Monthly Archives: February 2009

Pakistan MFA on Khan Release

Following up on Josh’s “post”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1842/khan-walks-back from the other day, I give you the two relevant statements from Pakistan’ Foreign Ministry. The “one from 6 February”:http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2009/Feb/PR_55_09.htm called AQK a “free man.”

Perhaps responding to some of the, um, somewhat negative reactions to that announcement, the Ministry said “the next day”:http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2009/Feb/PR_57_09.htm that Islamabad

bq. has dismantled the nuclear black market network and no individual associated with it enjoys any official status nor has access to any strategic facility.

I know how much you all like primary sources…

Pointing Fingers at Russia

Back in a previous blogging existence, I observed that “nobody is attributing new developments in Iranian missile technology to Russia”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2013/irans-ashura-missile-mystery — at least, not yet.

Now the inevitable seems to have begun, deep in one of the recent “comment marathons”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2181/why-would-a-2-stage-safir-be-surprising#comment at ACW:

I can’t help but wonder if this all isn’t about “more modern materials, tools and computing power”, but rather “expert russian rocket scientists working in their iranian-financed north-korean exile-design-bureau on improving ancient soviet technology secretly provided by modern-day russia”…

Those in the know will recognize this as an idea associated with “Robert Schmucker”:http://www.schmucker.de/, a Munich-based technology consultant and entrepreneur. Schmucker maintains that the Nodong/Shihab-3/Ghauri missile is actually a heretofore unknown device of Soviet vintage, with the designs and engineering provided to North Korea by corrupt and enterprising Russians. The AQ Khanski network, as it were.

(See the 17th slide of this “Schmucker briefing”:http://www.prif.org/fileadmin/content-ABM/schmucker.pdf for an instance of this claim.)

Although wrong, this idea is certainly intriguing and not as ridiculous as it might seem. Here is why. “Daniel Sneider”:http://fsi.stanford.edu/people/danielcsneider/ wrote in the San Jose Mercury News of July 25, 2006:

I encountered one crucial tentacle of Kim’s program some 14 years ago, in late October of 1992.

A group of 64 Russian rocket scientists, accompanied by their wives and children, were stopped just as they were about to board a flight to North Korea. The scientists were employees of a super-secret facility in the Urals, the V.P. Makeyev Design Bureau, responsible for the development of the Soviet Union’s submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

As the bureau chief for the Christian Science Monitor, I pieced the story together later from Russian press accounts and interviews with the scientists and others. A middleman with apparent official backing had offered the bureau, starving for orders and left adrift by the sudden end of the Cold War, work in North Korea.

Scientists who were making the equivalent of $15 a month jumped at offers of up to $4,000 a month to help a former Soviet ally. In the spring, a group of 10 scientists had gone for an initial foray. The Koreans, one of the scientists told me, initially never directly asked about nuclear warheads or missile designs. They claimed only to be interested in rocket science.

The Russians came home that fall and signed up dozens of their comrades as recruits. But the project was not officially sanctioned, and the KGB held them outside of Moscow for two months while the broker tried to re-negotiate their departure. Russian officials later described the North Koreans’ aim, without mentioning them by name, as an attempt to build “combat missile complexes that could carry nuclear weapons.”

North Korea began with copies of Soviet short-range Scud missiles and moved on to medium-range “Nodong” missiles, but they lacked the range and accuracy to meet Kim’s target. A decade after the airport incident, in 2003, credible reports emerged that the North Koreans were deploying a new, far more accurate missile based on the Soviet SS-N-6, a submarine-launched rocket developed by Makeyev in the 1960s. The Nodong-2, as some labeled it, could reach all U.S. bases in Japan and possibly even to Guam.

Now, there are just a couple of problems with extending the SS-N-6 paradigm to the Nodong.

First, the “work on the Nodong goes back to the late 1980s”:http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/65_681.html, before the collapse of the Soviet Union set in motion the dynamics described by Sneider.

Second, the Soviet precursor to the Nodong doesn’t exist. It’s a figment.

Applying the same kind of reasoning to Iran’s new generation of post-Scud, post-Nodong space launchers/ballistic missiles is still more problematic, since these devices “don’t seem to exist in North Korea”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2013/irans-ashura-missile-mystery, where the nefarious Khanski Gang is supposedly at work.

Here’s a different idea: if there are indications of Russian technology in the Iranian missile program, it’s because “the Iranians had considerable access to Russian expertise and training in the 1990s”:http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1998_03/rusiran — not because devices were transferred to them lock, stock, and barrel.

I hesitate to say it, but there does still seem to be some resistance out there to the idea that anyone not severely melatonin melanin-challenged can work with sophisticated technologies…

Just saying.

What’s The Chance?

Econo-blogger extraordinaire Felix Salmon writes:

“Low-Probability Disaster of the Day, Exosphere Edition”:http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/2009/02/12/low-probability-disaster-of-the-day-exosphere-edition?tid=true

From “Andy Pazstor”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123438921888374497.html:

Pentagon brass, satellite industry executives and NASA leaders for years have publicly expressed concern about the dangers of orbital debris. But the odds of a direct hit between satellites were considered so small as to be basically unthinkable.

Is there a way of distinguishing, ex post, between (a) the ex ante probabilities having been wrong, and (b) the collision having been genuinely improbable? I’m going with (a).

This is a really meaty question, actually. It’s not, as one might suppose, a deterministic problem, as there is a human element involved in steering active satellites away from anticipated collisions. (Expect some hard questions to be asked about how this collision came about.) It’s just the sort of complex and continuously occurring situation that “nuclear deterrence wonks often think about”:http://press.princeton.edu/titles/5301.html, in fact.

So if one were to assess the probability of a sat-sat collision beyond a first approximation, it would probably involve interrogating experts to get their probability estimates. And no, you really could not know if their probabilities for this or any other specific question were right or wrong. But you can establish, “after the fact”:http://press.princeton.edu/titles/7959.html, which experts provide accurate probabilities, and which don’t. What is more, with creativity and good preparation, you can even get a pretty solid idea of who is accurate and who isn’t “well before the fact”:http://www.us.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/History/20thCContemporary/?view=usa&ci=9780195064650. All without resorting to “black magic”:http://www.malleusmaleficarum.org/?p=6.

One thing you probably shouldn’t do is to try to judge the accuracy of past predictions by what happens now, “post-Iridium-Cosmos”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1847/iridium-cosmos. This event presumably reduces the odds of the next sat-sat collision, since operators will be more vigilant for a good while. There’s that slippery human element again.

Then again, sat-sat collisions are the least of our worries. The real threat is sat-debris collisions. Not only are these relatively common — David Wright identifies “seven such incidents since 1991”:http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/space_weapons/technical_issues/colliding-satellites.html — but we should expect the fresh debris generated by Tuesday’s debacle to accelerate the trend.

For The Record

A side note. “Andy Pasztor’s WSJ article”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123438921888374497.html contains a startling inaccuracy:

Industry officials say Iridium has identified the Russian craft as a Cosmos series satellite launched in 1993, weighing more than a ton and including an onboard nuclear reactor. That couldn’t be independently verified. Experts have said the chance of radioactive debris surviving a fall through the atmosphere and reaching inhabited areas is very small.

Rest assured, there was no nuclear reactor on board. Although “such a thing has been contemplated”:http://74.125.95.132/search?q=cache:syQ5XIH1lFMJ:https://research.maxwell.af.mil/papers/ay2004/affellows/Downey.pdf, so far as I’m aware, it’s never been done, and at least in my naive estimate, the practicalities seem daunting. That is presumably why this claim “couldn’t be independently verified” — which maybe means that it shouldn’t have been published, either.

(And let’s not even get into “Project Orion”:http://books.google.com/books?id=r_Gu4f0QxrkC.)

What Pazstor’s confused source probably was thinking of was a “radioisotope thermoelectric generator”:http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Radioisotope_thermoelectric_generator (or RTG), used to power deep space probes, the occasional satellite, or, in Russia, “various other things that require power, but people don’t routinely visit”:http://www.bellona.no/bellona.org/english_import_area/international/russia/navy/northern_fleet/incidents/37598. (RTGs have also provided Iran’s nuclear research agency with “an embarrassingly lame excuse for experimental Po-210 production”:http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/iaea_note172004.pdf.) Long story short, a pellet of plutonium (or other radioisotope) gives off heat, which is used to generate electricity.

But, as it happens, this wasn’t the case, either. Pavel Podvig has “flagged”:http://russianforces.org/blog/2009/02/collision_in_space.shtml the dead bird as a “Strela-2M”:http://www.astronautix.com/craft/strela2m.htm comsat, which apparently involved chemical batteries of some type.

Hey, live and learn.

Iran Thought, Not So Deep

We have all heard that negotiating with Iran about its enrichment program without first securing Iranian suspension of that program would be bad because Tehran could use those negotiations as cover to keep enriching. Since Iran is enriching now, this is not a cost to negotiating without a suspension. The above is also true because, absent such a suspension, the UNSC would maintain its sanctions on Tehran and could impose new ones.

Oh, and Josh blogs a lot, if you haven’t noticed. I doubled his salary.

The Iskander’s “Unmistakable Message”

This is a couple of months old, but what the hey. Click “here”:http://www.mnweekly.ru/comment/20081114/55356778.html to see a picture that’s worth at least two words. It’s even oriented properly, i.e., westwards.

Russia will not look on indifferently while the United States deploys the third positioning component of its missile defense shield in Eastern Europe. This was the unmistakable message from Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in his no-nonsense state-of-the-nation address recently.

(Paul, where is the label for “juvenilia”?)

The inevitable “musical bonus”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZThquH5t0ow.

_Paul Says:_ There is a label for “silly,” but we can always create a new one.

Iridium-Cosmos

“Apollo-Soyuz”:http://www-pao.ksc.nasa.gov/history/astp/astp.html it ain’t.

For those who haven’t heard, the _Washington Post_ “sums it up”:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/11/AR2009021103387.html thusly:

The Pentagon and NASA are scrambling to assess the risk to spacecraft and the international space station from hundreds of pieces of debris created in the collision Tuesday of two satellites 491 miles above Siberia. NASA’s initial estimate is that the space station faces a “very small” but “elevated” risk of being struck.

The situation is unprecedented. Scraps of spacecraft and other orbital junk have crashed together previously, but this was the first incident involving two intact satellites. One was an Iridium satellite launched in 1997 and used for the company’s satellite telephone network; the other, a Russian Cosmos satellite launched in 1993, had been non-operational for a decade, NASA and Pentagon officials said.

“Geoff Forden told you so”:http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2185/the-future-is-now. He “did”:http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2008/0327satellite.shtml! So did “David Wright”:http://www.aps.org/publications/apsnews/200806/spacedebris.cfm, “a whole bunch of guys from NASA”:http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/06/science/space/06orbi.html, and probably lots of others besides. It’s funny how low-probability events have a way of becoming high-probability events if enough time passes. Which it does, pretty gosh-darn consistently.

Iridium says “the following”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/science/space/12satellite.html:

In a statement, the company said that it had “lost an operational satellite” on Tuesday, apparently after it collided with “a nonoperational” Russian satellite.

“Although this event has minimal impact on Iridium’s service,” the statement added, “the company is taking immediate action to address the loss.” The company’s hand-held phones can be used anywhere around the globe to give users voice and data communications.

Inquiring minds want to know what, ahem, “impact”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/business/media/12radio.html this will have on a Sirius XM buyout. What with the heightened risk of a space debris chain reaction in low earth orbit.

I kid. But seriously, folks, could we avoid using “impact” in a metaphorical sense here?

Oh, and one other thing. Could we rethink this whole ASAT war business now? What do you say?

Get your musical bonus “here”:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wb9By-lODgk.

Ballistic Missiles in Saudi Arabia

A long-promised feature on “Saudi ballistic missile forces”:http://geimint.blogspot.com/2009/02/saudi-arabias-ballistic-missile-force.html has appeared at Sean O’Connor’s “IMINT & Analysis”:http://geimint.blogspot.com blog. It does not disappoint. To me, at least, it suggests that we know less than we thought we did about the subject, out here in the open-source world.

O’Connor locates not just the two missile bases that turn up in pretty much every book or paper on the subject, but _four_ sites, actually, scattered across some of the most rugged terrain of Saudi Arabia’s central plateau. As the warhead flies, two are about 1,800 km from Tehran, and the other two about 1,400 km from Tehran. Give or take a bit.

Despite some reports about a decade ago that the Saudis were shopping for newer missiles to replace their aging DF-3A IRBMs, O’Connor interprets all four bases as related to the DF-3As. At times, though, this seems a little forced.

All four locations appear to have a few things in common, notably roads, tunnel or bunker entrances, and a launch pad or two. But the pair of newly discovered locations doesn’t seem to have a great deal more than that. They’re at a farther remove from any major highways. And they look so austere in comparison to the better-known sites that one really wonders if they serve (or served) the same systems.

There are also signs of expansion and renovation at the better-known sites that don’t square with the established chronology. The DF-3As were acquired in the late 1980s, and reportedly became operational in the year or so before Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. (Also see “GlobalSecurity.org’s look at the As-Sulayyil base”:http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/saudi/al-sulayyil.htm, which shows “expansion between 1995 and 2000”:http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/saudi/al-sulayyil-support.htm.)

Clearly, the Saudi ballistic missile complex is an ongoing project. Do we fully appreciate what it consists of? An open question.

North Korea Standing Pat?

From this evening’s _Nelson Report:_

NK POLICY…lots of studies still on-working as the Obama folks, teams still forming, try to assess where we are, and what to do to get where we want.

Increasingly, the “insider/expert’s debate” has shifted toward rueful discussion of whether the US must now face the reality of the DPRK as a nuclear state, given what its officials says it would take to achieve “denuclearization”.

The alternative seems to be some variation of the current negotiating track…with its implied continuation of the flow of inducements for fear of making a bad situation worse if they are stopped.

Increasingly, we hear US experts previously very “pro-engagement” questioning the negotiation/inducements approach.

The following preliminary report from a member of last weeks’ “private experts” “delegation to Pyongyang”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1844/track-i-and-a-half-in-pyongyang addresses the above concerns en passant, and was prepared at our request. It is, by agreement, anonymous.

It will be fundamentally disquieting to everyone involved:

“Viewed from Pyongyang, the arcane Beltway debates about the North Korea seem increasingly wide of the mark. Our interlocutors made repeatedly clear that the nuclear test and the claims of weaponization of the North’s plutonium inventory mark a fundamental divide in Pyongyang’s thinking and actions.

“Though the officials with whom we met insisted that ‘the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ remains Pyongyang’s long-term strategic objective, this goal seems premised on expectations so fanciful as to vanish into the mists of time.

“The essential message is that the North is now a state in possession of nuclear weapons, and that it’s time for the U.S. to accept this reality; the weapons will not go away anytime soon. This claim does not mean that negotiations are irrelevant.

“For example, the full disabling of the Yongbyon reactor and associated facilities would be a significant accomplishment, and the North Koreans gave every indication of wanting to proceed to completion, though they do not see a verification protocol as part of the Phase 2 deal.

“The essential message: you fulfill your objectives (i.e., on the provision of energy), and we’ll fulfill ours. The converse seems equally true, though the challenges of reconstituting the Yongbyon complex are ever more daunting, if not insuperable.

“Assuming completion, however, the challenges will then only increase. Expectations of the provision of light water reactors (as a condition for dismantlement) are again in play, and in some statements to this effect seemed virtually non-negotiable. This may well be little more than a marker for future negotiations, but Pyongyang has few incentives to remove items from the diplomatic agenda before determining what various items might be worth.

“Pending the removal of the ‘U.S. nuclear threat,’ Pyongyang insists that it must continue to enhance its defense and deterrence capabilities, though reports of an impending missile test were left somewhat ambiguous.

“The North Koreans recognized that the Obama Administration is reviewing its approach to future negotiations, and they seem prepared to be patient, at least for now.

“Their preferred outcome would give predominant weight to the bilateral relationship with the United States, minimizing or even dispensing with the Six Party process.

“The latter outcome would be clearly unacceptable to the United States and the other four participants in the negotiations, a point that was made repeatedly clear by all delegation members. But (unlike the 1990s) the North Koreans seemed in no particular hurry to proceed with full diplomatic relations with Washington, though this too may be a pose.

“A more disquieting prospect is the utter trashing of relations with the Lee Myong Bak administration. (By comparison, the criticisms of Japan seemed far more temperate.) This was not characterized as a ‘hardline’ position, but an appropriate response to actions by the South, including the repeated speculations about Kim Jong Il’s health, which were viewed as disrespectful to the ‘Great General’.

“As our delegation made clear, an outcome that leaves inter-Korean relations and Japan-North Korea relations in a deep freeze is demonstrably unacceptable to the United States. It was difficult to tell if the North Koreans internalized this argument, but it was conveyed unambiguously.

“In a longer run sense, the DPRK’s declared strategy presumes the end of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the invalidation of the U.S. alliance, and the development of a U.S.-North Korean ‘strategic relationship’, for which Pyongyang would denuclearize in return.

“Is this a serious negotiating stance, or does the North’s seeming bravado and assurance mask deeper anxieties about the fate of their system?

“There may be some modest evidence of change in North Korea, especially in the increasing monetization of the economy for those able to secure even modest amounts of hard currency, but the prospects for the DPRK’s citizenry remain deeply disquieting, with no obvious way out.

“The fundamental questions for the United States and for North Korea’s neighbors persist: how can outside powers credibly negotiate with Pyongyang without validating its claims to nuclear weapons status? And are the self referential leaders of the DPRK truly prepared for normal relations with the outside world, beginning most immediately with the ROK?”

Track I and a Half in Pyongyang

Tonight’s “Presidential press conference”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1843/obama-on-nuclear-diplomacy touched on three hot nuclear-diplomacy issues: engaging Iran, launching post-START talks with Russia, and strengthening the nonproliferation treaty regime.

One subject not touched on was North Korea. Intriguingly, though, a revolving procession of U.S. academics and think-tankers in and out of Pyongyang is now underway, with each delegation followed shortly by the next, or so it seems. Two such delegations are mentioned “here”:http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090209_4835.php, and I’ve also heard of another.

This isn’t exactly Track II diplomacy, since the NK interlocutors are government officials — call it Track I and Half.

This sort of thing has been going on for years, actually, but the pace seems to have picked up. The “recently concluded visit led by Stephen Bosworth”:http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5jIUMgKnfmtyg8T8wMAghB4V2lInAD966LP2O0 of Tufts University may be of special interest, since he’s allegedly in line to be a “special envoy to North Korea”:http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jQU3AClp9uLyW4tZ44e9D6nn1Uww.

_Update: The reports about Bosworth appear to be pure speculation and rumor._

Update II: Now Bosworth supposedly will be a “part-time envoy”:http://www.totalwonkerr.net/1861/part-time-envoy.

This year’s top wonk memento has got to be an “Air Koryo”:http://www.korea-dpr.com//Air%20Koryo/about.htm air sickness bag.

Obama on Nuclear Diplomacy

Here are the two relevant excerpts from “tonight’s press conference”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/09/us/politics/09text-obama.html?pagewanted=print.

Caren Bohan of Reuters.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. President. I’d like to shift gears to foreign policy. What is your strategy for engaging Iran, and when will you start to implement it? Will your time table be affected at all by the Iranian elections? And are you getting any indications that Iran is interested in a dialogue with the United States?

MR. OBAMA: I said during the campaign that Iran is a country that has extraordinary people, extraordinary history and traditions, but that its actions over many years now have been unhelpful when it comes to promoting peace and prosperity both in the region and around the world; that their attacks or — or their — their financing of terrorist organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas, the bellicose language that they’ve used towards Israel, their development of a nuclear weapon or their pursuit of a nuclear weapon — that all of those things create the possibility of destabilizing the region and are not only contrary to our interests, but I think are contrary to the interests of international peace.

What I’ve also said is that we should take an approach with Iran that employs all of the resources at the United States’ disposal, and that includes diplomacy. And so my national security team is currently reviewing our existing Iran policy, looking at areas where we can have constructive dialogue, where we can directly engage with them. And my expectation is, in the coming months, we will be looking for openings that can be created where we can start sitting across the table, face to face; of diplomatic overtures that will allow us to move our policy in a new direction.

There’s been a lot of mistrust built up over the years, so it’s not going to happen overnight.

And it’s important that even as we engage in this direct diplomacy, we are very clear about certain deep concerns that we have as a country, that Iran understands that we find the funding of terrorist organizations unacceptable, that we’re clear about the fact that a nuclear Iran could set off a nuclear arms race in the region that would be profoundly destabilizing. So there are going to be a set of objectives that we have in these conversations, but I think that there’s the possibility, at least, of a relationship of mutual respect and progress.

And I think that if you look at how we’ve approached the Middle East, my designation of George Mitchell as a special envoy to help deal with the Arab-Israeli situation, some of the interviews that I’ve given, it indicates the degree to which we want to do things differently in the region. Now it’s time for Iran to send some signals that it wants to act differently as well and recognize that even as it is has some rights as a member of the international community, with those rights come responsibilities.

And:

All right. Helen. This is my inaugural moment here. (Laughter.) I’m really excited.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you think that Pakistan and — are maintaining the safe havens in Afghanistan for these so-called terrorists? And also, do you know of any country in the Middle East that has nuclear weapons?

MR. OBAMA: Well, I think that Pakistan — there is no doubt that in the FATA region of Pakistan, in the mountainous regions along the border of Afghanistan, that there are safe havens where terrorists are operating. And one of the goals of Ambassador Holbrooke as he is traveling throughout the region is to deliver a message to Pakistan that they are endangered as much as we are by the continuation of those operations, and that we’ve got to work in a regional fashion to root out those safe havens.

They’re — it’s not acceptable for Pakistan or for us to have folks who, with impunity, will kill innocent men, women and children.

And you know, I — I believe that the new government of Pakistan and — and Mr. Zardari cares deeply about getting control of this situation, and we want to be effective partners with them on that issue.

QUESTION: Did you get any promise from them?

MR. OBAMA: Well, Mr. Holbrooke is there, and that’s exactly why he’s being sent there, because I think that we have to make sure that Pakistan is a stalwart ally with us in battling this terrorist threat.

With respect to nuclear weapons, you know, I don’t want to speculate. What I know is this: that if we see a nuclear arms race in a region as volatile as the Middle East, everybody will be in danger.

And one of my goals is to prevent nuclear proliferation generally.

I think that it’s important for the United States, in concert with Russia, to lead the way on this. And you know, I’ve mentioned this in conversations with the Russian president, Mr. Medvedev, to let him know that it is important for us to restart the conversation, about how we can start reducing our nuclear arsenals in an effective way, so that —

MR. OBAMA: — so that we then have the standing to go to other countries and start stitching back together the non- proliferation treaties that frankly have been weakened over the last several years.