A submarine-wonk-colleague and I were just speculating this morning that yesterday’s “Russian sub accident that took the lives of 20 people”:http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jfn6BiK-75B0F4qtfZgNe12N18jw occured on one of the “Project 971/Akula class”:http://www.nti.org/db/submarines/russia/index.html boats.
And indeed. Though the Russians are yet to release additional information on the incident, the Indian press seems certain that it was the “Akula boat meant for India”:http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Accident_on_Russian_submarine_meant_for_India_kills_20/articleshow/3690965.cms. I wrote about “that boat, the INS Chakra,”:http://www.wmdinsights.com/I21/I21_SA1_QuestionsPersist.htm some time ago.
I have neglected to mention that Peter’s book was the subject “of a review essay”:http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21670 by Samantha Power in the _New York Review_ a couple months back. Read, if you haven’t already.
A colleague passed along “a WNN story”:http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN_A_look_at_the_future_of_nuclear_power_0311082.html on the topic. Apparently “Carlton Stoiber”:http://editorialcartoonists.com/cartoonist/profile.cfm/StoibC put forward this “pyramid superstructure [that] has the advantages of operating experience and seismic safety.”
During last week’s public lecture at the Monterey Institute, the amazing “Maj. Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin”:http://www.pircenter.org/english/members/dvorkin.htm told an anecdote, which meant to underline that the Soviets perceived cheating in strategic arms control as shameful.
At some point during the SALT negotiations, Soviet military experts supposedly told Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev that they knew of several potential loopholes (legal or technical, beats me), which could be exploited. Leonid Ilyich supposedly responded by saying:
bq. _Obmanyvat’ ne razreshu!_
Basically, he said that *cheating by his own people was something he would not put up with* (or, up with which he would not put, if you want the funny in there).
And I apologize beforehand to non-Russian speakers, but this classic impersonation of Brezhnev (if you imagine the style of delivery, it makes the anecdote more funny) by the duo from the show “Gorodok”:http://gorodok.tv/ was something I couldn’t resist sharing. (The silly plot is as follows. _Brezhnev, hungover after a night out with “Erich Honecker”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1676/honeckers-bunker, is giving out awards to “life savers” — a firefighter, a surgeon… When he comes up to the guy in the red sweater, it turns out that this last candidate for a medal is no lifesaver in the traditional sense — he sells beer someplace nearby. And since Brezhnev’s still feeling the impact of last night’s intense “discussions” about schnaps after the ones about the vodka…_)
Anya is blogging “much substance”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2078/bolton-esque-sanctions-on-russias-rosoboronexport over at ACW, which means I get to post charts like the one below:
“_Cross-posted from ACW_”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2074/nukes-to-lightbulbs.
The amazing Laura Holgate (with Robert Schultz) and the great Pavel Podvig are crossing swords over at the web edition of the _Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists_. The issue: “Megatons to Megawatts”:http://www.usec.com/megatonstomegawatts.htm.
Say Holgate/Schultz:
bq. As Pavel Podvig points out in “his July Bulletin Web-Edition column”:http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/pavel-podvig/the-fallacy-of-the-megatons-to-megawatts-program, the US-Russia “Megatons to Megawatts” program that is designed to eliminate 500 metric tons of HEU has been one of the most successful and cost-effective programs to reduce nuclear danger. Nonetheless, Podvig argues that extending or expanding the program could increase the risk of nuclear terrorism. Quite simply, _he is wrong_–his conclusion failing to take into account several key points that add up to a compelling case for moving faster and farther to eliminate HEU and its inherent risks.
“Go have a read”:http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/in-support-of-the-megatons-to-megawatts-program.
ISIS recently beta-launched a “new site”:http://www.isisnucleariran.org/ called ISIS Nuclear Iran. It has a trove of documents and other hot Iran nuclear action.
From what I understand, they want feedback. So check it out. Comments can be sent to ISISNuclearIran@gmail.com.
Personally, I am digging the “From the Sky”:http://www.isisnucleariran.org/from-the-sky/ feature, which is an “interactive tool…developed using Google maps that allows users to see a broad, annotated overview of Iran’s facilities.”
CFR.org has a good lineup of Iran experts “grappling”:http://blogs.cfr.org/forum/ with questions like “WTF do we do about Iran’s nuclear program?” Only they’re more articulate. (You will all doubtless be shocked to learn that I am not a CFR member.)
S. Sestanovich in the November/December 2008 issue of _Foreign Affairs_:
bq. Many U.S. foreign policy specialists look at the return of arms control with a *mixture of boredom and regret*. Most stopped viewing Russia as an interesting security problem years ago. In the U.S. military, Russian issues are no longer where the promotions are. When civilian experts bother with the issue of strategic arms reductions, it is usually *not because they think that the U.S.-Russian strategic balance matters* but because they want to revive attention to some related issue, such as “loose” nuclear weapons and materials or the need for the United States and Russia to strengthen nonproliferation efforts by making large cuts in their own arsenals. It is telling that the most significant arms control idea of recent years, advanced by the Cold War veterans Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry, and George Shultz, has been nuclear abolition. *Mere nuclear parity apparently bores them, too.*
