Author Archives: J-Pollack

Sarkozy on NATO

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Video of the French president’s address to the “Foundation for Strategic Research”:http://www.frstrategie.org/ is “here”:http://www.elysee.fr/webtv/allocution-lors-du-colloque-de-la-fondation-pour-la-recherche-strategique-la-france-la-defense-europeenne-et-l-otan-au-xxieme–video-3-1044.html.

If there are any good bits for nuclear wonks, I’ll try to post the English text when I see it.

In the meantime, dig those hand gestures.

Update: Reader Ferdinand, with sharper eyes than mine, has spotted the “document complet”:http://www.elysee.fr/download/?mode=press&filename=11.03__Conclusion_colloque_Defense_Otan.pdf. Thanks, Ferdinand!

Promissory Note

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Back before Paul doubled my salary, he made an “insightful little observation”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1850/iran-thought-not-so-deep about negotiating with Iran without first insisting on suspension of enrichment.

This has got me thinking. Perhaps it’s time to lay out as many pros and cons as can be thought of, and see how they stack up.

It’s not going to happen right away, but stay tuned.

Non-Technological Safeguards

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I’ve just stumbled across a “paper”:http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/Friend%20-%20Urenco%27s%20Views%20on%20International%20Safeguards%20Inspection.pdf, almost a year old now, by one Peter Friend, the head of Safeguards and Security at Urenco. It concerns the safeguarding of a centrifuge enrichment facility.

Yes, this again.

It includes a short section on “new inspection techniques.” Here are the highlights:

There are many organisations – particularly in USA – currently aiming to develop new equipment and new techniques for safeguards verification purposes. But many of the developers (who might not have many contacts with IAEA or with operators experienced in safeguards implementation) seem to be too interested in the technology per se, and should give a lot more thought into the practicalities.

[snip]

In Urenco’s view, the presence of a competent inspector on site provides more effective safeguards than the use of complex remote monitoring equipment.

(VERTIC’s Persbo has “mentioned the idea in the past”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2007/11/new-safeguards-approach-for-enrichment.html as well.)

Without regurgitating Friend’s entire list of concerns — see page 7 of “his paper”:http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/Friend%20-%20Urenco%27s%20Views%20on%20International%20Safeguards%20Inspection.pdf if you’re interested — it suffices to say that there are many complexities involved with designing and installing new monitoring technologies in centrifuge plants, especially if the plant is already standing.

One might add to this a certain lack of trust between the monitors and the monitored: just what is that gizmo doing, anyway? And those third parties meant to be assured by the monitoring may have concerns that the gizmos can be gamed, one way or another, if there’s no one around to keep an eye on them. So having a permanent on-site presence does seem preferable in many ways.

(To be sure, sorting out the modalities, including who would make a mutually acceptable on-siter, is not entirely simple. Also, I do think continuous flow monitoring would be an excellent idea. These are not mutually exclusive ideas, or shouldn’t be.)

But there’s another benefit to having a small team of on-site inspectors always present. They can really get to know the people.

It’s the People, Stupid

Without pretending to know more than I do, let’s just say that there can only be so many humans in a given country, such as Iran, with the requisite expertise in working with centrifuge enrichment technology. Getting to know those humans and what they are doing seems like the best possible monitoring technique.

Call it “social verification”:http://www.gsinstitute.org/pnnd/docs/NWC_Becker.pdf, right?

Concerns about breakout potential are “clearly”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1890/more-breakoutology “mounting”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1900/tribute-breakout-blogging — even if one doesn’t indulge in worst-case thinking — and undeclared centrifuge facilities are notoriously difficult to detect. So if you are worried about both a breakout at a declared site _and_ the possibility of an undeclared site somewhere else, how would you guard against them? There’s reason to be doubtful that even the Additional Protocol, by itself, would suffice to detect undeclared plants with confidence.

You’ll sometimes hear this same argument made in favor of a multinational fuel center; personally, I find it pretty compelling, at least compared to alternative strategies. But there’s a long way to go before any such proposal can be realized. The good news is, even if the multinationalization idea can’t be achieved, the idea of a full-time -inspectors- _presence_ can be adapted to safeguarding a national facility.

_Added thought: The difficulty, of course, remains in getting the monitored side to agree._

“Cross-posted to ArmsControlWonk.com”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2215/non-technological-safeguards. See “the comments at ACW”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2215/non-technological-safeguards#comment.

Rise and Shine

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Awhile back, in the umpteenth post on special envoys, “I wrote”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1882/narrowing-the-gulf:

Somebody wake me when it’s “Rose Gottemoeller’s”:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=101 turn.

And it didn’t take too long! Nicholas Kralev has the story at the “Washington Times”:http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/mar/09/us-russia-aim-to-cut-nukes/?page=2, concerning the possibility of appointing an “ambassador-at-large for strategic negotiations with Russia.”

One name that has been mentioned for a senior position in the field is Rose Gottemoeller, who is expected to become assistant secretary of state for arms control…

Trust me, I deserve no credit for this prediction. It’s a no-brainer. Let’s hope the idea prevails.

Primate PPBS

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David Brown at the “Washington Post”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/09/AR2009030901458.html and Coco Ballantyne at “Scientific American”:http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=chimpanzee-plans-throws-stones-zoo have the latest news on streamlined arms acquisition strategy, from Sweden’s Furuvik Zoo.

Both stories — which end on the same tragic note — concern an article by Mathias Osvath in _Current Biology,_ titled “Spontaneous planning for future stone throwing by a male chimpanzee”:ttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VRT-4VT0BCK-9&_user=10&_coverDate=03%2F10%2F2009&_alid=881199316&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_cdi=6243&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_ct=81&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10&md5=d1adc3b6cd1624d58dc8ba92677cb69c.

Here’s the abstract:

Planning for a future, rather than a current, mental state is a cognitive process generally viewed as uniquely human. Here, however, I shall report on a decade of observations of spontaneous planning by a male chimpanzee in a zoo. The planning actions, which took place in a calm state, included stone caching and the manufacture of discs from concrete, objects later used as missiles against zoo visitors during agitated chimpanzee dominance displays. Such planning implies advanced consciousness and cognition traditionally not associated with nonhuman animals [1]. Spontaneous and unambiguous planning behaviours for future states by non-humans have not previously been reported, and anecdotal reports, describing single occasions, are exceptionally scarce [2], [3] and [4]. This dearth of observations is arguably the main reason for not ascribing cognitive foresight to nonhuman animals [1]. To date, the surprisingly few controlled demonstrations of planning for future states by animals are experimentally induced behaviours in great apes [5], [6] and [7] and corvids [8] and [9]. The observational findings in this report suggest that these laboratory results are not experimental artefacts, at least in the case of great apes.

I know what you’re thinking, and yes, North Korea does have an embassy in Stockholm. But zoo visitors can rest easy, as the traveling Scud salesmen don’t seem to have gotten that far afield.

(PPBS, in the words of “this randomly selected news item”:http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44916, is the Pentagon’s “annual process of forecasting threats, and matching them to programs and then programs to budgets.”)

Headline of the Day

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“Iran: Hostile drones disrupted our satellite launch”:http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1069876.html

Hostile unmanned aerial vehicles overflew Iran last month and disrupted the communications systems at the launch site of a missile carrying Iran’s first satellite to space, according to the country’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The Iranian leader was quoted by an Iranian news agency as having said in recent discussions that the disruptions of communications caused a delay of several hours to the launch of the rocket, which had to be operated with the use of a backup system.

Ahmadinejad said drones flew at very high altitude and used sophisticated electronic equipment to jam ground-based systems. He also said that a decision was made to shoot down the drones with fighter planes, but it was decided not to do so for reasons he did not explain.

It goes on from there, but that’s the nut of it, if you’ll pardon the expression.

True? Embellished? Sheer hallucination? You’ll have to decide.

Iran’s president has got “a vivid imagination”:http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1063353.html, that much is certain.

Here’s the “musical bonus”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a6Oo79f742Q. You may wish to avert your eyes.

Fun Missile Defense Fact (?)

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According to a “newly released study”:http://cboblog.cbo.gov/?p=211 — see the “full report”:http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/100xx/doc10013/02-27-MissileDefense.pdf — the -existing- Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, as it will exist in 2012 or so, would not be able to defend itself against attack from Iran. First, there’s the radars:

To intercept U.S.-bound missiles from Iran, the GMD Block 3.0 system will rely on tracking from radars in Fylingdales, England, and Thule, Greenland. However, it will not be capable of defending those radar sites against Iranian missiles, which makes the system vulnerable to attacks in which multiple missiles first target the radars and then target the United States. That vulnerability could be removed by using local defenses to protect the radars — say, Aegis ballistic missile defense ships or terminal-phase systems such as the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense or Medium Extended Air Defense System.

And then there’s the main interceptor base itself at Ft. Greely, Alaska. Unless I misunderstand Fig. 3-1 on page 28, it’s not covered from attack by a hypothetical ICBM coming over the pole.

Not that it has to be; no such threat has yet emerged, and presumably won’t by 2012, either. (Right?) But it’s still a very interesting little quirk.

The assumptions of the study are given in a convenient appendix, for the curious.

Tribute (Breakout) Blogging

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Chances are, if you’re reading this, you’ve already seen “this assessment of Iran’s ability to bypass safeguards”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2213/bypassing-safeguards by Andreas Persbo of VERTIC:

At the present, I believe that the likelihood of an Iranian break-out is slim. The principal reason for this argument is that Iran’s installed capacity at the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz is still low, and that a break-out would entail significant political and security risks for the country. As long as Agency safeguards are in place at the Iranian sites, the international community is likely to get advance warning of any attempt to divert material or to use the existing facilities for nefarious purposes.

The problem is that not all of the nuclear fuel cycle is under safeguards. Processes downstream from the uranium conversion facility are generally covered. But uranium mining and milling as well as certain nuclear related activities (such as research centres or centrifuge assembly sites) are not monitored. Since this is the case, it is easy for a fairly technologically advanced state to construct a parallel nuclear fuel cycle, using indigenous uranium resources to fuel a clandestine weapons programme.

(Read “the whole thing”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2213/bypassing-safeguards.)

What you might not have seen, though, is the entire series of in-depth posts appearing lately at his home blog, “Verification, Implementation and Compliance”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/:

* “Progress at Natanz”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2009/02/progress-at-natanz-reposted.html

* “The Iranian breakout scenario”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2009/03/iranian-breakout-scenario.html

* “Tracking UF6 cylinders”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2009/03/tracking-uf6-cylinders.html

* And now, of course, “Bypassing safeguards”:http://verificationthoughts.blogspot.com/2009/03/bypassing-safeguards.html.

Now, some of this is not for the faint of heart. When I wrote about “safeguards at Natanz”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2018/safeguards-at-natanz last summer at ACW, for example, I consciously avoided using certain words like “hexapartite.” It’s not that the ACW readership can’t figure that one out; it’s just distracting if you have to. But if you like your nuclear wonkery undiluted and in-depth, then you had better be following VIC.

Shooting Down North Korea’s Launch?

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Will either the U.S. or Japan attempt to shoot down a North Korean satellite launch? It’s not impossible, but don’t bet on anybody doing anything quite that provocative.

The “last time such threats emanated from the U.S.”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/21/AR2006062101518.html, lo and behold, North Korea’s (failed) long-range missile launch was accompanied by a barrage of short-range and medium-range missiles, which performed just fine. Point made.

Plus, “we have enough space debris already”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1847/iridium-cosmos, don’t we?

Oddly, the following item sourced to the “KCNA website”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/ is not yet there, [Update: “here it is”:http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2009/200903/news09/20090309-02ee.html] but it’s popped up “elsewhere online”:http://www.individual.com/story.php?story=97486636 and is worth careful study, as it does not read quite like the usual KCNA drivel:

In view of the prevailing grave situation the General Staff of the KPA solemnly declares as follows in order to protect the supreme interests of the country and the nation from the war maniacs’ reckless moves for aggression against the DPRK:

1. Our revolutionary armed forces will counter the enemies’ any slight hostile acts of violating the sovereignty of the country and intruding into its inviolable territory, territorial waters and territorial air with prompt merciless military actions.

It is the invariable stand of our revolutionary armed forces fully ready for all-out confrontation not to allow any enemies to intrude into our territory, territorial waters and territorial air even 0.001 mm.

2. We will retaliate any act of intercepting our satellite for peaceful purposes with prompt counter strikes by the most powerful military means.

If the enemies recklessly opt for intercepting our satellite, our revolutionary armed forces will launch without hesitation a just retaliatory strike operation not only against all the interceptor means involved but against the strongholds of the US and Japanese aggressors and the South Korean puppets who hatched plots to intercept it.

Shooting our satellite for peaceful purposes will precisely mean a war.

3. As an immediate measure we will enforce a more strict military control and cut off the North-South military communications in order to guarantee the security in the opened Eastern and Western coastal areas under the control of the North and the South while the DPRK-targeted war exercises are under way.

It is nonsensical to maintain normal communications channel at a time when the South Korean puppets are getting frantic with the above-said war exercises, levelling guns at fellow countrymen in league with foreign forces.

Accordingly, our army will cut off the military communications, the last channel which has existed between the North and the South, from March 9.

Even if you think there’s no more than a 10% chance of retaliation, would you risk it? it just doesn’t seem remotely worth making whatever point would be made by destroying a primitive satellite.

Instead of a musical bonus, here’s an apt (if dated) comment on the “infamous op-ed”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/21/AR2006062101518.html linked above.

Enjoy.

!/images/70.gif!

Like Shooting Monkeys In A Barrel

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“Brent Scowcroft”:http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSTRE5247XC20090305 on the Middle East:

We’re on the cusp of an explosion of proliferation and Iran is now the poster child.

“Hillary Clinton”:http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101532912 on U.S.-Russia relations:

[W]e’re testing waters, we’re determining what is possible. We’re turning new pages and resetting buttons.

“Musical bonus”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cqOKvonLrH8.