I somehow missed it until now, but ACA’s Peter Crail had this very “clearly written piece”:http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=3386 on nuclear safeguards in Iran online a few weeks ago:
bq. In the months ahead, the United States and its allies may confront a choice. Do we want to get Iran to suspend its known nuclear activities, or do we want to achieve the transparency needed to detect any unknown activities? Both are important goals in their own right, but it may be increasingly important to shift our focus to the latter.
I guess the answer to that question depends on what the U.S. brings to the table. Assuming there even is a table.
From The Hindu, March 5, 2008:
http://www.thehindu.com/2008/03/05/stories/2008030554841000.htm
What the IAEA needs more than anything else is for Iran to resume its adherence to the Additional Protocol. If there is an iota of truth in the “alleged studies” — which Iran says are based on fabricated documents — the best way for the IAEA to find out is by invoking the wider powers to inspect unlisted sites that the AP confers. Iran had declared that if the UNSC lifts its sanctions now that all concrete outstanding issues have been resolved, it is willing once again to adhere to the AP. As for the enrichment issue, the Iranian offer of running its national facilities as a multinational venture (with multinational oversight) very much remains on the table. These two elements would go a long way towards assuring the international community that Iran’s nuclear programme was entirely peaceful. But it seems there are more powerful interests at work, with aims that go well beyond what is stated.