the production level and future potential of this country*. It is however expected that the amount of uranium from Kazakhstan will increase in coming years with the operation of various joint ventures.

According to a neat pie chart on pg. 22, *Russia supplied 24.65 % of U to EU utilities in 2007* (followed by Canada, Niger, and Australia). There is a nifty table in Annex 1 of the report that details Russian/CIS U supplies to the EU too.

If you want a quick fix of the report, check out this “WNN writeup”:http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/ENF-European_utilities_building_up_uranium_inventories-0307088.html.

“This ISNA headline”:http://www.isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1155535&Lang=E makes the joke for me…

bq. Iran to Declare View on Package After Precise Examination: Aghazadeh

You got excited by IAEA DG ElBaradei’s “announcement earlier this month”:http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2008/ebsp2008n005.html that he will be issuing another report about Libya. Or you blogged about it.

ElBaradei told the IAEA BoG that

bq. Libya has recently provided additional information about the timeline of some of its past undeclared activities, which has helped the Agency gain a full picture of Libya´s past and present nuclear programme and will enable the Agency to resume verification in Libya on a routine basis.

Should be interesting. I wonder if it’s more Khan network stuff or what.

I wrote “these two”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_07-08/IAEAandLibya.asp “articles”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Libya.asp back in the day about ElBaradei’s previous reports. The reports themselves can be found “here.”:http://www.armscontrol.org/country/libya/#key

ElBaradei’s full statement is below:

Following Libya´s disclosure of its undeclared nuclear activities in December 2003, the Agency has continued its efforts to verify the correctness and completeness of Libya´s declarations about its nuclear programme, including past undeclared activities.

Since my last report on 30 August 2004, Libya has continued to be transparent and to provide the Agency unrestricted access, beyond what is required under its comprehensive safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol, to those locations, information and individuals deemed necessary by the Agency. Libya has recently provided additional information about the timeline of some of its past undeclared activities, which has helped the Agency gain a full picture of Libya´s past and present nuclear programme and will enable the Agency to resume verification in Libya on a routine basis. A detailed report on safeguards implementation in Libya will be submitted to the Board.

_Thanks to FoKerr JP_.

This is totally unrelated to things nuclear (unless you’re into “Lynn Eden”:http://books.google.com/books?id=yDk5hfkyISUC), but I just wanted to note that the “1,345 NorCal fires”:http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_9742015 are no fun. If you’ve ever been to Monterey Bay, you know that the area is usually quite foggy. It’s somewhat disturbing, however, to not be able to tell whether the thing in the distance is fog or smoke.

I wanted to mention that Dennis Gormley’s amazing book “Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security”:http://www.greenwood.com/psi/book_detail.aspx?sku=C9836 is out. I’ve read the manuscript several times already, but having just received my own copy of the actual book, I can’t wait to dig into it again. There will be an “official book roll-out”:http://cns.miis.edu/cns/media/pr080626_missile_contagion.pdf on July 24 (at the Stimson Center’s quarters in DC), moderated by Janne Nolan, which I will remind about closer to the date. You should come.

In any case, I’ve been thinking that I should blog more about my favorite cruise missile — the “BrahMos”:http://www.brahmos.com/. So, stay tuned for some BrahMos mania coming your way soon. In the meantime, as a decent backgrounder, see this slightly dated “_WMD Insights_ piece”:http://www.wmdinsights.com/I23/I23_SA1_IndiaExpands.htm that I wrote with an Indian colleague.

And here is the legend of the BrahMos, “as recalled by a former head of Russia’s NPO Mash”:http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/1-2004/at/hy/:

bq. _Dr. Kalam had been on a trip to Russia, where he had visited St. Petersburg and walked along the banks of the Neva – he later even wrote a poem about this river. He suggested that the enterprise be called BrahmNev, combining the names of the prominent Indian and Russian rivers. We pointed out that Mashinostroyenia is located in the Moscow region, so it would be more proper to take the name from the Brahmaputra and Moskva rivers. This is how this name – BrahMos – appeared._

I just realized that I failed to point out “this amazing post”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2008/05/chagai-story-of-nuclear-rivalry.html from Andreas about Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear test.

You need to read it all, because I can’t do it justice. This part should whet the appetite, however:

…there was in effect two bomb programmes in existence in Pakistan. KRL had exclusive control over uranium enrichment. It had also branched into the shaping of uranium metal into cores, weapon design, and delivery vehicle research, development and testing. PAEC was doing parallel work in all these areas. It also controlled the nuclear power plants (and access to the plutonium route to the bomb).

*What happened within this two organizations during the 1980s and 1990s is largely uncharted. It is likely that they started work on several designs: both domestic and imported. The KRL design was clearly acquired from China. The origins of PAEC designs are mostly unknown.*

It is quite likely that the organizations proceeded on several tracks at once, much like the Soviet Union did 40 years earlier. The first Soviet design was much more powerful and efficient than the US Manhattan Project design. But *since Fuch had leaked detailed specifications to the Soviets, Stalin and Beria thought it was prudent to proceed with constructing proven designs first. Something similar could have happened in Pakistan.*

Irrespective of which bomb design was tested in 1998, however, *PAEC held one trump-card; it owned and controlled the test site. KRL had no suitable sites of their own, and had seemingly been relegated to the back seat.*

And I am totally stealing the video he posted:

A guest post from my ACA successor Peter Crail:

Perhaps the biggest news in the nonproliferation world Thursday was North Korea’s delivery of its long-awaited nuclear declaration. Caveats aside, and they are big ones (yes it’s late, no it won’t detail what the North Koreans were doing with Syria or with uranium enrichment, no it won’t cover whatever weapons were made) this is the start of getting a good look at what the North Korean’s were doing with their Pu program and hopefully, shutting it down for good.

Of course, the devil is in the details. That means verification, which has become the new buzz word for all things North Korea these days.

During Secretary Rice’s North Korea “speech”:http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/06/106034.htm at the Heritage Foundation this month (entitled “U.S. Policy Toward Asia,” but really…it was a North Korea speech) she outlined in quite specific terms some of the expectations for what the verification process should look like:

bq. Verification should require, among other measures, on-site access to facilities and sites in North Korea. Verification should require the collection and removal of environmental and material samples, as well as forensic analysis of materials and equipment, all at North Korean sites and facilities. Verification should require access to design documents, operating and production records, reports, logbooks, and other records for all facilities associated with production and processing of all nuclear materials in North Korea. And verification should require interviews with North Koreans involved in nuclear programs. Verification will not be easy, but it is essential. And the six parties are developing a detailed verification and implementation plan incorporating these principles.

Stanford’s Sigfried Hecker has “said”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_06/NKPlutonium.asp that, if Pyongyang agrees to measures like these, we should have “high degree of confidence” of how much Pu they produced.

Of course, Rice insisted several times that these verification measures would be required at “all facilities.” She is right, but the question is, will North Korea really agree to verification for anything beyond Yongbyon, at least in the near future? I suspect we will either be looking at more than the three phases envisioned, or a “phase three” with quite a few sub-phases to get to that point.

So, it’s still too early to break out the champagne bottles, but maybe a little “fireworks display”:http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=060000&biid=2008062740168 is in order.

Even if this had nothing to do with nuclear weapons, it would be pretty great:

Why don’t birds have teeth? What is GAO thinking of downloading from my blog?