Here is an excerpt from India’s statement to the First Committee:

As a responsible nuclear weapon State, India is committed as per its nuclear doctrine, to maintain credible minimum deterrence with the posture of no-first use and non-use against non-nuclear weapon States. Without diminishing the priority we attach to nuclear disarmament, India supports the immediate commencement of negotiations in the CD of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein, which remains the most suitable basis for negotiations to commence, as reinforced by the outcomes of the GGE on FMCT as well as the High-Level Expert Preparatory Group on FMCT. India participated in the recent GGE on Nuclear Disarmament Verification and looks forward to constructively participating in the upcoming GGE on NDV to further contribute in this important area of our work. India has supported the commencement of negotiation by the CD of a legally binding instrument on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), also building on the work of the GGE on PAROS that concluded in March 2019.

The document also calls for

complete elimination of nuclear weapons through a step by step process, enunciated in our Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament submitted to the UNGA in 2006 and later to the CD in 2007 (CD/1816), has a wide resonance and continuing relevance. India reiterates its call to undertake the steps outlined in the Working Paper…

Here is the paper and here are the steps:

There’s more about topics like chemical and biological weapons, conventional weapons, delivery vehicles, and terrorism.

The Council of the European Union announced on October 12 that it is extending for one year the sanctions applied to several entities linked to CW use.

The Council today decided to extend the regime allowing the EU to impose restrictive measures on persons and entities involved in the development and use of chemical weapons by one year, until 16 October 2021.

The sanctions regime was introduced in 2018 as a follow-up to the conclusions of the European Council of 28 June 2018. The objective was to counter the proliferation and use of chemical weapons, which pose a serious threat to international security. The regime was due to apply until 16 October 2020. On the basis of a regular annual review, it was decided to extend the restrictive measures for a further year.

Restrictive measures currently apply to nine persons – five linked to the Syrian regime and four involved in the Salisbury attack using the toxic nerve agent Novichok – and one organisation, the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), the Syrian regime’s principal entity for the development of chemical weapons.

It’s likely not news to people who have been following the issue, but the list of sanctioned persons contains some useful detail:

Some information from an October 5 UNSC meeting which serves as a useful follow-up to this post from the other day:

Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, said that, since she last briefed the Council, her Office has maintained regular contact with OPCW and has not received any further information from the Syrian authorities on the implementation of resolution 2118 (2013) — which first mandated the scheduled destruction of the country’s chemical weapons programme.

I previously noted a July 9 OPCW decision which gave Syria 90 days to take a number of steps concerning the government’s chemical weapons program. This September 24 OPCW DG report states that “As at the date of this report, the Secretariat has not received a reply from the Syrian Arab Republic.” Given that the July decision requires the DG to report “within 100 days” regarding Syrian compliance, one imagines that we’ll hear more soon.

The NYRB published a review essay this past August about John Bolton’s most recent book. Without getting into its substance, I have to quote passages that make me question my writing ability:

Hedging against the remote possibility that some readers are smart enough to decipher spuriousness…

and

Even more trying are his sour, stilted witticisms, some of which he feels compelled to point out are supposed to be funny—in case any bleeding-heart types are too dumb to realize it.

The Review published a similar piece back in 2008 (sub,. req.) about Bolton’s first book. Readers can make what they will of this sentence:

Whether a consistent and comprehensive foreign policy, no longer intoxicated by ideological or neo-imperial fantasy, will emerge from this change of attitude is far from clear.

The next Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction is scheduled for this coming November. The first one took place last year. Here’s the most relevant part of the report:

At its 5th and 6th meetings, on 20 November, the Conference held a thematic debate. Representatives of participating States exchanged views on a range of related issues, including principles and objectives, general obligations regarding nuclear weapons, general obligations regarding other weapons of mass destruction, peaceful uses and international cooperation, institutional arrangements and other aspects. The Conference agreed that representatives of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones organizations should be invited to share good practices and lessons learned with respect to the implementation of treaties establishing such zones prior to the second session of the Conference.

There’s also a political declaration:

We, the representatives of participating States at the first session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, having met at Headquarters from 18 to 22 November 2019, pursuant to General Assembly decision 73/546:

(a) Welcome all initiatives, resolutions, decisions and recommendations on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;

(b) Believe that the establishment of a verifiable Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would greatly enhance regional and international peace and security;

(c) Declare our intent and solemn commitment to pursue, in accordance with relevant international resolutions, and in an open and inclusive manner with all invited States, the elaboration of a legally binding treaty to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by consensus by the States of the region;

(d) Call upon all States of the Middle East and all other States to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of the objectives of the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;

(e) Convinced that the realization of this long-standing goal would be facilitated by the participation of all States of the Middle East, extend an open-ended invitation to all States of the region to lend their support to the present declaration and to join the process;

(f) In that spirit, believe that the Conference, through the elaboration of a legally binding treaty establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, could contribute to building regional and international confidence therein;

(g) Commit to undertaking efforts to follow up on the declaration and on the outcomes of the Conference and to engaging in preparations for the second session of the Conference, commend the efforts of the Secretary-General in convening the first session of the Conference, and request his continued efforts and those of relevant international organizations and the strong support of the international community towards the success of the Conference in establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.